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ABSTRACT  
Micro health insurance (MHI), a healthcare financing tool in the developing 
world, is the focus of this thesis.  MHI is increasingly being seen as a transitional 
mechanism to establish large-scale health insurance systems, which can 
potentially turn out-of-pocket (OOP) payments into a pre-payment system that 
spreads the financial risks associated with ill health across a wide range of 
clients. Globally, developing countries have the largest proportion of healthcare 
spending financed by OOP payments. Bangladesh displays characteristics typical 
of the developing world, including low public spending on health, high OOP 
expenses, inadequate coverage for quality healthcare and inefficiency in resource 
use. The current national health financing strategy thus highlights the need for 
an alternative financing tool that can ensure efficiency by simultaneously 
increasing the pool of resources available for funding healthcare and reducing 
dependency on OOP payments. The strategy aims to achieve universal health 
coverage (UHC) by means of a social health insurance scheme, and MHI has been 
identified as an intermediate step that will facilitate transition towards this goal.  
In this context, the thesis aims to explore the prospects and challenges of 
implementing MHI in rural Bangladesh based on national and international 
evidence. Using both primary and secondary data, the experience of, and 
prospects for, MHI in Bangladesh is assessed from the viewpoint of three major 
stakeholders: the consumer, the insurance provider and policy makers. The 
Chakaria Health Card Scheme of Chakaria, a remote rural area in Bangladesh, and 
the population of Chakaria were studied to obtain data for this research. In 
addition, international experience regarding the prospects and challenges of 
implementing MHI in a low-income country like Bangladesh is reviewed to 
provide insights into useful lessons for Bangladesh in progressing its UHC 
agenda.  
Among the three players, findings from consumers and providers showcase 
significant learnings on the level of understanding about MHI, factors influencing 
demand for MHI, and people’s preferences for alternative health financing 
mechanisms. The opinions of those responsible for program implementation 
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highlight challenges in implementing MHI on the ground, difficulties in making 
MHI popular, MHI standing in the face of competitors in the market, and other 
technological and operational challenges.. Finally, the opinions of the policy 
makers give a flavor of the policy environment around MHI and its 
implementation in Bangladesh. The international experience from three other 
countries of similar socio-economic context, using a health financing framework 
offers valuable learnings for Bangladesh if it is to implement a social health 
insurance scheme en route to its journey towards universal health coverage. 
The research findings help understand the acceptability of, and interest in, MHI 
among the common people of Bangladesh, and the programmatic challenges in 
designing an MHI scheme to attract clients and protect them from the potentially 
impoverishing effects of healthcare costs. The policy implications of these 
findings are highly relevant to Bangladesh at a time when the government is in a 
trial phase for introducing an insurance mechanism to move the country towards 
universal health coverage. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
 
Health is one of the major factors that dictate the direction of economic and 
other development of any country, be it developed or developing. Poor 
population health contributes to social and economic instability and undermines 
development efforts (1, 2). Time and again, ensuring quality healthcare for every 
human being has therefore remained central to the global development actions. 
The ‘health for all’ agenda set at the Alma Ata declaration of 1978 (3), the 
Millennium Development Goal of year 2000 (4), WHO and UN endorsed agenda 
of Universal Health Coverage primarily set in 2005 (5) and finally the resolution 
at UN general assembly in 2015 on sustainable development goals (6) all bear 
testimony to the quest for improving health and access to health for people all 
around the globe.  
The millennium development goals brought about unprecedented progress in 
many of the health indicators worldwide, particularly in the developing regions. 
Globally, under-five mortality rate declined more than half between 1990 and 
2015 (90 deaths/ 1,000 live births in 1990 vs. 43 deaths/1,000 live births in 
2015), and maternal mortality dropped by 45% between 1990 and 2013 (7). The 
proportion of under-five children who are underweight has reduced by almost a 
half between 1990 and 2015 (7). Besides health, achievements were also visible 
in other development areas where extreme poverty (defined by people living 
below $1.25 a day) dropped from nearly half the population of developing world 
in 1990 to 14% in 2015 and gender disparity was eliminated for primary, 
secondary and tertiary education between 1990 and 2015 (7). However, 
significant obstacles still persist in terms of equitable distribution of gains.  This 
poses a particular threat to the health systems and overall socioeconomic 
development of developing countries against which growth is biased. For 
example, despite the good progress achieved in reduction of maternal mortality 
worldwide (an estimated 523 000 deaths in 1990 to 289 000 in 2013), the rate in 
the developing regions is 14 times higher than in the developed regions (7). 
Current estimates show about 795 million people are undernourished globally 
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and the majority of these people (780 million) live in the developing region (7). 
Although impressive reduction in under-five mortality has been observed about 
half the burden of world’s under-five death falls on the Sub-Saharan Africa region 
(7). Furthermore, the worst effect of the situation falls increasingly on the rural 
areas of the developing countries, which have very low standards of well-being 
(7, 9) and quality health care (10, 11). As a post MDG agenda, the goal of 
universal health coverage (UHC) set in 2005 aims to tackle the existing health 
systems challenges which include among others universal access to quality 
healthcare and its affordability. The world health report 2010 explained 
universal health coverage from three dimensions: the health services that are 
needed, the number of people that need them, and the cost to whoever must pay 
(12). Accordingly in reaching universal coverage a country need to ensure 
equitable access to quality healthcare for all and at the same time provide 
financial protection while accessing healthcare. Any country, no matter what its 
stage of development, can instigate the journey towards UHC. However, the 
challenges in achieving UHC and the efforts to combat them will vary depending 
on the level of development, national capacity and other structural differences 
between the various countries. 
Reports on the global burden of illness reveal that 84% of the world’s poor 
shoulder 93% of the burden and only 11% of total healthcare reaches low and 
middle income countries (13). In the quest for achieving UHC particular 
attention is thus required on improving access and affordability of quality 
healthcare in developing countries. Studies have shown that the state in most 
low-income countries has not been able to fulfill the health care needs of the 
poor, and especially of the rural population. Shrinking budgetary support for 
health care services, inefficiency in the public provision of health services, and 
unacceptably low quality of those services all demonstrate the state’s inability to 
meet health care needs of the poor (14). The health systems of developing 
countries are typically characterized by low revenue, low investment in health, 
high out-of-pocket expenses for healthcare, low accessibility to qualified 
healthcare, and lack of effective governance.  At the same time, these countries 
are experiencing demographic trends which, when coupled with unequal 
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development, are increasing the burden of poverty, particularly the proportion 
of people living below the extreme poverty line. Further to this, out-of -pocket 
expenses for healthcare comprise more than 50% of total health expenditure in 
many low-income countries including Bangladesh (15). A study of 89 countries 
suggested that the more a country relies on OOP, the more its households face 
financial catastrophe (16, 17). In general, the higher the share of OOP in total 
health expenditure, the more households face catastrophic expenditure and 
impoverishment . Health related costs have indeed been found to be a primary 
cause of impoverishment in many countries (14). The impoverishing effect of 
catastrophic healthcare cost pushes about 100 million people below the poverty 
line each year.  The high out-of-pocket expense for healthcare in Bangladesh 
pushed around 3.5% people under the poverty line in 2010 (18). Further, high 
out-of-pocket expenses discourage use of needed health services, particularly by 
the poor (19). This situation is aggravated by the virtual absence of an effective 
risk pooling mechanism to spread the risk of financial catastrophe between the 
ill and the healthy and between the poor and the rich. This puts a huge burden on 
the people who are delayed in accessing, or denied access to, health care. A WHO 
study reports that, health impoverishment results from lack of risk pooling and 
insurance (13, 20). Globally, the estimate for the share of total health 
expenditure funded by health insurance reveals that spending on healthcare 
channeled through risk sharing is more in rich countries compared to the low 
and middle income ones (see Figure 1) (21). In the absence of any risk 
management mechanism or cushion to counter the backlash of catastrophic 
expenses for healthcare, people in low and middle-income countries, particularly 
the poor, rely on various coping mechanisms. Strategies to cope with financial 
shock include, among others, borrowing money (often at very high interest rates 
at informal money markets), selling precious assets (22), and compromising 
consumption (23). These coping strategies, in one way or another, expose people 
to further financial hardship. Sudden catastrophic health expenses can thus 
make poor families lose, in a matter of hours, assets that took them years to 
accumulate (15).  
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FIGURE 1: SPENDING AND RISK SHARING ARRANGEMENTS 
 
 
In May 2005, in their 64th session, the WHO passed a policy resolution where 
they suggested health insurance as one of the solutions to counter the health 
systems challenges in developing countries (24-26). Health insurance is a 
financial instrument that can generate adequate resources for health care, pool 
risk, and provide more equitable and better quality healthcare (14). The 
advantage of using health insurance as a financing tool for healthcare is that it 
does not put the whole financial burden on the government but spreads it 
around different partners (27). In 2010 the WHO report added, investing in the 
development of prepayment and pooling, as opposed to simply funding projects 
or programmes through separate channels, is one of the best ways donors can 
help countries move away from user fees and improve access to health care and 
financial risk protection (21, 22). Paul Mosley, in his study on micro insurance 
for the poor, also mentioned that insurance is one such institution that can 
protect people, particularly those whose existing coping strategies are failing, 
from social and financial exclusion (28). The potential of micro health insurance 
in providing financial protection to the poor in low-income countries has been 
highlighted in other studies as well (29) (10, 30). In addition, studies have shown 
that the “health care crisis” in the last decade has led to the emergence of many 
 A. Total health spending as a share of GDP    B. Spending Channeled through risk-sharing arrangements 
 
 
Source: (3) 
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micro health insurance schemes or community financing schemes in different 
regions of the developing world, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (29, 31, 32).  
The role of micro health insurance has been pivotal in countries that have a 
national health insurance system (e.g. Thailand, Ghana, Philippines, Vietnam, 
India). Evidence so far exhibits that, with a built in characteristics of flexibility in 
terms of its role, a micro health insurance scheme can serve as a transitional 
mechanism for countries that have chosen to take the path of a national 
insurance system to achieve universal health coverage (33-39). When public 
funding in health is low, micro health insurance can assist countries to build 
capacity and provide financial protection for a certain segment of the population.  
Skills gained in running micro health insurance schemes particularly in low 
income setting, such as developing an effective information system, and skills 
involved in regulating health insurance, may later be useful in managing publicly 
funded schemes as they expand. Above all, these small-scale schemes can help 
build a culture of insuring against the risk of ill health in countries where the 
concept of health insurance is comparatively new (17).  Having said this, it is also 
worth discussing the financing mechanism of varied types of health insurance 
and their potential impact on equity which is key to achieving UHC. Mandatory 
health insurance (commonly known as national health insurance, social health 
insurance) and voluntary for profit (e.g. private health insurance) and not for 
profit health insurances (e.g. micro health insurance, community based health 
insurance) are the different types of health insurances offered in different parts 
of the world.  Depending on how these insurance schemes are financed or in 
other words, how revenue is collected under the schemes have implications for 
both equity in financing and financial protection and equity in health service use 
(40, 41). The more progressive the financing mechanism, the greater the 
potential to reach equity and ensure financial protection as people with least 
ability-to-pay will then bear the lowest burden of healthcare cost (40).  Health 
insurance schemes that charge a flat rate usually results in levying regressive 
burden on people as everyone irrespective of their ability-to-pay contributes the 
same amount. Schemes charging a fixed rate of salary can also be regressive in 
cases where it is levied on only salary and not on total income. However, 
schemes with sliding scale contribution with higher income group paying higher 
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percentage of income and those that have built in exemption for vulnerable 
groups can potentially be progressive and equity enhancing (40). Health 
insurance schemes with a progressive financing mechanism thus can provide 
financial security for the poor in developing countries and improve access and 
equity in health service utilization, which constitutes one of the major goals 
under UHC.  
Bangladesh, the country which is the focus of the current thesis, is a low-income 
country and shares many of the challenges of health systems faced by countries 
in similar settings. Although the ‘health for all’ mission appeared in the country’s 
policy document as early as the 1990s, its proper implementation in the field has 
so far been missing. The essential service package for health of the government 
of Bangladesh is supposed to provide free health care regardless of cost or ability 
to pay. However, public healthcare often involves unofficial payments and the 
benefits from these services are mostly concentrated among the better-offs 
(Begum and Ensor 2007) (42). A study on the cost of public health facilities 
showed that the out-of-pocket expenditure on primary healthcare for a patient at 
sub-district level could be around 200% higher than the cost of service delivery 
of the facility itself (43). This extra share of OOP constitutes expenses like drug 
costs, costs of medical investigations, and unofficial payments to access 
healthcare (42, 44). To tackle the existing challenges posed by difficulty in 
access, uncertainty around quality of care and the financial constraints, the 
government of Bangladesh has recently embarked on the mission towards 
achieving universal health coverage. The country is planning to move towards a 
system of social health insurance to reach UHC. The current national health 
financing strategy 2012-2032 documents this commitment and has also 
highlighted the role of community or micro health insurance to gradually build a 
social health insurance mechanism that would protect its people from the 
financial catastrophes resulting from sudden illness and at the same time ensure 
access to quality healthcare (45). The following section gives a synopsis of the 
health system of Bangladesh, its achievements and current state of health, the 
challenges faced and the role of micro health insurance in reaching a solution to 
the existing challenges. 
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HEALTH IN BANGLADESH 
CURRENT STATE OF HEALTH 
The health gains in Bangladesh achieved since its independence in 1971 have 
been applauded in the global development arena in recent times (46-55). Even 
with a very low level of public expenditure the general health indicators 
returned a relatively higher value for the resources invested over the years. The 
under-five (U5MR) and infant mortality (IMR) has declined impressively by 57% 
and 46% respectively during 1990/1-2007 which has set the country on track to 
meet the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of reducing U5MR and IMR to no 
more than 31 and 50 deaths per 1,000 by the year 2015. The Total Fertility Rate 
(TFR) plateaued around 3.3 between the years 1993-94 and 2004 but has now 
come down to the replacement rate target of 2.2 children per woman of 
reproductive age (56). Life expectancy has increased over 50% from 45 years in 
1970. Now an average person can expect to live 70 years according to the 2011 
WHO data (56). More impressive is the achievement that women in Bangladesh 
now are expected to live longer than men, which is the biological standard and 
experienced around the world. The Maternal Mortality Ratio and the nutritional 
status of children still remain a challenge for Bangladesh even though the MMR 
has declined to the level of 240 per 100,000 live births in 2010 from 322 in 2001 
(57, 58).  
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The following table gives a comparative picture of health attainments of a few of 
the countries in the region alongside Bangladesh:  
TABLE 1: SELECTIVE HEALTH INDICATORS, BANGLADESH AND OTHER SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES, 2011 
Health indicators Bangladesh Maldives Sri Lanka India Nepal Pakistan Myanmar 
Total fertility rate 
(TFR) per woman 
2.2 1.7 2.3 2.6 2.7 3.3 2 
Maternal Mortality 
Ratio (MMR)     per 
100,000 live birth, 
2010 
240 60 35 200 170 260 200 
Life expectancy at 
birth (years) 
70 77 75 65 68 67 65 
Under-five mortality 
rate per 1,000 live 
births 
46 11 12 61 48 72 62 
Source: (56) 
 
HEALTH SERVICE DELIVERY 
Health services in Bangladesh are delivered through a mix of public-private 
institutions and Non-government Organizations (NGOs). The public sector 
provides both curative and preventive care and is considered to be the key 
source of care for the majority of the population. The private sector, on the other 
hand, mostly provides curative care while NGOs provide preventive and basic 
primary level care (60). 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE OF HEALTH SERVICE DELIVERY 
Public health services in Bangladesh are provided through a four -tier system of 
extensive facilities which are setup at union (lowest level administrative and 
local government unit), Upazila (sub-district), district and regional level (60, 61). 
A total of 4,400 Union Health and Family Welfare Centres (UHFWC) are located 
at the union level to deliver primary healthcare (PHC) and each of these UHFWCs 
cover a population of around 30,000. At the ward level (9 wards make up a 
union), community clinics serve 6,000 people each. Upazila level facilities include 
417 Upazila Health Complexes (UHCs) with 31-50 bed capacity. Both in-patient 
and out-patient care, PHC, family planning services and some referral services 
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are provided through these settings. The Union Health and Family Welfare 
Centres and the Upazila Health Complexes are the key facilities to provide 
healthcare to the rural population of the country. At the district level there are 59 
District Hospitals and some general hospitals with bed capacities ranging from 
50 to 350.  Primary and tertiary level care for in-patient and out-patient services 
are provided through these hospitals. At the regional level 13 Medical College 
Hospitals are responsible for delivering tertiary level care with bed capacities 
ranging from 250-1,700. In addition, specialized laboratory facilities are also 
provided for treating complicated cases (60, 62). Complementing these four-
level facilities are the six postgraduate institutions providing both in-patient and 
out-patient specialized care at the national level. The private sector, on the other 
hand, is diverse, ranging from modern facility-based services to indigenous 
medical practitioners, village doctors/drug sellers and other non-qualified 
practitioners (63). 
All of these health sector institutions belonging to the public and private sector 
are managed and controlled centrally under the policy guidelines of the 
government (64) (65). The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) is 
the highest authority, headed by a Cabinet Minister, responsible for policy 
formulation, planning, implementation and decision-making regarding the health 
sector activities of Bangladesh. The secretary is the administrative head of 
MoHFW (64). The MoHFW operates through four implementation wings: 
Directorate General of Health Services (DGHS) and Directorate General of Family 
Planning (DGFP), Directorate of Nursing Services (DNS) and Directorate General 
of Drug Administration (DGDA). The DGHS provides technical support to the 
ministry and is responsible for implementation of the health 
programmes/services. The DGFP oversees the operations of district-level 
Maternal and Child Welfare Centres (MCWCs) and union-level health centres. At 
the most peripheral areas both wings work to provide healthcare at the 
domiciliary level (60). The DGDA supervises and implements drug regulations in 
the country and the DNS contributes in policy making related to nursing, health 
and family planning (65). 
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COST OF HEALTHCARE 
The constitution of Bangladesh entitles its citizens to primary healthcare free of 
charge.   In the rural areas the Upazila Health Complexes (UHC) and facilities 
below this level are meant to provide both curative and preventive healthcare 
free of charge. Similarly in the urban context the government dispensaries are to 
provide curative and preventive healthcare free of charge to the urban 
population. Fees like registration fees for in-patient and out-patient services are 
fixed and fees for services including surgery, ambulance, radiological tests, etc 
are variable (42). Although there is provision of free of charge primary 
healthcare at the public facilities of the rural and urban areas, services most 
often involve unofficial payments (23, 66). First and foremost is the expense for 
medicine.  Other unofficial payments include bribes to receive better care 
(including good behaviour towards patients), and to secure drug and other 
supplies for the patient. Studies have found these unofficial payments to be 
higher than the official payments in most instances (44, 66, 67).   Unfortunately it 
has been observed that patients of lower socioeconomic status bear a higher 
percentage of these illegal payments compared to the better-off patients (67). 
The private health facilities including the NGOs, on the other hand, provide 
healthcare on a fee-for-service basis. However, most of the NGOs have safety net 
programmes where they provide healthcare at free of cost or at a minimal charge 
to patients with limited ability to pay, particularly patients of lower 
socioeconomic status. In addition the NGOs are running a few micro health 
insurance schemes in parts of the country to provide healthcare (26). 
 
HEALTHCARE FINANCING 
In Bangladesh per capita expenditure on health is very low at US$ 27 which 
constitute 3.8% of its GDP(68). The major financing agents in Bangladesh health 
systems are households, the government, NGOs and foreign Development 
Partners (DP) (69). Households are the largest source of financing and about 
64% of the total national health expenditure is financed privately through out-of-
pocket (OOPs) payments (69). This share is far too high compared to the global 
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level where OOPs account for about 32% of total health expenditure (17). 
Government with a share of 26% is the second largest financing source for 
healthcare in Bangladesh (69). Development partners contribute a sizable 
amount of their assistance for health through government and the NGOs. While 
funds provided to the government from development partners is combined in 
the government expenditure statistics, direct assistance to the NGOs for health 
related activities varied from 5% to 9% of total health expenditure during the 
period 1997-2007 (69). Public expenditures and funds from development 
partners are primarily used to finance the public provider system whereas the 
OOPs are mostly used to finance pharmaceutical products and diagnostic tests. 
 
HEALTH FINANCING VIA HEALTH INSURANCE 
Private health insurance, even though it exists in Bangladesh, is accessible for a 
limited number of the population engaged in formal sector employment. A large 
segment of the population is involved in informal employment, which is largely 
characterized by the absence of any collective arrangements to pay for 
healthcare. Community financing mechanisms, used in some parts of the world to 
serve the informal sector, are nearly non-existent in Bangladesh except for a few 
attempts by NGOs on a limited scale and contribute less than 1% of the total 
health expenditure (62, 70). Analysing the shares of the various financing agents 
for the country it has been observed that the role of insurance companies as a 
financing agent is very limited. Health care spending by insurance companies, 
which are mostly private sector firms, was Taka 314 million in 2007, or less than 
0.2% of total health expenditure (69, 70). However, about one-third of private 
health insurance expenditures are for health insurance administration, and 
almost all the rest is used to pay for services at private hospitals. Figure 2 
illustrates the flow of funds to the health system of Bangladesh from sources of 
financing to the entities that manage health funds to the providers of services. 
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FIGURE 2: FLOW OF FUNDING IN HEALTH SYSTEMS OF BANGLADESH 
 
Source: (59)  
 
THE CURRENT HEALTH FINANCING STRATEGY AND ITS LINK TO MICRO HEALTH 
INSURANCE 
There are inefficiencies in the way funds are managed or allocated within the 
ministry of health and family welfare (MoHFW) of Bangladesh. Within the 
current system every Upazila (sub-district) level facility receives the same 
amount of fund irrespective of the need of the catchment population. Per capita 
spending on health, as a result, varies across the different divisions(45).  The 
government subsidies for health do not fully reach the targeted population with 
more than 30% of the subsidies going to the richest quintile. In most cases 
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subsidies to hospital care are pro rich while for non-hospital care they are pro 
poor (O’Donnell et al, 2007). Until 201`2, Bangladesh had no formal health 
financing strategy, which could be targeted to minimize these types of 
inefficiencies in fund management and allocation. In 2012, the government 
implemented the health financing strategy 2012-2032 and the mission of this 
strategy is to achieve universal health coverage by means of establishing social 
protection for health (45). The major objective of the financing strategy is to 
halve the out-of-pocket expenses for healthcare at point of service from the 
current level of 64% to 32% by the year 2032. The strategy further aims to 
ensure efficiency in resource allocation within the MoHFW in order to attain 
maximum value for money and an equitable and sustainable financing 
mechanism. Indeed the success of any health financing strategy depends not only 
how the resources are accumulated but also on how the collected revenues are 
spent and allocated (45). Risk pooling through an insurance mechanism has 
proved to be an efficient health financing mechanism, which possesses the ability 
to ensure higher value for money for healthcare. The government of Bangladesh 
is also inclined towards testing social health insurance schemes in this regard. 
The current strategy plans to combine funds from tax-based budgets with the 
social health protection scheme, existing community-based and other 
prepayment schemes, and donor funding to ensure financial protection against 
health expenditures for all segments of the population (45).  The importance and 
interest in testing social health protection schemes was also highlighted in the 
country’s health sector Strategic Investment Plan (SIP) of 2003-2010. This Plan 
identified seven long-term strategic priorities, and accruing additional funds for 
the Health, Nutrition, and Population (HNP) services of the government was 
among these seven. Alternative financing mechanisms like social (payroll) 
insurance and community financing schemes were considered as mechanisms to 
raise funds in the SIP (World Bank 2010). The current health financing strategy 
of Bangladesh further elaborates on the path towards universal health coverage 
where it includes small scale health insurance schemes like micro health 
insurance or community health insurance as an intermediary step towards 
establishing a social health insurance mechanism to cover the risks of ill-health 
nationwide.  
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Although in Bangladesh the Gono Shasthya Kendra initiated a micro health 
insurance scheme in the mid 1970s, it was limited to a small areas and the 
culture of insuring against the risk of health was, and continues to be, quite alien 
for the population of Bangladesh (71). Even with a few other NGOs in the field, 
the experience with health insurance so far has remained mostly limited to 
small-scale community based or micro health insurance schemes. The history of 
micro health insurance in Bangladesh is closely linked with that of micro finance. 
Bangladesh is a pioneer in making a credit market accessible to the poor through 
micro finance. As a part of the micro finance program, the NGOs in some parts of 
the country initiated micro health insurance to ensure good health for their 
clients. As a result most of the existing micro health insurance schemes are found 
to be tied with a micro finance program. Some of the major players in the micro 
health insurance market of Bangladesh that have initiated MHI as a part of their 
MFI program include Sajida Foundation, BRAC, Dhaka Community Hospital, 
Grameen Kalyan, Integrated Development Foundation and Society for Social 
Development and Dushtha Shasthya Kendra. Nari Uddug Kendra and ICDDR,B 
are among those organizations that initiated MHI without any link with MFIs. 
Most of these schemes provide out-patient services including limited curative 
care, ANC, PNC services, annual health checkups along with medicine and 
pathological services to some extent. Some also provide referral services. BRAC 
and ICDDR,B has in-patient care included in their packages. All the schemes 
provide a fee waiver for those not able to pay. However, despite several years of 
operation, these schemes could cover only one-third of their catchment area. 
Further modifications with regards to operational technique, marketing, client 
retention and financial management are required for the schemes to achieve 
their full potential. In this regard, factors such as pre requisite to introduce 
prepayment for health, diversifying source of funding, monitoring of dynamics of 
health insurance market and ensuring easy access to health service for the poor 
demand deeper understanding. For this the country needs to accumulate 
findings from the existing trials and or programs to build a system that would 
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allow efficient risk pooling and fund allocation under a well managed national 
insurance scheme. 
 
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THESIS 
The current thesis is an attempt to assist the government in its endeavor 
towards establishing a nationwide insurance mechanism for health and feed the 
national system with learnings gathered from national as well as international 
experiences. 
Insights based on national experience will be gleaned from data on a previous 
micro health insurance scheme in Bangaladesh, to inform the design and 
development of micro health insurance schemes within the broader context of 
the national health insurance scheme to which the country is committed.  This 
micro health insurance scheme was implemented in Chakaria, a sub-district 
under Cox’s Bazar district of Bangladesh during 1998-2005.  The scheme 
operated with technical support from an international research organization 
based in Dhaka, Bangladesh, namely the ICDDR,B. The rationale behind choosing 
the micro health insurance scheme in Chakaria lies with the existence of a 
demographic surveillance system within the study area, which among other 
reasons, allowed us to investigate the demand influencing factors of the micro 
health insurance scheme. It is true that there were a few other micro health 
insurance schemes operating in the country at the time when this analysis was 
carried out, quality data were not available from those schemes that would have 
served the purpose of this study. As a result even though the data were 
comparatively old we decided to choose the scheme in Chakaria for our analysis. 
Detailed methodology of the study is presented in chapter 2.  For international 
experience the thesis focuses on three countries with similar socioeconomic and 
or cultural context as that of Bangladesh, namely India, Thailand and Ghana. A 
health-financing framework based on the three essential roles of health 
financing, namely revenue collection, pooling and purchasing, was used to study 
the experience in each of these countries. In addition, the enabling factors for the 
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national health financing system in each of these countries were explored. The 
experiences offer valuable learnings for Bangladesh. 
Given the potential micro health insurance holds as an efficient health financing 
tool, comparatively little effort has been made so far to understand the 
challenges that face the schemes in rural Bangladesh. A few studies have 
attempted to investigate the market. However, none of them to my knowledge, 
have integrated the different segments of the market. Some expresses the 
challenges faced by the clients and some by the providers. The current study is 
expected to bridge this gap and provide a comprehensive analysis of factors that 
interact among all the major stakeholders, i.e. beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, 
provider organization, policy makers, involved in the health financing 
mechanism of the country. In particular the thesis aims at exploring the 
feasibility of micro health insurance in Bangladesh from the point of view of the 
three different players in the insurance market: the consumer, the provider and 
the policy maker. In addition, the findings from international experience will 
highlight prospects and challenges of implementing micro health insurance in a 
low-income country like Bangladesh. At the end the thesis will showcase salient 
learnings, including good practices and challenges, based on national and 
international evidence and a possible roadmap for Bangladesh if it is to 
implement a social health insurance scheme en route to its journey towards 
universal health coverage. 
The thesis is segregated into 8 chapters. Chapter 2 gives an elaborated 
description of the methods and materials used in conducting the research for this 
thesis. Chapter 3 elaborates the theories around demand for health insurance 
and links these with demand for micro health insurance in particular. The theory 
lends explanations to the factors that influence demand for micro health 
insurance and in the current thesis we try to link our findings with the 
established theories.  The characteristics of micro health insurance and the 
influence of insurance market failure on MHI are also explored in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 elaborates on the relationship between MHI and micro finance, which 
is considered to be an important one in shaping MHI schemes in developing 
countries.  Chapters 5 and 6 present the analytical section of the thesis, which are 
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driven from both quantitative and qualitative sources. The quantitative findings 
in chapter 5 present evidences on the factors influencing demand for micro 
health insurance in Chakaria using logistic regression analyses. The qualitative 
findings in chapter 6 highlight the opinions of villagers who comprised the 
clientele of the micro health insurance scheme in Chakaria, the programme 
personnel in charge of running the scheme, and the policy people from the 
ministry of health and family welfare of the government of Bangladesh. Chapter 
7 is devoted to the international experience around MHI in India, Thailand and 
Ghana, while chapter 8 formulates the discussion around learnings from this 
thesis for Bangladesh and the policy implications of the study. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHODS AND MATERIALS 
  
This chapter of the thesis presents a broad overview of the methods that have 
been used in carrying out the current study. Some background materials that 
explain the health insurance scheme under investigation and the health systems 
of the area are also included in this section. The current study includes both 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of data and the methods used for each are 
elaborated in this section. A brief summary of the methods is also provided at the 
beginning of the corresponding chapters. 
 
THE STUDY AREA: CHAKARIA 
The area under investigation for the current study is Chakaria, a remote rural 
area of Bangladesh where a micro health insurance scheme was in operation 
during the time period 1998-2005. The scheme was supported by an 
international organization of Bangladesh, namely ICDDR,B. In addition, Chakaria 
is one of the field sites of ICDDR,B where they run a regular health and 
demographic surveillance system (CHDSS) and this site is a member of the 
INDEPTH network (1). As a result socioeconomic and demographic data of the 
study participants was readily available from the CHDSS database.  
The study area Chakaria is an Upazila, sub-district, under the Cox’s Bazar district 
of Chittagong Division of Bangladesh. Characterizing rural Bangladesh, Chakaria, 
is situated in the southeast part of the country and is home to a population of 
around 500,576 (2012 est)(2). The east side of Chakaria is hilly, while the west 
side towards the Bay of Bengal is lowland (2, 3). 
The health and development indicators of the area lag behind that of the rest of 
the country. The healthcare provision in the area is comparable to the national 
system and the common health system challenges that face the nation are also 
true for Chakaria. The results presented in this thesis can thus be generalized to 
represent the country (4). Some of the unique features of the area include 
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malaria endemicity, prevalence of rickets, exposure to natural disasters like 
cyclone and tidal surges and other climate change related issues.  
The Upazila comprises of a municipality and Unions. Unions and municipalities 
are lowest level of civil administration for rural and urban areas respectively. 
Chakaria municipality area came into existence in 1994 covering an area of 15.4 
square km with a population of approximately 85,000(5).  
FIGURE 3: Map Of Chakaria And The Working Area Of ICDDR,B 
Source: (6) 
HEALTH SYSTEMS OF CHAKARIA  
EXISTING HEALTHCARE FACILITIES 
The health facilities in Chakaria are comprised of government and private 
hospitals/clinics, private chambers of MBBS doctors, dentists, diagnostic centres, 
and allopathic and homoeopathic pharmacies.  The facilities can be divided into 
ones that are inside the municipality area and the ones that are outside. There 
are in total 161 fixed health facilities located within the municipality area of 
Chakaria and the pharmacies/drugstores are the most dominant type (see Box 1 
for details). The Upazila Health Complex (UHC) established in 1973 is the only 
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government facility in the area and there are 3 private sector hospitals which 
were established during 1997, 2005 and 2007.  The other facilities include NGO 
clinics, private chambers of doctors, private chambers for dental services and 
diagnostic centres providing pathological and biochemical services in the area 
(5).   
Source: (5) 
 
 
Outside the municipality area there is only one hospital namely the Christian 
Missionary Hospital (see Box 2 for details) established in 1966 and providing 
mainly orthopedic healthcare, maternity services with provision of caesarean 
section. The pharmacies/drug stores are also occupying the major share in the 
outside municipality area.  
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1: Health Services in Chakaria Municipality Area, 2007 
Health Facilities No. Type  
Served by graduate doctors 
Upazila Health Complex  Government  
Zam Zam Private Hospital 1 Private  
Life Center Hospital 1 Private 
Maa-Shishu Hospital 1 Private 
SARPV clinic 1 NGO 
MBBS Private chamber  37 Private  
Served by trained healthcare professional  
Diploma Dentists 7 Private 
Diagnostic Center 17 Private 
ICDDR,B Diagnostic Center 1 NGO (discontinued since 
2007) 
Served by untrained healthcare providers 
Allopathic Pharmacy  76 Private 
Homeopathic Pharmacy  18 Private 
Total  161  
Public  1 (0.6%)  
Private  160 (99.4%)  
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Box 2: Health Services outside Chakaria Municipality Area, 2007 
Health Facilities No. Type 
Served by graduate doctors 
Missionary Christian 
Hospital 
1 Missionary  
Village Health Posts 7 Community  
MBBS Private chamber  6 Private  
Served by trained healthcare professional  
Rural Dispensary  2 Government  
Family Welfare Center 13 Government  
Satellite Clinic 96 Government  
NGO satellite clinic 21 NGO 
SBA satellite clinic 3 Private  
Diploma Dentists chamber 1 Private  
Served by untrained healthcare providers 
Allopathic Pharmacy  297 Private 
Homeopathic Pharmacy  62 Private 
Total  509  
Public  111 (21.8%)  
Private  398 (78.2%)  
 
  
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
   
 
Source: (5) 
In total, there are 2564 health care providers practicing in Chakaria and only 4%
of them are working in the formal sector. The informal healthcare providers 
dominate the health market of Chakaria. A study on health seeking behaviour of 
villagers in Chakaria has revealed that people seek care from these informal 
healthcare providers in 65% of the cases (7, 8). Village doctors and drug sellers 
with questionable quality of care make up majority of the share for informal
healthcare providers in the area (3, 5). Physical access to the available formal 
health services and the physicians is a major concern for the villagers in Chakaria 
as the trained healthcare providers are mostly based at the Upazila 
headquarters. Given the economic condition of the villagers and the direct and 
indirect costs involved in visiting a healthcare provider, access to modern health 
services is a major challenge for villagers.     
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TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF HEALTH FACILITIES BY TYPE WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE MUNICIPALITY AREA OF 
CHAKARIA, 2007. 
Type of health 
service 
Within Municipality 
area 
Outside Municipality 
area 
Total  
Formal  67 359 426 
Informal  94 150 244 
Total  161 509 670 
Public  1 111 112 
Private 160 398 558 
Total  161 509 670 
Source: (5) 
AVAILABLE HEALTH SERVICES 
Both inpatient and outpatient services are available in Chakaria. However, 
provision of inpatient services is limited to a few of the facilities. The Upazila 
health complex is the only public facility providing both inpatient and out-
patient services from the 31 bed hospital which includes an operation theatre. 
Safe motherhood services, immunization, child health services, and family 
planning related services are also provided from this facility. The other private 
facilities providing in-patient and out-patient services include the Zam Zam 
Private Hospital, Life Centre Hospital, Maa-shishu General Hospital and the 
Missionary Christian Hospital. The rest of the facilities are mostly involved in 
out-patient service provision.  
 
COST OF HEALTH SERVICE: COMPARATIVE PICTURE 
Table 3 gives a comparative picture of expenses for health service at government 
facilities and at private health facilities. As it looks most of the services 
mentioned are provided free of charge in the public hospitals. The private 
hospitals are for fee and expensive and thereby are mostly accessed by the better 
offs. Even though the public hospitals provide services free of charge issues like 
supply shortage, under the table payment, provider absenteeism, and favorable 
treatment towards the better-offs make health service from public hospitals not 
as accessible as it should be for the poor and disadvantaged.  
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TABLE 3: AVAILABLE HEALTH SERVICE AT THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HOSPITALS IN CHAKARIA AND THEIR 
RESPECTIVE COSTS, 2007 
Source: (5) 
*NA= service not available; X=service available; Blank cell= data not available; EPI= Expanded program on 
immunization 
 
HEALTH FINANCING THROUGH MICRO HEALTH INSURANCE IN CHAKARIA: 
Health financing through any sort of health protection scheme is not common in 
Bangladesh and for that matter in Chakaria. The Chakaria Health Card scheme is 
the only MHI scheme that offered healthcare in Chakaria.  The scheme was 
initiated in 1998 on voluntary basis and it was known as the “CCHP Health Card” 
(referred as chakaria health card from now on). However, the scheme was 
presented to the villagers in the form of a pre-payment based family health card 
which delivered primary healthcare services for the whole household in 
exchange of an annual fee paid in advance. The reason the scheme was not 
introduced as an insurance product explicitly is the lack of trust among villagers 
towards the mechanism of “insurance”.  Villagers had experienced fraud in 
buying insurance products, though not for health, previously and therefore were 
not comfortable with the word “insurance” which is called “Beema” in Bangla. 
The operational process of the health card was however the same as that of a 
micro health insurance scheme where members pay a yearly premium at a 
certain point of time irrespective of the health status to receive primary 
healthcare for the rest of the year at a discounted rate. 
Health services Inside municipal area Outside municipality area 
Union 
Health 
Centre 
Cost (TK) 
(1 USD= 69 TK 
approx 2007 
price) 
ZamZam 
(private 
hospital) 
Cost (TK) Christian 
Missionary 
Hospital 
Cost (TK) 
Outpatient care  X 5 X 100-120 X 50-110(rego)+ 
50-60 
(consultation ) 
Indoor patient 
care 
X Free X 200-500   
EPI X Free  None    
Contraceptives X 1/doz  None    
Medicine X Free X Actual  X Actual 
Antenatal care X Free  X 60-120   
Postnatal care X Free X 60-120   
Delivery service  X Actual  X 2,000-2,800 X 2,000-2,500 
C- section  NA  X 7,000-9,500 X 15,000-25,000 
Minor surgery  X Actual  X 200-800   
Accident 
management  
X Free X 100-200   
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The scheme was introduced by the self help organizations formed by the local 
villagers with technical support from the Chakaria community health project 
(CCHP) of ICDDR,B  in Chakaria. The Chakaria Community Health Project was an 
initiative of ICDDR,B to facilitate local initiatives for the improvement of health of 
the villagers in general and of children, women, and the poor in particular 
(details on the project activities can be found elsewhere (9)). The project 
engaged with villagers from 6 of the 19 unions of Chakaria and 2 other unions 
served as comparison areas to monitor changes over time.  The intervention and 
the comparison areas were selected purposively considering mode of 
communication between the unions. The project theme was community 
participation where the villagers themselves worked for the betterment of the 
health and health services in their area. They mobilized local resources to 
establish health centres known as the “village health posts” that would provide 
healthcare in their vicinity. The “CCHP Health card” was one of the major 
productive outcomes of this initiative.  The villagers established 7 village health 
posts covering 6 unions of Chakaria.  
The health card scheme operated taking household as a unit such that a single 
premium would cover the whole household irrespective of its size. The premium 
was heavily subsidized and was set according to ability to pay of the 
patients/households.  Better-off families could buy a health card for an annual 
rate of taka 50 (equivalent of approx. US$1, 1999 value) which would cover the 
whole family. A safety net was built into the system to protect the poor where the 
households could buy a health card for their family at the rate of taka 10 per 
annum (20 cent 1999 value).  Households that had atleast one member involved 
in menial labor were identified as being poor. The rest of the fund to operate the 
scheme came from the Chakaria Community Health Project (CCHP), which 
received donor support for their activities. From the donor fund a drug revolving 
fund was created at the beginning of the scheme to maintain supply of drug at a 
discounted (10% lower than market price) rate for members. Details of the 
scheme can be found in the following table ( 
Table 4): 
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TABLE 4: THE SCHEME AT A GLANCE 
Key features of the scheme  
Coverage   Peak coverage achieved in 2004 was 1,396 households in 8 unions of 
Chakaria 
Nature of Membership  Voluntary  
Facility 7 Village Health Posts established within the boundary of the 
villages  
healthcare provider   1 MBBS physician assisted by 1 paramedic 
Frequency of service 
provided at each facility  
Once a week for half a day  
Type of services 
covered  
Primary healthcare  
Safe motherhood services including ANC, PNC, Skilled birth 
attendant  
Immunization  
Fee structure 
Socioeconomic status  Health card 
cost 
in BDT  
(US $1= 51 
BDT, 1999) 
Consultation fees  
in BDT 
Subsidies and OOP 
expenses for cardholders 
(in BDT) 
Non card 
holders 
Card 
holders 
Subsidy  OOP 
expenses  
Poor  10 40 25 20* 5 
Non-poor 50 40 25 0 25 
Source of financing  Major share in financing the scheme comes from donor agency. 
Earnings from premium collection, diagnostic and medicine charges 
also contribute to the resource pool.  
Note: * poorest of the poor receive subsidy of TK25 with no OOP expenses (10) 
 
The services that were covered under the scheme included primary healthcare, 
safe motherhood services like ANC, PNC and delivery with skilled birth 
attendant. However, due to human resource shortage the services were available 
to the villagers once a week at each village health posts for half a day. Medicine 
was provided at a discounted rate and sugar and albumin tests were done free of 
charge. For all other diagnostic tests patients had to pay out of pocket. Cases that 
required further specialized care were referred to concerned health service 
providers. The cost of healthcare for referred cases was not covered under the 
scheme.  
 
STUDY POPULATION 
The study was carried out among respondents from the Chakaria Demographic 
Surveillance (DSS) area. The Chakaria DSS of ICDDR,B covers a population of 
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26,979 in eight of the 19 unions of Chakaria and has been in operation since 
1999 (2, 6). Additional respondents were selected from programme personnel 
involved in running MHI schemes in Chakaria, Bangladesh and from policy 
makers in the health sector to study the challenges facing MHI schemes and the 
policy environment around MHI in Bangladesh respectively.  
VARIABLES 
Socioeconomic status: Socioeconomic status (SES) was defined in terms of 
engagement in menial labour of any household member for making a living. 
Households that had at least one member selling menial labour were identified 
as poor. The rest were categorized as non-poor. This is a proxy measure for SES 
as the standard indicators of SES like income, is not easy to measure in 
Bangladesh where a large majority of the population is engaged in informal 
economy which lack reliable income data (REF). Also in places where 
unemployment is high the assumed association between education, occupation 
and income does not always hold (11). In the context of rural Bangladesh 
households that make their living by selling menial labour belong to lower 
socioeconomic status. This is due to the seasonality of income that is inherent in 
this type of employment. This is why we used presence or absence of menial 
labor to indicate a household’s SES. This categorization has been used in other 
studies looking at effect of socioeconomic status on development indicators and 
the like (12, 13).   
Household: A household is defined as a unit comprising of a single individual or a 
group of blood or otherwise related or unrelated individuals who live in the 
same compound and share food from the same kitchen. Individuals who live 
outside the household but spend at least one night every month at the household 
are also considered members of the household (10). 
Household head: A household head is defined as the key decision-maker and the 
leader of the household (10). 
SOURCE OF DATA 
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The study compiles both primary and secondary level data. The primary level 
data is qualitative in nature and the secondary sources are quantitative data 
using 3 surveys carried out in 1999, 2004 and 2005.  It should be mentioned that 
although data from the year 2005 is comparatively old, we did not have more 
recent data relevant to the analysis of the thesis. The scheme seized operation in 
2005 and no additional data was collected after that. 
 
PRIMARY LEVEL QUALITATIVE DATA 
The qualitative data were collected with the aim to understand the factors 
influencing demand for micro health insurance (MHI), programmatic challenges 
in implementing MHI schemes and the policy environment around MHI in 
Bangladesh. Data were gathered from three different groups of respondents, 
namely the community members forming the client base for MHI in Chakaria, the 
programme personnel, and the policy makers.  Information on programme 
related issues and on policy environment was collected through key informant 
interviews. Attempt was made to select key informants who are most 
knowledgeable on the concerned issues and are able to guide us in 
understanding the programmatic challenges and opportunities facing MHI 
industry in Bangladesh and the prospect of MHI from policy perspective. The 
programme personnel who ran the health card scheme in Chakaria were 
interviewed. The health card scheme was one of the activities of an ongoing 
project in Chakaria and that project was still in operation during our current 
study. Most of the programme people involved with the health card scheme were 
available at the project field office and we could get information from them. 
However, for respondents on policy issues interviews were limited to those who 
were available during the data collection period due to the busy schedule of the 
policy makers.  
Semi structured interviews were conducted amongst the villagers to delve 
deeply into the factors that influenced the uptake of MHI scheme in Chakaria 
during 1998-2005. Using semi structured interviews allowed to discuss 
particular topics, like people’s understanding about MHI, preference between 
paying in advance for healthcare and paying as and when need arise etc., in 
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detail. More on the use of semi structured interviews and key informant 
interviews as qualitative research tool can be found elsewhere (14, 15). 
Complementing the interviews, a hypothetical scheme was presented to the 
community members using the Vignette method to understand factors that 
influence their decision to enroll in health insurance schemes (16) (17).  
Vignettes can be described as “stories about individuals, situations and 
structures, which can make reference to important points in the study of 
perceptions, beliefs and attitudes” (17).  The Vignette to describe the 
hypothetical micro health insurance scheme was developed taking into account 
the demand for specific healthcare services, the current market rate for these 
services, and people’s average healthcare expenditure. For all the interviews, the 
interviewer, the transcript writer, and the translator were the same person. As a 
result the views expressed by the respondents are accurately presented in this 
thesis. 
DEVELOPMENT OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
The guidelines for the interviews were developed in consultation with experts in 
the field and by studying published literature related to micro health insurance 
and its market in developing countries. Guidelines for each of the respondent 
groups are provided in appendix 5,6 and 7. 
RESPONDENTS 
In order to understand the influencing factors driving uptake of MHI in Chakaria 
key informant interviews were carried out among the household heads i.e. the 
decision makers.  Villagers had experience with the health card scheme that 
operated in Chakaria during 1998-2005. The interviews were carried out 
amongst the members and non members of this scheme. The respondents were 
selected purposively to include members and non members, households living 
close to and distant from the VHPs and an equal distribution of respondents from 
rich and poor households.  
Respondents for the key informant interviews on operational issues of MHI 
included programme personnel of Chakaria Health Card Scheme. 
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Respondents for assessing the policy environment for MHI included high officials 
from the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW), the Health Economics 
Unit (HEU) of the MoHFW and the Directorate General of Health Services (DG 
Health).  
SAMPLE SIZE 
For client level data a total of 40 semi structured interviews were carried out. 
Twenty were with the members and the rest 20 with the non-members of the 
Chakaria Health Card Scheme. A socioeconomic difference in opinion was 
expected and thus we further divided the interview participants into poor and 
non-poor groups.   Households, members and non members, were randomly 
selected from the DSS database of Chakaria. Number of interviews continued till 
the point of saturation where no more new theme could be detected from the 
data. 
Six programme personnel from the Chakaria health card scheme were 
interviewed.  
Policy level data were collected through five key informant interviews from the 
government high officials involved in health sector. Due to the busy schedule of 
the high officials it was not possible for us to increase the number of respondents 
in our limited time frame.  
DATA COLLECTION 
Data were collected during February-March 2012. 
The interviews with the program personnel and policy makers were scheduled 
for 20 minutes in total. For the villagers the total time allotted to interviews were 
30 minutes each.  We approached the household heads or any other informed 
member available for interview at a time convenient for the respondents. 
Informants for programmatic issues were contacted in person or via telephone 
prior to the interview for scheduling appointments. For policy related interviews 
the higher officials (respondents) or their personal assistants were contacted for 
scheduling interview times via telephone.  
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Written consent was taken from all the respondents involved in the study before 
initiating data collection. The consent form contained information on the 
purpose of the study, the right of the person as a respondent, privacy of the data 
collected, and on use of data. Sample consent forms for the three groups of 
respondents are presented in appendix 8, 9 and 10. 
DATA ENTRY AND ANALYSIS 
Hand written detailed notes were taken during the interviews. Transcripts were 
prepared from the notes soon after data collection to ensure more accurate 
recording of information.  Transcripts were then analysed manually. A thematic 
analysis approach was taken to identify the different patterns in the data. Data 
were then coded according to the specific themes that were developed in the 
interview guidelines and then analysed. Finally the findings from these themes 
have been presented in this thesis. The findings of the qualitative analysis can be 
found in chapter 6. 
 
SECONDARY LEVEL QUANTITATIVE DATA 
The secondary level quantitative data were used to determine the factors 
influencing decision to enroll into the Chakaria health card scheme. The findings 
from this analysis are presented in chapter 5. 
THE 1999 CENSUS 
The information in the 1999 census include but are not limited to: demographic 
and socio-economic profile of household members in Chakaria, membership 
status of households for the health card scheme, known as the CCHP health card 
scheme, membership status of households in the non-government organizations 
(NGOs), water and sanitation system of household, pregnancy related 
information for pregnant women in the households, feeding habit and 
vaccination status of under five children (The 1999 census questionnaire has 
been added in appendix 2). 
Sample size: The 1999 dataset used in this study is a census that includes 
information on all the 26,352 households in Chakaria Upazila.  
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Respondents: Interviewers collected data either from the head of each household 
or from other informed members of the household. 
Data collection period: The 1999 census was carried out during April 1999-
February 2000.  
Data collection: Thirty-three data collectors, with at least 12th grade of schooling 
and some experience in health and demographic data collection, were recruited 
from the locality to collect data.  
A six-member supervisory team, consisting of a statistician and 4 social science 
graduates, supervised the fieldwork. The supervisors randomly checked the 
quality of data by re-interviewing 5% of the respondents within two days of data 
collection. 
The field research supervisors observed at least one interview of each of the 
interviewers daily. Collected data with errors or inconsistencies were marked 
and documented in a structured form. These errors or inconsistencies were 
discussed among the team members in a group and sent back to the field for 
correction. The field supervisor compared the data of interviews with that of the 
re-interviews and provided necessary feedback. The field supervisors also made 
random spot checks to ensure the quality of data. To cover absentees, at least 
two re-visits were made during the time when they were likely to be at home 
according to their neighbours (10). 
Data entry: A team of data-management personnel examined the data manually 
for apparent inconsistencies or errors. Open-ended questions were then coded, 
and data were entered into a relational database created using the FoxPro 
software (10). 
THE 2004 AND 2005 SURVEY: 
The 2004 and the 2005 surveys are follow-up surveys after the 1999 census to 
track changes in the membership status of the health card scheme. Households 
included in the 2004 and 2005 surveys were included in the 1999 census.  
Information on demographic and socio-economic profile of household members 
in Chakaria, membership status of households for the health card scheme, 
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membership status of households in the non-government organizations (NGOs) 
were again collected through these two subsequent surveys. Therefore, one 
could easily track changes in membership status of health card scheme overtime 
combining the three datasets (2004 and 2005 survey questionnaires are 
attached in appendix 3 and appendix 4). 
Sample size: The 2004 and the 2005 surveys are part of the demographic 
surveillance system (DSS) that is in existence in Chakaria. The 2004 and 2005 
surveys collected data from 7042 systematically randomly chosen households in 
Chakaria.  
Respondents:  Interviewers collected data either from the head of each household 
or from other informed members of the household. 
Data collection: In total 24 field trained data collectors collected data. The data 
collectors were provided with written instructions on questions that required 
additional explanations.   
Six supervisors supervised the data collection process. Supervisors re-visited 5% 
randomly chosen households within 2 days of data collection to check for any 
anomalies. Later on supervisors and the data collectors together sorted out any 
inconsistencies in data collection.  
Data entry: All the questionnaires were manually checked for completeness and 
inconsistencies. Computer based data editing procedures were used to ensure 
quality of data is maintained (18). 
PANEL DATASET: 
The 2004 and 2005 surveys were carried out among households that were 
included in the 1999 census. All the three datasets had unique identifiers for the 
households (household ID) and it was possible to identify each household in the 
three different surveys. This allowed us to create a panel dataset. However, it 
was an unbalanced panel data set as after 1999 newer households were added in 
2004 and in 2005. We used this panel dataset to analyse the influence of factors 
on membership decision over time.  
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SELECTED DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE THREE SURVEYS  
Some selected descriptive statistics from 1999, 2004 and 2005 surveys are 
presented in the following tables (Table 5, Table 6, Table 7). 
TABLE 5: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR 1999 CENSUS 
Variable 
Type and 
level 
Variable name n %  Mean Min Max 
Individual level       
Continuous Average age of HH members (years)  163,081  21 0 132 
Continuous 
 
Average education of HH members 
aged >=6 years (years passed) 
132,350  2.51 0 19 
Categorical 
 
Religion  
Muslim  
Hindu 
Buddhist  
Christian  
 
152,028 
8,816 
1,793 
10 
 
93.5 
5.4 
1.09 
0.01 
 
 
  
Categorical 
 
Nationality  
Bengali 
Tribal 
 
160,906 
1,038 
 
99.4 
0.6 
   
Household level     
Continuous 
 
Average HH size  26,267  6.2 1 43 
Categorical 
 
HH size grouped 
1-5 members 
6-10 members 
10+ members 
 
11,534 
13,237 
1,496 
 
43.9 
50.4 
5.7 
   
Categorical 
 
Sex of main earner 
Male  
Female  
 
1,158 
24,787 
 
95.5 
4.5 
   
Categorical 
 
Socioeconomic status  
Better-off HH 
Poor HH 
 
13,380 
12,675 
 
51.4 
48.6 
   
Categorical 
 
NGO membership 
Member HH 
Non member HH  
 
5,916 
19,399 
 
23.4 
76.6 
   
Categorical 
 
Presence of pregnant women  
At least 1 pregnant woman  
No Pregnant woman  
 
3,210 
23,142 
 
12.2 
87.8 
   
Categorical 
 
Presence of VHP  
VHP village  
Non-VHP village  
 
24,658 
1,693 
 
93.6 
6.4 
   
Categorical 
 
Presence of <5 children  
Atleast one <5 child 
No <5 child 
18,012 
8,339 
 
68.4 
31.6 
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TABLE 6: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR 2004 SURVEY 
Variable 
type and 
level 
Variable name % 
 
n Mean  Min Max 
 
Individual level  
Continuous  Average age of HH members 
(years) 
 47,72
7 
22.2 0  122 
Continuous Average education of HH 
members aged >=6 years (years 
passed) 
 24,26
4 
5  0 
 
18 
Categorical Religion  
Muslim  
Hindu 
Buddhist  
 
91.1 
6.1 
2.8 
 
43,47
4 
2912 
1310 
   
Categorical Nationality  
Bengali 
Tribal 
 
98 
2 
 
46,72
9 
967 
   
Household level  
Continuous  Average HH size  7,211 6.62 1 31 
Categorical HH size grouped 
1-5 members 
6-10 members 
10+ members 
 
34.8 
58.6 
6.6 
 
2,514 
4,223 
474 
   
Categorical Sex of main earner 
Male  
Female 
 
90.2 
9.8 
 
6,502 
709 
   
Categorical Socioeconomic status  
Better-off HH 
Poor HH 
 
67.4 
32.6 
 
4,862 
2,349 
   
Categorical NGO membership 
Member HH 
Non member HH 
 
34.8 
65.2 
 
2,501 
4,679 
   
Categorical Presence of pregnant women  
At least 1 pregnant woman  
No Pregnant woman 
 
14 
86 
 
1,009 
6,202 
   
Categorical Presence of VHP  
VHP village  
Non-VHP village 
 
4.8 
95.2 
 
349 
6,862 
   
Categorical  Presence of <5 children  
Atleast one <5 child 
No <5 child 
 
67.2 
32.8 
 
4,845 
2,366 
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TABLE 7: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR 2005 SURVEY 
Variable type and 
level 
Variable name %  n Mean  Min Max 
Individual level  
Continuous Average age of HH members 
(years) 
 53,790 23 0 117 
Continuous 
 
Average education of HH 
members aged >=6 years 
(years passed) 
 36,925 2.8 0 18 
Categorical 
 
Religion  
Muslim  
Hindu 
Buddhist  
 
91.6 
6.1 
2.3 
 
49,281 
3,284 
1,225 
   
Categorical 
 
Nationality  
Bengali 
Rakhain (tribal) 
 
98.3 
1.7 
 
52,875 
915 
   
Household level       
Continuous 
 
Average household size   7,855 6.9 1 38 
Categorical 
 
Household size grouped 
1-5 members 
6-10 members 
10+ members 
 
32.7 
57.9 
9.4 
 
2,571 
4,548 
736 
   
Categorical 
 
Sex of main earner 
Male  
Female  
 
89.8 
10.2 
 
7,044 
803 
   
Categorical 
 
Socioeconomic status  
Better-off HH 
Poor HH 
 
34.5 
65.5 
 
2,707 
5,134 
   
Categorical 
 
NGO membership 
Member HH 
Non member HH  
 
44.6 
55.4 
 
3,494 
4,342 
   
Categorical 
 
Presence of pregnant women  
At least one pregnant woman  
No Pregnant woman in HH 
 
16.8 
83.2 
 
1,316 
6,531 
   
Categorical 
 
Presence of Village Health 
Post  
VHP village  
Non-VHP village  
 
4.8 
95.2 
 
377 
74,78 
   
Categorical  
 
Presence of under-five 
children  
Atleast one under-five child 
No under-five child 
 
65.2 
34.8 
 
5,113 
2,734 
   
 
DATA ANALYSIS FOR 1999, 2004 AND 2005 SURVEYS 
Both bivariate and multivariate analysis was carried out in investigating the 
factors that influence membership in the health card scheme. Bivariate analysis 
was carried out to observe one-to-one relationship between membership status 
and the influencing factors. Data was analysed using STATAIC 12 software. The 
list of influencing factors included socioeconomic and demographic profile of the 
household, proximity of the households to the health centres, presence of 
pregnant women in household, presence of under-five children in household, and 
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membership at development programmes offered by non-government 
organizations. These factors were chosen, based on literature review on this field 
and on suggestion by the programme people of the MHI scheme. Variables were 
mostly at household level as membership at the scheme was per household.  
The scheme as mentioned above was household based and for that we expected 
household size to play a role in decision to enrol. Comparatively larger 
households had to pay no extra fee for getting the regular services under the 
healthcare scheme for each of the household members. Among the other factors 
socioeconomic status was included as a person’s current wealth is expected to 
influence his or her decision to invest in any scheme. At the same time its 
important to judge whether the scheme is able to address issues with social 
exclusion from access to social protection (like MHI) and the influence of 
socioeconomic status on membership can help us understand this aspect (19-
22). Education provides access to information that helps people to understand 
the importance of securing oneself against the uncertain health risks (20, 23). 
For this we included the mean level of household education as one of the 
independent variables.  As official age of children joining school in rural 
Bangladesh is six years we excluded members aged less than six years in 
calculating mean household education. Age has been found to play important 
role in individual’s decision to insure against health risks (24). Ill health is most 
often found to be positively correlated with age and therefore we presumed that 
households with higher mean age of its members would have greater incentive 
to join the scheme. The other demographic factor included was the sex of the 
main income earner of a household. It’s been found that male-headed households 
are comparatively in better-off socioeconomic position which gives them access 
to fund needed to join MHI schemes (25, 26). However, its also true that women 
participation in development programmes has been encouraging (27-29). 
Therefore the interest to observe the impact of gender in decision to enroll in 
MHI scheme, lead us to include this variable in our analysis. The services 
provided at the VHPs were mainly primary level care. However, vaccination and 
healthcare for the children were also provided at the VHPs. We anticipated this 
aspect of service provision would attract families with children under the age of 
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five to become members of the health card scheme. Travel distance to the 
healthcare centre has historically played a deciding role in seeking healthcare 
from any particular facility (30-34). The health card scheme operated through 7 
VHPs covering 8 villages. Thus the presence of VHP in a village is expected to 
influence household membership in the health card as the scheme only provided 
services through these health centres. Presence of pregnant women in the 
household was included in the list as the scheme benefits included pregnancy 
and delivery related care in addition to the primary healthcare services. 
Membership of households in development programmes offered by NGOs was 
taken as an influencing factor. Studies conducted earlier have shown that 
households with membership of the development programmes especially the 
micro finance ones are more likely to join MHI programmes in developing 
countries (35). 
The multivariate analysis to show the influence of each of the explanatory 
variables on the response variable holding all other variables constant is 
explained in the following section.  
ANALYTICAL MODEL FOR MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
From economic perspective the villagers’ choice to enroll in the health card 
scheme can be explained by the expected utility theory where they compare the 
expected utility from having health insurance with that of not having any 
insurance. According to the theory the villagers will enroll into the scheme only 
when they find the expected utility of joining at a given premium to be greater 
than that of not joining. Based on the choice villagers make all our study 
participants can be grouped into two categories ‘members’ and ‘non-members’. 
In search of factors that influence uptake of health insurance scheme the 
dependent variable of concern in our current study is therefore defined as a 
binary choice variable. A logistic regression model has been used in explaining 
the relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables 
as the dependent variable in our case has a binary distribution and not a normal 
distribution. Our variable of interest is a probability, i.e. we are interested in 
finding out how the independent variables are linked with the probability of a 
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household being member of the health card scheme or not. Probabilities are 
different from continuous variables in the sense that they are bounded by the 
values 0 and 1. Therefore we can not assume normality for a probability. The 
logistic regression model analyses the influence of various independent variables 
on a dichotomous/binary outcome by estimating the probability of the event 
occurring. It does so by examining relationship between the independent 
variables and the log odds of the dichotomous variable by estimating changes in 
the log odds of the dependent as opposed to the dependent variable itself. The 
log odds ratio is a summary measure of the relationship between the two 
variables and is expressed as the ratio of two odds.  
The central mathematical concept underlying logistic regression model is the 
logit, known to be the natural logarithm of an odds ratio. It takes the following 
form: 
Logit (Y)= natural log (odds) = ln [       ] = α +βiXi---------------------(1) 
Where  
Y=outcome of interest, i.e. in our case health card membership 
Xi= i number of independent variables, i.e. influencing factors for membership 
p=probability of event occuring, i.e. in our case probability of households having 
health card membership 
α = intercept 
βi = regression coefficients  
Taking antilog of equation (1) on both sides we can predict the probability of 
occurrence of the outcome of interest, i.e probability of households having health 
card membership. This would look like: 
p=Probability (Y=outcome of interest | Xi=xi, values of Xi) = 
           
             
  
In this model the value of the coefficient β determines the strength of 
relationship between the independent variable(X) and the logit of the dependent 
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variable (Y). When β is greater than zero, larger (or smaller) X values are 
associated with larger (or smaller) logits of Y. Conversely, if β is less than zero, 
larger (or smaller) X values are associated with smaller (or larger) logits of Y 
(36). 
Details on logistic regression analysis can be found elsewhere (36-38).  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL  
The influence of various indicators on uptake of the MHI scheme in Chakaria was 
analyzed taking health card membership as the dependent variable. The 
independent variables were the same set of factors that has been used in the bi-
variable analysis. These were a mix of categorical and continuous variables. A 
summary of the dependent and independent variables used in the multivariate 
analysis is given in Table 8. 
TABLE 8: DEFINITION OF VARIABLES IN THE ANALYSIS 
Variable  Operational definition  
Dependent variable 
Enrolment in CCHP health card Yes=1 and No=0 
Independent variables  
Sex of main earner  Male =1  and Female=0 
Socioeconomic status* Poor=1   and better-off=0 
Proximity to health center (VHP villages) VHP villages=1  and non-VHP villages=0 
Membership in NGOs Yes=1   and No=0 
   Presence of under-five children in household 
   (categorical) 
Presence of under-five children in household  
(continuous) 
Yes=1  and No=0 
 
Continuous variable ranging from  
Presence of pregnant women in household  Yes=1  and No=0 
Household size 
Household size grouped 
Continuous variable ranging  from  1-43 
HHsize 1-5 =1; HHsize 6-9= 2; HHsize 10+=0 
Mean household education Continuous variable ranging  from  0-14 
Mean household age 
Aggregated education level of household 
Aggregated age of household members 
 
Continuous variable ranging  from  5.25-100 
Continuous variable ranging from  
Continuous variable ranging from  
*Note: socioeconomic status of household is based on engagement in daily labor work. If any of the 
household members are involved in day labor that household was characterized as being poor and the rest 
were categorized as better-offs.  
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The model used in analysis therefore takes the following form, 
logit (hcard) =                                          
                        
where  
hcard= membership in MHI scheme 
HHSize= household size 
Sex= sex of main earner 
SES= socioeconomic status 
VHPVill= Presence of Village Health Post (VHP) in the village 
NGO= membership in NGOs 
U5= presence of under-five children in the household 
Preg= presence of pregnant women in the household 
Age= Age of household members 
Edu=Education level of household members 
The    are the regression coefficients and indicate the direction of relationship 
between the independent variables and the logit of health card membership. A 
positive relationship hold between the independent variable and the logit of 
health card membership when    is greater than zero. Conversely, values of   
smaller than zero indicate a negative relation between the two. 
In total 21 models were analyzed using various forms of the set of independent 
variables to reach the best fitted regression model for our analysis. The variables 
relating to household size, education level of household members and age of 
household members were used in more than one form to observe the variance in 
outcome. Findings from all these 21 models are presented in chapter 5. 
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Influence of the explanatory variables on the MHI membership overtime was 
analyzed using a panel logistic regression model. Results of panel logistic 
regression models are presented in chapter 5. 
EVALUATION OF THE MODEL 
To assess the effectiveness of the logistic regression models used in our analysis 
the following aspects were investigated: 
 Overall model evaluation: in a logistic model a better fit to data is 
indicated by the fact that the said model demonstrates an improvement 
over the intercept-only model. The intercept-only model serves a good 
baseline as it involves no predictors. This improvement is measured 
using the likelihood ratio test. 
 Statistical significance of individual predictors, i.e. independent 
variables: the individual significance of each of the independent 
variables in our analysis is tested using the z-test.  
 Goodness-of-fit statistics: this statistics measures the fit of a model 
against actual outcomes. In our analysis we used Hosmer and lemeshow 
goodness-of-fit test.  
 Percentage of correct prediction. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORIES IN HEALTH INSURANCE 
 
Health insurance has proved to be an efficient tool in ensuring health care 
coverage by pooling risks across a large group of people in the developed world 
of today. According to Bennett (2004), the primary purpose of any insurance 
scheme, in principle, is to share risk between individuals and hence extend 
financial protection to members of the scheme (1, 2). The developed countries 
have been proved to possess the capacity to pool resources across a wide range 
of individuals. The significant existence of formal sector together with the 
effective regulatory mechanism in health systems of developed world make it 
feasible to collect the revenues that are required to build a large enough resource 
pool. This ultimately results in efficient cross subsidization between the ill and 
the health, the rich and the poor (3).  However, the developing world is yet to 
gain from the comparative advantage of health insurance. A concept that is 
widely becoming popular in the developing country context is micro health 
insurance (MHI). Despite its huge potential to ensure access to and provision of 
healthcare for the people, particularly the poor, there remains debate around 
feasibility and sustainability issues. A concern that is central to the MHI 
literature in developing countries is why its demand has remained relatively low 
over the years. Studying theories of demand for health insurance can help us 
understand the market for MHI. However, providing empirical evidence to come 
to a decision on which theory is correct in determining the demand for health 
insurance is very difficult and that is not the intension of the present chapter. We 
will, in this section, consider two facets of health insurance markets: theories 
around decision making and the demand for health insurance, and market 
failures that influence supply and demand of health insurance. The discussion 
will delve into the various theories that have contributed to the literature on 
health insurance and will study the relevance of each for MHI. 
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THEORIES OF DECISION MAKING: APPLICATION FOR HEALTH INSURANCE AND 
HEALTHCARE MARKETS 
Healthcare, when considered as a commodity, has been identified to have some 
distinct economic features. According to Folland, Goodman, and Stano, 
uncertainty, incomplete and asymmetric information, and the prominence of 
insurance are among the key economic features of healthcare markets (4, 5). 
Uncertainty in healthcare comes with respect to both the incidence of disease 
and the efficacy of treatment (6). This gives rise to financial uncertainty which 
results from cost of treatment and loss of income ensuing from workdays lost 
due to illness. Arrow argues that the existence of uncertainty implies that risk 
bearing and information become commodities (7). Thus uncertainty gives rise to 
a demand for health insurance. Through insurance people have the choice to 
level off their income between two states-ill and healthy. Although health 
insurance does not typically provide income protection directly, it can ensure 
access to treatment on time which in turn reduces wage loss resulting from 
illness.  This increases utility of the insured and provides some level of certainty 
making them better off than those who are not insured at that time. It therefore 
follows that theories of decision making under uncertainty are required to 
understand the demand for health insurance as that decision is based on an 
expectation about future health. 
 
Expected utility theory (EUT) has so far been the most widely used theory in 
explaining the demand for health insurance (7-9). The expected utility 
hypothesis (due originally to Daniel Bernoulli 1738) states that individuals 
choose between alternatives so as to maximize expected utility(10). In general, if  
is the probability of the state of the world i occurring in the forthcoming time 
period (i = 1, …, n) , and   is the utility of income in state i, then expected utility 
(EU) is given by the probability-weighted sum of utilities across all possible 
states: 
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The individual’s objective is assumed to be the maximization of expected utility. 
EUT states that a person’s demand for insurance is reflected in their degree of 
risk aversion and preference for income certainty. The demand for insurance 
arises out of a choice between an uncertain loss with a probability when 
uninsured, and a certain loss in the form a premium when insured. EUT assumes 
that individuals are normally risk-averse indicating that they have diminishing 
marginal utility of income. A person is said to be risk averse if he or she, starting 
from an initial income, prefers not to face a zero mean risk (a risk that has 
positive variance but expected value of zero)(11). It follows from this 
assumption that if an individual is given a choice between a probability 
distribution of income, with a given mean income m, and the certainty of income 
m, then he/she would prefer the latter.  Given this preference, if an insurance 
company offers insurance against the full value of a medical cost for an 
actuarially fair premium (i.e. if the full value of the medical cost is a random 
variable with a mean m, the company will charge a premium equal to m), the 
individual will prefer the certain outcome involving the payment of the premium 
and will therefore take out a policy, giving rise to a welfare gain (7). This theory 
also states that, if the amount of the loss to be covered can be chosen by the 
individual, then the more risk averse a person is, the more coverage he or she 
will buy.  
EUT is silent in explaining how the demand for insurance varies with varying 
socioeconomic status.  
 
Prospect theory put forward by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) questions the 
assumption of expected utility theory that expected utility is linear in the 
probability of loss. This assumption implies that marginal expected utility is 
constant as the probability of loss varies. However, individuals may experience 
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increasing marginal disutility as the probability of loss increases, placing a 
greater weight on changes in the probability of loss for higher probabilities of 
loss (Tversky and Kahneman refer to these weights as “decision weights”). In this 
case, EU becomes non-linear in the probability of loss as reflected in the 
following formulation of the EU function: 
1
( ) ( )
n
i i
i
EU w p u y


                                     … (2) 
The weighting function w reflects the allowance for differing (i.e. non-linear) 
effects of the probability of loss on expected utility. The resulting EU function (or 
value function in the parlance of prospect theory)can therefore be asymmetric 
and steeper for losses than gains, indicating displeasure for losses to be more 
than pleasure for gain(6, 12).People choose between prospects through 
weighted probabilities of loss or gain. In the health insurance market this theory 
suggests that people insure if they overweight the probability of illness. To the 
extent that the poor underweight their probability of illness as they cannot 
afford to get ill and lose their wages, they will therefore remain uninsured. 
However, this theory is again silent on the relation between socioeconomic 
status and its influence on degree of risk aversion. 
 
Regret and disappointment theory introduced simultaneously by Loomes and 
Sugden (1982) and David Bell (1982) is based on the notion that a person’s 
objective is to minimize regret and disappointment(13, 14). In the health 
insurance market, people may remain uninsured to avoid disappointment from 
failing to receive a payoff and regretting the decision to insure, or they may 
insure to avoid regret if they fall ill while being uninsured. Again this theory does 
not explain the difference in degree of regret and disappointment between rich 
and poor (15). 
A few economic and social theories have contributed to the understanding of 
demand for health insurance by different socioeconomic strata which would be 
more relevant in understanding the market for micro health insurance, as MHI is 
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more popular in the developing world. Among these theories are: state-
dependent utility, endowment effect, status quo bias, regret and disappointment 
paradigms, prospect theory, and theories related to trust and social capital. 
 
State dependent theory says that consumers’ utility or taste is influenced by 
their state, i.e. socioeconomic status, health status and at the same time by their 
degree of risk aversion. Demand for health insurance depends to some degree on 
the anticipation about need for medical care and the magnitude of insurance 
payoff(16). Participants in the famous RAND study (15, 17) revealed that their 
demand for health insurance was influenced more by the payoff offered by the 
scheme than the premium level and their income. 
 
Cumulative prospect theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky is a 
combination of state dependent and prospect theory (18). It states that people 
assign different weight to the probability that an event will occur.  
 
Endowment effect theory assumes that peoples’ decision making is influenced 
by their risk aversion about something new. They place a larger value on giving 
something up for gaining benefit from something new (19). On this approach 
poor people will insure only if they perceive the benefit of being insured to be 
greater than the cost of giving up being uninsured. The implication of this theory 
in practice is that, for insurance to be attractive to the poor, it needs to ensure 
access to healthcare and to reduce unofficial payments. This is particularly 
important for MHI where the poor are asked to make out-of-pocket payments, 
which give mathematical discretion to the provider. In cases where people have 
mistrust of the provider, this scheme will not be attractive. 
 
Status-quo bias theory argues that the ‘veil of experience’ determines peoples’ 
choices−people prefer to be in familiar status quo situation if there are 
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increasing alternatives and the choices are complicated (20). This arises 
particularly when there is incomplete information in the market. Therefore, to 
attract poor people in the health insurance market, they need to be fully 
informed about the operation of the scheme and its benefits (21). 
 
The poverty literature says poor may not insure, as out of necessity they value 
present consumption more over future anticipated consumption. The poor may 
choose to find alternatives to replace insurance, such as money lenders, 
diversification of income, increasing earning members of household, etc. Even 
though these are important coping mechanisms where premiums are 
unaffordable or insurance is not desired, there are limits to what these 
mechanisms can achieve.  
A study on Vietnam showed that the demand for health insurance was influenced 
by the absence of an informal credit market and strong financial networks(22).  
 
Trust is one important factor in determining the demand for health insurance, 
particularly in a low income setting (23, 24). Medical care is a commodity where 
customers cannot test the product before consuming it and therefore there is an 
element of trust in this relationship. It is worth mentioning that trust, being an 
unobservable element, has been measured from different aspects throughout the 
literature. Patt et.al 2009 has identified trust in three different dimensions: trust 
in the product itself, trust in the institution and the degree of interpersonal trust. 
Patt et.al 2009 showed that trust in the health insurance market operates in 3 
dimensions: patient’s trust in provider, trust in insurer, and trust in control 
mechanisms for law enforcement (25, 26). Insurers can build reputation by 
demonstrating expertise, responsiveness to consumers, and ensuring quality 
care in contracting health facilities and thereby attracting more clients. These 
trust issues are particularly important for MHI. Weak legal and political systems, 
mutual non-written contracts, managers’ lack of technical expertise, and 
providers’ inferior quality of care can negatively affect membership of MHI. 
 63 
 
The practical implication of these theories helps identify factors that may 
influence demand for health insurance in general and MHI in particular. What 
follows from the above discussion is that, to make health insurance attractive in 
low income settings, the programme managers should concentrate on insurance 
design, information context, and the socioeconomic status of their clientele. To 
attract the poor and win their trust in the MHI schemes, they will have to be 
provided with complete information about the insurance package and at the 
same time the financial management of the scheme has to be accountable and 
transparent. 
Further, the theories around attitude towards risk and people’s decision making 
under uncertainty bear important implication in terms of marketing the product 
that is offered under any insurance scheme. For marketing a health insurance 
product that will attract sufficient clients it would require a strong value 
proposition. If the value proposition for the product focuses on people’s 
preference towards risk (i.e. risk lover, risk averse or risk neutral) the product 
might succeed in increasing the demand for health insurance. A strong value 
proposition backed by knowledge of the clients’ need and preference can 
potentially help people understand the real value of the product. Increasing the 
demand for MHI thus warrants further research in this area. 
 
The Law of large numbers is the fundamental principle underlining insurance 
mechanism (27).  This law for insurance implies that as the number of mutually 
independent risk in a risk pool increases, the variance of mean losses tend to 
decrease. As a result actual claim runs much closer to projected claim making 
insurance policies more viable (28, 29). In other words, if the insurance scheme 
has enough number of policies then according to the law of large numbers it 
becomes highly unlikely that the insurer will face an extremely large amount of 
loss relative to the premium they collected (30). 
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INSURANCE MARKET FAILURE 
There exist a number of practical limitations in using insurance to share risk and 
reduce uncertainty (7).Given that the assumption of risk aversion holds, 
everyone offered health insurance should theoretically insure themselves 
provided premiums are not too actuarially unfair. However, in reality, the 
percentage of individuals remaining uninsured is quite significant. Arrow states 
“If consumers are risk averse, the fact that the uninsured exist implies that the 
market has not succeeded in meeting this demand and that market failures 
exist”(6, 7). Having said that, it is also possible that in places where there is 
public insurance or publicly funded healthcare, it would provide a disincentive 
for people to buy additional private health insurance.  
 
Nevertheless, the financial incentives under insurance can affect consumer and 
producer behaviour and result in market failure in the form of moral hazard 
and/or supplier induced demand (SID) and adverse selection and/or cream 
skimming (31-33).  
 
ADVERSE SELECTION 
In insurance it is desired that the probability of the event covered by insurance 
occurring is outside the control of the individual. In reality this is not always 
possible – an individual's risk taking behaviors (e.g. smoking, dangerous driving) 
can influence their health outcome.  If the individual knows their actual health 
risk (e.g. high blood pressure, diabetes etc) but this information is not known by 
the insurer, this can give rise to adverse selection(31).It arises when asymmetric 
information exists between the insurer and the person buying the insurance and 
that information asymmetry favours the person buying the insurance. 
Adverse selection is a general problem in the insurance context. It refers to “a 
state in which a disproportionate share of people from the scheme’s total target 
group are insured who are relatively more likely to fall ill/injured and need more 
care compared to their uninsured counterparts”(34).  If the same insurance 
premium is offered to all potential purchasers of a given policy, this is likely to 
attract a disproportionate number of high-risk individuals into the insurance 
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pool.  Such high risk individuals would not meet the actuarial break-even price as 
their expected payoffs would be greater than the premium.  Consequently, they 
would constitute a net drain on the insurance funds as their payoffs from the 
fund would exceed their contribution to the fund. On the other hand, setting a 
premium which is too high would only attract people with high health risk and 
would thus end up undermining the risk pooling function of insurance. The 
works of Akerlof 1970,Miyazaki 1977,Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976,and Wilson 
1979 have shown that the ability of the consumer to withhold information from 
the insurer impedes the formation of different types of insurance market (7, 34-
38). 
Market failure arising from adverse selection can be rectified by making health 
insurance compulsory for all. Adverse selection can also be reduced by risk-
rating premiums  where premiums vary depending on the level of coverage 
offered (32). Enforcing waiting periods before someone who buys insurance can 
begin claiming is another mechanism enforced by many schemes to counter the 
impact of adverse selection (39).  
 
CREAM-SKIMMING 
A different form of selection bias can occur in insurance markets which is not 
attributable to asymmetry of information. A profit-motivated insurer may opt for 
a strategy called cream-skimming, or favorable selection, where they seek to 
enroll low-risk individuals given that they can identify subgroups of consumers 
with different expected medical costs. For example, they might want to exclude 
the elderly, people with previous illness and the like, from the insurance pool to 
avoid high risks. This selection problem can be tackled with regulatory 
frameworks prohibiting such type of exclusion by the insurers. 
 
MORAL HAZARD  
In economic theory moral hazard refers to the change in unobservable human 
behavior in response to the provision of a contract that protects against specific 
risks (40). Moral hazard (or unobservable action) in health insurance has been 
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defined as “the likely behaviour changes of users and providers in terms of over-
utilization as well as over-provision of health care due specifically to health 
insurance coverage which allows healthcare bills to be partly or fully paid by a 
third party which does not provide or receive the services” (7, 33, 37, 41, 42). 
Demand-induced moral hazard: The fact that the insurer cannot fully monitor 
the medical need of its client and that insurance contracts are based on incurred 
health expenses not on actual health needs, gives rise to demand induced moral 
hazard (31). With insurance the cost of healthcare at point of service for the 
patient is well below the personal marginal valuation which induces increased 
utilization by the insured members.  
Supplier induced demand (SID): The cost of healthcare does not always solely 
depend on the illness suffered by individuals but also to some extension the 
choice of the doctor and his willingness to use medical services. Certain payment 
structures can encourage providers to over-prescribe healthcare. This can result 
in “supplier induced demand” (SID). Arrow (1963) indicated that, in the relation 
between healthcare provider and the patient, it is most likely that the patients 
have significantly less information about the type of care that is needed for a 
particular condition(7). As the actual health condition of concern to the patient is 
not always known to the insurer, the provider does have the leverage to over-
provide care. SID was first observed in case of hospital services, now enshrined 
in what is known as Roamer's Law which states that “a bed built is a bed filled” 
(43).Incentives associated with remuneration for services are a key factor in 
causing supplier-induced moral hazard. Co-payments and deductibles have been 
introduced into many policies to tackle market failure stemming from moral 
hazard (44, 45).    
 
MHI AND ITS EXPOSURE TO INSURANCE MARKET FORCES:  
WHAT IS MICRO HEALTH INSURANCE (MHI) 
Before we try to understand how far MHI schemes are exposed to the classical 
problems of health insurance markets, we need to delineate the basic 
characteristics of MHI and the contractual terms under which MHI schemes 
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operate. MHI schemes are a part of micro insurance schemes. According to 
Churchill 2006 micro insurance is “the protection of low-income people against 
specific perils in exchange for regular premium payments proportionate to the 
likelihood and cost of the risk involved” (28). It is worth mentioning that this 
definition of micro insurance indicates that the premium is risk-rated whereas 
literature has shown that premium in micro health insurance is often 
community-rated. Following the definition of Churchill, CGAP (the Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor) (46) defined micro health Insurance as “a type of 
insurance where accessibility to essential health services is made available to 
individuals and families, who are unable to afford formal health insurance 
schemes, through affordable premiums and low prices for health services”(47). 
 
WHAT IS MICRO IN MICRO HEALTH INSURANCE? 
One obvious question that may arise is, what is micro about MHI? “Micro” in MHI 
does not refer to the level of risk covered or the size of the insurance pool.  
Rather, it refers to “the level of society where the interaction is located, i.e. 
smaller than national schemes, and “insurance” refers to the economic 
instrument”(48, 49). 
 
DESIGNING MHI SCHEMES 
MHI schemes may vary in their design from one to the other but some of their 
features are common across all the schemes: MHI schemes target low income 
individuals and households in the informal sector and are designed as not-for-
profit entities. Various models of MHI schemes have been tried out in different 
parts of the world depending on who insures whom and who absorbs risk (45). 
These models can be group into four major categories:  
1. Community based models: community members act both as owners of the 
insurance scheme and are insured by the scheme. 
2. Partner-agent models: links with an insurance company and then the MHI 
unit acts as the distribution point.  
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3. Full service model: local institutes become insurance providers and bear 
underwriting risks as long as there is a source to cross subsidize.  
4. Provider-driven model: an existing provider of a health service, such as a 
hospital, initiates the insurance scheme. 
 
CALCULATING PREMIUM: 
MHI schemes face a major challenge in calculating premiums that would attract 
sufficient numbers of clients for the scheme to survive. Unlike private insurance, 
MHI often charges its clients the same premium irrespective of their level of 
health risk, age, sex, occupation etc. i.e. the premiums are community-rated. 
Under community rating the premium is based on the health and demographic 
profile of the target population or the region where the policy is being offered 
(50, 51). In this process higher cost groups (people more prone to illness and 
requiring treatment more frequently) are included with lower cost groups 
(healthier people requiring comparatively less treatment) in calculating the 
average or community-rated premium for the group as a whole. However, one 
needs to be careful about introducing flat rate premiums as it can exacerbate 
inequity in the community (3). In a scheme with flat rate premium people with 
low ability-to-pay end up paying a larger share of their income compared to 
those with higher ability-to-pay. Safe-nets where premium for those with lower 
ability-to-pay are subsidized or exempted have been useful in brining in the 
desired level of equity (3). 
 
DEMAND FOR MHI 
Demand for MHI has remained historically low in the developing countries(52-
54). Affordability of premiums, access to the health services provided under MHI, 
benefit packages, trust in provider organizations, and understanding of the 
health insurance mechanism are some of the major determinants of demand for 
MHI (39, 45, 55, 56). Along with other factors the extent to which the population 
is already covered by the public health schemes also affects the ultimate demand 
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for MHI. People may choose to remain uninsured when offered MHI coverage 
due to the presence of such publicly funded schemes. If MHI is offering coverage 
which duplicates these public schemes, there may be little incentive to purchase 
it.  Demand for MHI will build only when it provides cover for expenses or for 
better quality services (e.g. lower waiting time, access to better quality service, 
coverage against any out-of-pocket expenses, and easier geographic access to 
clinics) that are not offered under existing government insurance schemes. In 
short, the “value proposition” of MHI vis-à-vis other competitors needs to be 
considered as a determinant of demand for MHI. 
 
LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS AND MHI  
The law of large number is of particular concern in operating MHI schemes. The 
ever existing low demand for MHI leads to the concern that, if only small 
numbers enrol, the economic or actuarial basis of the scheme is undermined. 
Several studies have found that risk pooling remains limited for MHI schemes 
due to their small size (57). On the other hand, when a sufficiently large number 
of people join a scheme then, following the law of large numbers, projected 
claims can be estimated with high degree of confidence. This allows the insurer 
to keep the premium more affordable for their clients, particularly for the poor, 
as now they do not have to include a large margin for error in their product 
pricing (28).  
Having said this it is also true that the very nature of MHI prevents it from 
achieving economy of scale. This is in contrast with mandatory health insurance 
where only one or a small number of pooling mechanisms exist. The number of 
pooling mechanism involved in a system bears significant importance as this 
determines the ability of the insurance mechanism to redistribute risk. 
Fragmentation of pooling mechanisms limits the ability to provide health service 
benefits to members due to limited resources in each pool (58, 59). 
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INSURANCE MARKET FAILURE AND MHI 
MHI being an insurance mechanism is exposed more or less to the classical 
insurance market challenges mentioned above in the insurance market failure 
section of this chapter.  
MORAL HAZARD AND MHI 
Studies have found the existence of moral hazard in MHI schemes (57). 
Deductibles and co-payments as mentioned above have been introduced to 
minimize the effect of moral hazard (45). On the other hand, studies have also 
shown that MHI schemes are safeguarded from the effect of moral hazard to 
some extent. It is partly due to the fact that these schemes operate on micro level 
where members of the schemes are usually known to each other. The possibility 
that overutilization by any particular member may result in expulsion from the 
group limits the existence of demand-induced moral hazard (48). 
ADVERSE SELECTION AND MHI 
MHI schemes experience adverse selection and many empirical studies have 
documented the presence of adverse selection in operating MHI schemes in 
various parts of the world (60, 61). In the context of MHI, adverse selection 
arises not so much due to lack of information on risk probabilities at the insurers 
end (which is usually the case for health insurance markets) but because of the 
need to keep the insurance contract simple. The simplicity objective overrides 
the efficiency objective, so preventing the  insurer charging different premium to 
different group of people. Additionally the high cost of obtaining statistical 
information prevents MHI units from risk rating their premiums. Instead 
premiums for MHI schemes as mentioned above are community rated.  This 
discourages low risk groups from joining such schemes as the premium may 
seem costly for them. On the other hand, high risk groups might get attracted to 
the scheme as the premium would most likely be below their expected level of 
claims. This can provide strong incentives for adverse selection and also for 
cream-skimming by insurers to counter the incentives for adverse selection. 
However, the scheme can be modified to rectify the problem by varying 
premiums on the basis of one of the variables (such as age, excluding pre-existing 
condition etc.) to adjust premiums accordingly (51). 
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Additionally, in many countries health insurance in the formal sector has been 
made compulsory to avoid adverse selection, and subsidies have been 
introduced to those who lack the financial resources to pay the premium to buy 
the specific coverage. Studies carried out in developing countries suggest that 
educating people on the adverse effect of health risk and the need for insurance 
could also counter the effects of adverse selection (39, 60).  
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CHAPTER 4: LINK BETWEEN MICRO HEALTH INSURANCE AND 
MICRO FINANCE 
 
 
For the purpose of the current thesis it is imperative to study the evolution of 
micro health insurance (MHI). The concept of MHI has its close link with that of 
micro finance (MF), which is another financial tool to improve the economic 
condition of the poor and disadvantaged people of the developing countries. A 
few studies have found that reduction in out-of-pocket expenses for healthcare 
and improved financial protection for health coincided with both health reform 
such as health financing schemes and with economic recovery and poverty 
alleviation schemes like micro-finance (1). Due to the very importance of the 
relationship between MHI and MF this brief chapter aims to provide an overview 
of the similarities and links between MF and MHI. 
The chapter will mainly focus on issues related to what links micro finance and 
micro health insurance, the similarities between the two, effects of bundling 
micro health insurance with micro finance on development indicators 
particularly in a developing country context, and finally what leanings of micro 
finance can be tailored to serve the purpose of establishing micro health 
insurance in a developing country like Bangladesh.   
 
EVOLUTION OF MICRO FINANCE AND ITS INVOLVEMENT IN HEALTH SECTOR 
Micro finance, also popularly known as micro credit, has its root in Bangladesh 
and was initiated as early as in 1970s by experimenting with microloans for the 
rural poor. Micro finance aims to fulfill the credit needs of the poor and 
disadvantaged population and thereby give them an opportunity to use the 
credit in a productive manner to improve their economic condition. Money 
lending in traditional markets is characterized by the provision of collateral by 
the borrower in exchange for which the lender provides a loan.  Those lacking 
any collateral are therefore often denied access to credit. The micro finance 
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organizations evolved to address the difficulty in obtaining credit by those 
without collateral and reverse the ideology prevailing till then that the poor are 
un-bankable and uninsurable(2, 3) .  With an aim to improve the economic 
condition of the poor, micro finance organizations provided loans and other 
financial services to help their clients initiate and grow a business and thereby 
enable them to better manage financial shocks.  
Micro finance is a comparatively well established entity in many developing 
countries (4-7). In the past few years it has been applauded for its successful 
contribution towards alleviating poverty worldwide. A World Bank study of 
three MFIs in Bangladesh, for example, found that 40% of the entire reduction of 
rural poverty over 14 years was directly attributable to microfinance (8). This is 
one of the biggest achievements of MFIs, made possible by the extent of their 
reach. Through their programs, MFIs have reached the segment of the population 
who were unreachable and left out of the periphery of any development 
intervention. By the end of 2010, 137.5 million of the total 205 million clients of 
micro finance belonged to the poorest group (9). 
Despite its positive effects, it is true that micro finance is not a development 
panacea. For this MFIs have added service components to their existing 
programs with a vision to ensure financial security and social protection for the 
poor and disadvantaged population (10). While analyzing the major reason 
behind delays in loan repayments by their clients, micro finance organizations 
found that health-related reasons (e.g. workdays lost for illness, reduced 
productivity due to illness) were among the top ones. The micro finance 
organizations then opted for tagging health promoting products with the existing 
micro finance program which they believed would help their clients fight against 
the risk of ill health and uncertainty arising from it (11). Likewise, the micro 
finance institutes in Bangladesh introduced micro health insurance to protect 
their clients from the financial consequences of health shocks and resulting loss 
in productivity. This would also minimize the default risk and help MFIs to 
maintain a more stable client pool. To some extent the importance of micro 
health insurance emanates from the limitation of micro finance programs in 
protecting the poor from all sorts of vulnerabilities (11). A varied combination of 
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these two products has been tested in different places around the developing 
world. These include MHIs being offered by the MFIs or other insurance 
organizations as a bundle product with MF (MHI being a prerequisite for MF in 
cases where the insurance is provided through other organizations) or as an 
independent product. No matter whether MHI is implemented as a bundle 
product with MFIs or an independent scheme, it can always tap into the 
advantages of MFIs and increase efficiency in service delivery.   
 
FEATURES OF MFI THAT CAN AID MHI IMPLEMENTATION 
MHI is implemented through a delivery channel which is responsible for taking 
the product to the people, selling it and providing after sales services. It would 
work best when the entities included in the channel are those who are close to 
the people and the market for micro health insurance (12). MFIs potentially offer 
a robust platform for delivery of complementary services that are required and 
demanded by the poor. MFIs serve millions of poor people, especially women, on 
a regular basis and often extend their services to isolated, hard-to-reach places. 
Therefore, the wider coverage is one advantage the micro health insurance 
schemes can bank on either by tagging along with the micro finance 
programmes, i.e. bundling micro finance with micro health insurance, or by 
utilizing the network of MFIs. In addition the type of clients micro finance 
originations serve make it all the more important for them to provide services at 
an affordable cost while ensuring administrative sustainability which makes 
them an efficient organization producing maximum output at the lowest possible 
cost. The financial know-how of micro finance organizations could prove to be 
beneficial for micro health insurance. Micro health insurance and micro finance 
shares some inbuilt similarities. Both the entities deal with managing risk in 
programme operations, MFI managing default risks and MHIs managing health 
risks of the clients. It would be very useful, for example, to understand how MFIs 
have managed their choice of clients to whom they extend credit in the absence 
of collateral and how do they assess default risk. Trust, another important 
element in implementing any financial instrument including micro health 
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insurance, is a strength of MFIs which they have built through their regular 
communication with the locals (8).  
The local influence of MFIs and their business acumen can help MHIs to establish 
an efficient link with the healthcare providers, negotiate rates between provider 
and insurer, and ensure quality of services (8). In Philippines the largest MFI, 
known as CARD, negotiated special discounts for its clients with the private 
healthcare providers in the rural areas which has improved accessibility and 
affordability of health care for their clients (13). Similarly in Cambodia, the 
GRET_SKY health insurance program tagged with an MFI uses its leverage to 
improve the quality of care at the public health facilities. This gives the people 
access to quality care at an affordable price and channel poor people away from 
expensive private health care (14).  
Besides these MFIs could also support MHIs by introducing complementary 
services that can encourage uptake of health insurance and improved health 
habits resulting in lower risk of illness. Health education is one such product that 
has been identified by different studies to improve health knowledge leading to 
behavioral change and positive health outcomes (10, 15-18).  
For a long time it was believed that the poor are too poor to save and contribute 
towards meeting their healthcare needs. This belief has been questioned in the 
recent past particularly in countries like Bangladesh, and there is now a growing 
realization that even the poor can make small, periodic contributions that can 
secure healthcare for them (19).  Micro finance has contributed in building this 
culture of saving and investing among the poor. As a result, risk management 
techniques from other sectors to health is now taking place within many micro 
finance and other development organizations in low and middle income 
countries (20, 21). 
Although bundling health products, particularly health insurance, with micro 
finance looks promising and aligns well with MFI’s core competencies, the 
challenges in doing so are not trivial.  There is a dearth of expertise within the 
MFIs in terms of analyzing health-seeking behavior, needs and costs, additional 
types of communication and education capabilities, and developing efficient 
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monitoring and management mechanism to prevent fraud, and avoid the classic 
insurance market failures (e.g. adverse selection, moral hazard etc.) (10). The 
technical complexities around operation of micro health insurance schemes 
therefore require additional investments and experiments to come up with a 
design which is replicable and scalable. It is not necessary that MHIs are 
implemented through MFIs only. In cases where MHIs are introduced as 
independent products they could use the advantages that the MFIs have already 
acquired.  
 
BUNDLING MHI AND MF: WHAT CAN WE LEARN? 
Developmental goals cannot be achieved by actions in any single area.  Their 
achievement demands coordinated initiatives in the different sectors of 
development.  Many-a-times improvement in one is linked to, or even dependent 
upon, the other. MHI and MFIs are examples of such dependence. On one hand, 
the microfinance framework could facilitate implementation of MHI through 
their involvement at community level and with informal sectors of the economy 
in which the financial infrastructure of banking and insurance has not been 
established. So far it was believed that poor are too poor to save and contribute 
towards meeting their healthcare needs. The culture of saving and investing 
among the poor has been established through the MFIs (19). This is expected to 
have a catalytic effect on building the concept of insuring against health risk 
particularly among the poor. Furthermore, MFIs can leverage the social capital 
that exists in smaller and more destitute communities, which would ease 
adoption of the insurance concept. At the same time, MFIs work on low resource 
settings and have the technical know-how on efficient operation at minimum 
cost which can benefit the MHIs where financial sustainability is a major 
challenge. MFIs also have expertise on marketing products to the community 
depending on their socioeconomic status and the demand of the people. Micro 
health insurance being a newly experimented concept, proper marketing is 
essential in making the product sellable and popular. Otherwise, the concept of 
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paying an upfront premium for future financial protection for healthcare is not a 
wholly known or accepted concept (22).  
On the other hand, incorporating MHI within MFI program by bundling the two 
products can help MFIs to improve their portfolio by insuring their clients 
against health risks and associated loss in income and productivity.  Experiments 
with bundling MHI with MFIs, indeed, have demonstrated positive outcomes in 
places, particularly in terms of increased utilization of health services, reduction 
in time gap between onset of illness and treatment seeking, improved 
productivity, poverty level (11). 
Having said this, requiring consumers to purchase MHI with MFI can at times 
result in unforeseen complications. Including MHI bundled with MFI can increase 
costs of services and thereby the interest rate charged on loan disbursed (23). 
MFIs are widespread in many countries but face serious competition and are 
continuously under pressure to offer products at prices prevailing in the market. 
One of the MFIs in Bangladesh, the Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK), that added 
MHI to their services were at one point of service forced to abandon MHI and 
continue with MFI services alone due to the lower rate of interest offered by 
other competitors in the market.  It is true that there are instances where 
bundling MHI with existing MFI schemes has led to a loss of clients for MFI due to 
the higher interest rate charged on loans disbursed to pay for the premium for 
health insurance (24). Thus, although at a first glance bundling MHI with MFIs 
may appear lucrative, further research is needed to find alternative ways to 
benefit from the learnings of MFI that are useful for the implementation of MHI. 
At the very least the MHIs could use the vast reach of MFIs to expand their 
network and create a client pool that is large enough to efficiently spread the risk 
of ill-health between the rich and the poor, and between the ill and the healthy, 
and ensure higher value for money.  
The discussion above presents the features of MHI and MFI and the comparative 
advantage of each. Whether it is beneficial to offer the two in a single bundle or 
to use the advantage of each to better equip the other in terms of serving the 
poor is a decision that will be based on the specific context of each country.  
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CHAPTER 5: FACTORS INFLUENCING DECISION TO ENROLL INTO 
THE CHAKARIA HEALTH CARD SCHEME: FINDINGS FROM THE 
QUANTITATIVE SURVEYS 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
Health risk sharing through health insurance, as mentioned earlier, is not 
common in Bangladesh. For a country like Bangladesh where people experience 
a very high share of out-of-pocket expenses for healthcare one might expect 
health insurance to be an effective solution to manage the private expenditure on 
health and ensure quality healthcare at the same time (1). However, through 
times development organizations have struggled to introduce and sustain health 
insurance in Bangladesh to minimize the financial burden on people resulting 
from sudden health shocks. Majority of the organizations followed the model of 
micro health insurance with an aim to support the poor and disadvantaged (2, 3). 
However low level of uptake remain a major challenge in using MHI as an 
alternative health financing mechanism (3, 4). Thus, it is important to 
understand the determinants of enrolment in the MHI programs.  
This chapter aims to explore factors that influence peoples’ decision in rural 
Bangladesh to enroll in MHI schemes or pre-payment based health services. In 
doing so we take the case of the “Chakaria Health Card” scheme (sharing 
characteristics of an MHI scheme) that operated in Chakaria, a rural area of 
Bangladesh, during the time period 1998-2005 (details of the scheme can be 
found in chapter 2 ‘Methods and Materials’). The influence of each of the factors 
was explored using both bivariate and multivariate analysis.  
For the bivariate analysis cross-tabulation was carried out treating membership 
at the health card scheme as dependent variable. List of independent variables 
influencing membership included household size, sex of main earner in the 
household, mean age of household members, mean education level of household 
members, membership in NGO development programs, existence of health 
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service facility (the Village Health Posts) in the villages, socioeconomic status of 
the household, presence of under-five children in the household, presence of 
pregnant women in the household. The rationale for including each of these 
variables is given in the Methods and Material chapter (Chapter 2). As the 1999 
dataset was a census data we used it to conduct the bivariate analysis, which 
included 26,352 households that existed in the catchment area in 1999. Chi 
square test was carried out to test significance of each of the relationships.  
All the variables used in the bivariate analysis were included in the multivariate 
analysis. The relationship between health card membership and the nine 
independent variables was analyzed using logistic regression. Household 
enrollment status in the scheme was treated as dichotomous dependent variable 
(1=yes; 0=no) and membership was treated as outcome variable in the analysis. 
The model was first run at individual level. Later on due to the fact that 
membership was at household level we decided to run the regression model at 
household level. The individual level analysis was carried out on 1999 data and 
for household level analysis all the model variations were implied on each of the 
three survey years (i.e. 1999, 2004, 2005) and the panel data comprising data 
from 1999, 2004, and 2005. For models at both levels we started our analysis by 
keeping all the independent variables and later on adding variations to our 
analysis, which included dropping variables to observe the effect of multi-
collinearity and changing the summery measures (e.g. mean, aggregate) for some 
of the variables. The analysis included 26,352 households for 1999 and 7,042 
households for 2004 and 2005 survey years. More details of the methods used in 
carrying out the data analysis presented in this chapter are provided in the 
“Methods and Materials” chapter (see chapter 2). 
 
FINDINGS 
A total of 1265 households (4.9% of the total in the catchment area) covering a 
population of 26,352 was enrolled in the scheme in 1999. Membership increased 
to 5.3% in 2004 and then went to 1.9% in 2005. 
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FINDINGS FROM BIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
This section of the chapter gives an account of how all the nine influencing 
variables included in the analysis interacted with the dependent variable of 
membership of health card scheme. The results from cross tabulation are 
presented in Table 9. 
AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD SIZE OF MEMBERS AND NON-MEMBERS 
The scheme was offered to the villagers taking households as the unit of 
membership. For this we looked into the relationship between household size 
and membership. In 1999 the average family size of health card members was 
greater than that of non-members (7.2 vs. 6.1). Analysing the association 
between membership status and household size reveals a positive linear 
relationship between the two variables with proportion of membership 
increasing as household size increases (Table 9).  
HOUSEHOLDS WITH MEMBERSHIP IN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OFFERED BY NGO: 
5.7% of the households having membership at any NGO offered development 
programs were members of the health card scheme whereas, 4.6% of the 
households not having any NGO membership were enrolled in the health card 
scheme (Table 9). This indicates a positive impact of NGO membership on health 
card enrolment.  
DISTANCE TO HEALTH FACILITIES 
Enrolment of health card scheme was 3 times higher among households that 
lived close to the Village Health Posts (VHPs) than those who lived further away. 
13.4% of the households living in close-by areas were members of health card 
scheme compared to only 4.3% of the households living in distant places 
(p=0.000) (Table 9).  
ENROLMENT BY SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS 
Data shows that uptake of health insurance was significantly higher (p=0.000) 
amongst the non-poor compared to the poor. In 1999, 3% of the poor population 
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in Chakaria joined the health insurance scheme whereas among the non-poor 
membership was 6.6%.   
GENDER GAP  
Culturally in rural areas of Bangladesh important household decisions, 
particularly the financial ones, are mostly taken by the male members. We 
investigated the influence of gender in the decision to join the Chakaria health 
card scheme. We took sex of main earner to look into this factor. Findings 
showed that a significantly higher percentage of households with male main 
earner (4.9%) joined the health card scheme compared to the female main 
earner households (2.4%). However, it should be mentioned that majority of the 
households (89.8%) are male headed which might have influenced the outcome 
observed (Table 9). 
HOUSEHOLD AGE AND HOUSEHOLD EDUCATION 
Membership in health card scheme varied across different level of household 
education. Member households of health card scheme had higher mean level of 
education compared to the non-members (3.7 years vs. 2.1 years)(Table 9). 
Mean age of member and non-member households was quite similar, 21.8 years 
for member households and 22.03 years for non-member households (Table 9). 
PRESENCE OF PREGNANT WOMEN AND CHILDREN UNDER FIVE YEARS OF AGE IN THE 
HOUSEHOLD 
Enrolment of heath card scheme was significantly higher for households having 
at least one child aged five years or less than those having no children under the 
age of five (5.1% vs. 4.3%). No significant difference was observed in enrolment 
status between households having atleast one pregnant woman compared to 
those who had none (Table 9). 
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TABLE 9: MEMBERSHIP AT CHAKARIA HEALTH CARD SCHEME BY SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND 
GEOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS, CHAKARIA 1999. 
Variables  Health card member  
%  (n=26,352) 
p  
Socioeconomic status  
Better-off 6.6 0.000 
Poor  3.0 
Sex of main earner 
Male  4.9 0.000 
Female  2.5 
Presence of children aged under the age of 5 years? 
Yes  5.1 0.002 
No  4.3 
Presence of pregnant women? 
Yes  4.6 0.466 
No  4.9 
Existence of VHP? 
Yes  13.4 0.000 
No  4.3 
NGO membership? 
Yes  5.7 0.000 
No 4.6 
 Member 
Mean 
Non member  
Mean 
p  
Mean household size  7.2 6.1 0.000 
Mean household age 21.8  
years 
22.03  
years 
0.328 
Mean household education  3.7  
years 
2.1  
years 
0.000 
 
 
FINDINGS FROM THE MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS  
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANALYSIS 
MODEL 1:  
Individual level analysis was run based on data from the 1999 census. As the 
1999 dataset was a census data this gave us findings that incorporated all the 
households in Chakaria. We included the variables that we identified or assumed 
to have influence on membership status (see chapter 2 for details). The current 
model has been identified as the initial model for the rest of this chapter.  
The following model was run:  
Logit (health card membership)= f(sex of main earner, household size, 
socioeconomic status of household, presence of Village Health Posts in the 
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village, membership in NGOs, presence of children aged under five years in the 
household, presence of pregnant women in the household, mean age of 
household members, mean level of education of household members) 
Membership in health card scheme was significantly influenced by household 
size, socioeconomic status of household, existence of VHPs in the villages, 
membership in NGO development programs, presence of at least one child under 
the age of five in the household and mean education level of households. 
Influence of having at least one pregnant woman in household and mean 
household age on membership status was found to be insignificant.  
Households with larger family size were significantly more likely to join the 
health card scheme than those with comparatively smaller family size. 
Households with male main earner were more likely to join the scheme than 
those with female main earner. However this relationship was not statistically 
significant. The odds of poor households joining the health card scheme were 
lower than the better-off households (odds ratio 0.68) indicating poor 
households being less likely to join. Households that lived in villages with VHPs 
were more likely to join the scheme compared to those who lived in villages with 
no VHPs (odds of households living in villages with VHPs being 4.3 times of 
households not living in VHP villages). Participation in development 
programmes offered by local NGOs played a significant role in influencing people 
to join the health card scheme. Those who were members of NGO development 
programmes were more likely to join the Chakaria scheme compared to those 
who were not. The odds of households with at least one child aged under five 
years joining the scheme were 1.22 times that of households with no children 
under the age of five. Households with high mean education level were 
significantly more likely to be members of Chakaria scheme than the households 
who had lower level of mean education (Odds ratio 1.20). 
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Detailed output of the analysis is presented in Table 10.  
TABLE 10: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS AT INDIVIDUAL LEVEL (MODEL 1) 
Note: *** indicates significant at 5% level. 
 
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL ANALYSIS 
Household level analysis was carried out for all the survey years separately and 
then for the panel data that incorporated data from all the three years. Similar 
models were run for all the survey years and eventually for panel data which 
would indicate the change in influence of the independent variables on the 
probability of enrollment over time. We will report the results sequentially 
starting from the base year 1999 followed by 2004, 2005 and then the panel data 
combining data from years 1999, 2004 and 2005.  
Variables  Membership status of health card scheme  
(yes=1; no=0) 
Co-efficient 
(S.E.) 
z 
(p value) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Constant  
 
-4.24 
0.116 
-36.45 
0.000 
0.01 
(0.01-0.02) 
Household size 
 
0.06 
0.003 
18.14 
0.000 
1.06 
1.05-1.07 
Sex of main earner  
(binary – ‘female’ is ref cat) 
0.15 
0.097 
1.50 
0.134 
1.16 
0.96-1.40 
Socioeconomic status  
(binary – ‘better-off’ is ref cat) 
-0.38 
0.032 
-12.04 
0.000 
0.68 
0.64-0.73 
Village has VHP?  
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
1.46 
0.034 
42.40 
0.000 
4.30 
4.02-4.60 
Any NGO membership in HH? 
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.39 
0.029 
13.76 
0.000 
1.48 
1.40-1.57 
Presence of children <5 years of age in 
HH? (binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.20 
0.034 
5.86 
0.000 
1.22 
1.14-1.30 
Presence of pregnant women in HH 
(binary- ‘no’ is ref cat) 
-0.04 
0.039 
-0.97 
0.333 
0.96 
0.89-1.04 
Mean household education  
 
0.18 
0.005 
35.52 
0.000 
1.20 
1.19-1.21 
Mean household age  
 
0.00 
0.002 
0.36 
0.721 
1.00 
0.10-1.01 
Test  
Overall model evaluation  
Likelihood ratio  χ2 (9) 
 
4633.88*** 
Goodness-of-fit test  
Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 (8) 
 
52.79*** 
Correct classification 94.3% 
 89 
 
RESULTS FROM 1999 SURVEY: 
MODEL 2:  
The household level analysis was initiated by keeping all the independent 
variables that were originally identified. The model took the following form: 
logit (health card membership)= f(sex of main earner, household size, 
socioeconomic status of household, presence of Village Health Posts in the 
village, membership in NGOs, presence children aged under five years in the 
household, presence of pregnant women in the household, mean age of 
household members, mean level of education of household members) 
Results showed that the findings in the individual level model hold for the 
household level analysis. Household size, socioeconomic status of households, 
presence of VHP in the villages, membership in NGOs, presence of children aged 
under five years in the household, and mean level of education in the household 
continued to have significant impact on the decision to enroll into the Chakaria 
health card scheme.  
Holding all other variables constant larger households were significantly more 
likely to join the health card scheme compared to the smaller households. The 
odds of a poor household joining the scheme were lower than that of better-off 
households (odds ratio 0.71) indicating that poorer households were less likely 
to join the health card scheme. Households situated in villages with VHPs were 
more likely to join than those situated in villages without VHPs. Membership in 
NGO programmes influenced decision as households with NGO membership was 
found to be more likely to join the Chakaria health card scheme than those 
without any NGO membership. The odds of households with atleast one child 
under the age of five years was 1.21 times the households without any children 
below the age of five years. Mean education level of households again was an 
important determinant. Households with higher mean education level were 
significantly more likely to join the scheme than those with comparatively lower 
level of mean household education. Sex of main earner, presence of at least one 
pregnant woman in household, and mean household age, on the other hand, did 
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not have any significant impact on membership at the Chakaria health card 
scheme (See Table 11). 
TABLE 11: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL (MODEL 2), CHAKARIA 1999 
Variables  Membership status of health card 
scheme 
(yes=1; no=0) 
Co-efficient 
(S.E.) 
z 
(p value) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Constant  
 
-4.48 
(0.258) 
-17.37 
(0.000) 
0.01 
(0.01-0.02) 
Household size 0.08 
(0.009) 
8.90 
(0.000) 
1.09 
(1.07-1.11) 
Sex of main earner  
(binary – ‘female’ is ref cat) 
0.23 
(0.206) 
1.10 
(0.273) 
1.25 
(0.84-1.88) 
Socioeconomic status  
(binary – ‘better-off’ is ref cat) 
-0.34 
(0.075) 
-4.50 
(0.000) 
0.71 
(0.62-0.83) 
Village has VHP?  
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
1.36 
(0.085) 
16.01 
(0.000) 
3.90 
(3.30-4.61) 
Any NGO membership in HH? 
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.38 
(0.070) 
5.46 
(0.000) 
1.46 
(1.28-1.68) 
Presence of children <5 years of 
age in HH? (binary – ‘no’ is ref 
cat) 
0.19 
(0.084) 
2.30 
(0.021) 
1.21 
(1.03-1.43) 
Presence of pregnant women in 
HH (binary- ‘no’ is ref cat) 
-0.09 
(0.097) 
-0.96 
(0.335) 
0.91 
(0.75-1.10) 
Mean household education  0.18 
(0.012) 
14.78 
(0.000) 
1.19 
(1.17-1.22) 
Mean household age  -0.00 
(0.005) 
-0.13 
(0.896) 
1.00 
(0.99-1.01) 
Test  
Overall model evaluation  
Likelihood ratio test  χ2 (9) 
 
749.4*** 
Goodness-of-fit test  
Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 (8) 
 
17.56*** 
Correct classification  95.2% 
Note: ***significant at 5% level 
 
MODEL 3:   
The model was then modified to eliminate the probability of multicollinearity. 
The correlations between the independent variables were tested and it was 
found that the correlation between all the variables are below 0.5 except for 
correlation between ‘presence of children aged under five years’ and ‘mean 
household age’ which was 0.52. Models were then run excluding the two 
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variables, one at a time. Model 3 excludes the variable for ‘presence of children 
under the age of five’ in household and keeps all other variables the same.  
The model looked like: 
logit (health card membership)= f(sex of main earner, household size, SES of 
household, presence of Village Health Posts in the village, membership in NGOs, 
presence of pregnant women in the household, mean age of household members, 
mean education level of household members) 
Results of model 3 are presented in Table 12. Dropping the “presence of children 
under the age of five in household” variable did not result in any significant 
change in the parameters compared to those in model 2. The P value for variable 
“mean household age” improved from 0.896 in model 2 to 0.122 in model 3, but 
was still insignificant.  
TABLE 12: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL (MODEL 3; DROPPING 
“PRESENCE OF CHILDREN AGED UNDER FIVE” VARIABLE), CHAKARIA 1999 
Variables  Membership status of health card scheme 
(yes=1; no=0) 
Co-efficient 
(S.E.) 
z 
(p value) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Constant  -4.26 
 (0.239) 
-17.81 
(0.000) 
0.01 
(0.009-0.023) 
Household size 0.09 
 (0.009) 
9.70 
(0.000) 
1.09 
(1.074-1.113) 
Sex of main earner  
(binary – ‘female’ is ref cat) 
0.25 
 (0.206) 
1.19 
(0.234) 
1.28 
(0.853-1.913) 
Socioeconomic status  
(binary – ‘better-off’ is ref cat) 
-0.34 
 (0.075) 
-4.56 
(0.000) 
0.71 
(0.614-0.823) 
Village has VHP? (binary – ‘no’ is ref 
cat) 
1.37 
 (0.085) 
16.13 
(0.000) 
3.93 
(3.329-4.644) 
Any NGO membership in HH? 
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.37 
 (0.070) 
5.37 
(0.000) 
1.45 
(1.268-1.667) 
Presence of pregnant women in HH 
(binary- ‘no’ is ref cat) 
-0.08 
 (0.097) 
-0.81 
(0.417) 
0.92 
(0.764-1.118) 
Mean household education  0.17 
 (0.012) 
14.56 
(0.000) 
1.19 
(1.161-1.217) 
Mean household age  
 
-0.01 
 (0.004) 
-1.54 
(0.122) 
0.99 
(0.985-1.002) 
Test  
Overall model evaluation  
Likelihood ratio test  χ2 (8) 
 
744.03*** 
Goodness-of-fit test  
Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 (8) 
 
8.88ns 
Correct classification  95.2% 
Note: ***significant at 5% level; ns: not significant  
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MODEL 4: 
We then dropped the variable “mean household age” instead of “presence of 
children aged under five” and ran the logistic regression. The model took the 
following form: 
logit (health card membership)= f(sex of main earner, household size, 
socioeconomic status of household, presence of Village Health Posts in the 
village, membership in NGOs, presence children aged under five years in the 
household, presence of pregnant women in the household, mean level of 
education of household members) 
Again no significant change from model 2 was observed. Dropping the variable 
“mean household age” did not alter any of the relationships analyzed.  
Detailed results are presented in Table 13. 
TABLE 13: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL (MODEL 4; DROPPING “MEAN 
HOUSEHOLD AGE” VARIABLE), CHAKARIA 1999 
Variables  Membership status of health card scheme 
(yes=1; no=0) 
Co-efficient 
(S.E.) 
z 
(p value) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Constant  -4.50 
(0.216) 
-20.86 
(0.000) 
0.01 
(0.007-0.017) 
Household size 0.08 
 (0.009) 
8.90 
(0.000) 
1.09 
(1.068-1.108) 
Sex of main earner  
(binary – ‘female’ is ref cat) 
0.23 
 (0.206) 
1.10 
(0.271) 
1.26 
(0.838-1.879) 
Socioeconomic status  
(binary – ‘better-off’ is ref cat) 
-0.34 
 (0.075) 
-4.50 
(0.000) 
0.72 
(0.617-0.827) 
Village has VHP?  
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
1.36 
 (0.085) 
16.01 
(0.000) 
3.90 
(3.303-4.61) 
Any NGO membership in HH? 
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.38  
(0.070) 
5.47 
(0.000) 
1.46 
(1.277-1.679) 
Presence of children <5 years of age in 
HH? (binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.20 
 (0.072) 
2.77 
(0.006) 
1.22 
(1.060-1.406) 
Presence of pregnant women in HH 
(binary- ‘no’ is ref cat) 
-0.09 
 (0.097) 
-0.97 
(0.334) 
0.91 
(0.752-1.102) 
Mean household education  0.18 
 (0.012) 
14.82 
(0.000) 
1.19 
(1.165-1.220) 
Test  
Overall model evaluation  
Likelihood ratio test  χ2 (8) 
 
749.39*** 
Goodness-of-fit test  
Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 (8) 
 
16.81*** 
Correct classification  95.2% 
Note: ***significant at 5% level 
 
 93 
 
Variance Inflating Factor (VIF): Test of multicollinearity 
In addition to altering the model we calculated the Variance Inflating Factor 
(VIF) for our household level model (Model 2) which was below 2 indicating no 
evidence of multicollinearity.  Literature has shown, as a rule of thumb, VIF>4 
warrants further investigation for collinearity and VIF>10 is a sign of serious 
multicollinearity (5).  
These results together indicate there is no multicollinearity in the estimated 
model.  
 
MODEL 5:  
Further to the analysis of effect of having children under the age of five we were 
interested to know whether this effect varied with difference in total number of 
children under the age of five within a household. So we replaced “presence of 
children aged under five years” (a binary response variable) by total number of 
children aged under five years in any household (a continuous variable). The 
following model was used: 
logit (health card membership)= f(sex of main earner, household size, 
socioeconomic status of household, presence of Village Health Posts in the 
village, membership in NGOs, total number of children aged under five years in 
the household, presence of pregnant women in the household, mean age of 
household members, mean level of education of household members) 
Results showed that total number of children aged under five years in any 
household did not have significant effect on membership status. However, 31% 
of the households did not have any children under the age of five and this might 
have some influence on the outcome of the model.  
All other findings remained the same as that of model 2 (Table 14). 
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TABLE 14: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL (MODEL 5; IMPACT OF 
TOTAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN AGED UNDER FIVE YEARS IN HOUSEHOLD), CHAKARIA 1999 
Variables  Membership status of health card scheme 
(yes=1; no=0) 
Co-efficient 
(S.E.) 
z 
(p value) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Constant  
 
-4.23   
(0.247)    
-17.17 
(0.000) 
0.014 
(0.009-0.023) 
Household size 0.09    
  (0.011)  
8.56 
(0.000) 
1.10 
(1.073-1.119) 
Sex of main earner  
(binary – ‘female’ is ref cat) 
0.25   
(0.206)     
1.19 
(0.233) 
1.28 
(.854-1.914) 
Socioeconomic status  
(binary – ‘better-off’ is ref cat) 
-0.34    
(0.075) 
-4.57 
(0.000) 
0.71 
(0.614-0.823) 
Village has VHP?  
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
1.37    
(0.085)     
16.13 
(0.000) 
3.93 
(3.331-4.647) 
Any NGO membership in HH? 
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.37  
(0.070)        
5.33 
(0.000) 
1.451 
(1.265-1.664) 
Total number of children under 
the age of 5 in household 
-0.02   
(0.036)    
-0.43 
(0.667) 
0.99 
(.917-1.057) 
Presence of pregnant women in 
HH (binary- ‘no’ is ref cat) 
-0.08   
(0.097)    
-0.79 
(0.429) 
0.93 
(0.765-1.121) 
Mean household education  
 
0.17   
(0.012)   
14.36 
(0.000) 
1.19 
(1.160-1.216) 
Mean household age  
 
-0.01   
(0.005)    
-1.56 
(0.119) 
0.99 
(0.983-1.002) 
Test  
Overall model evaluation  
Likelihood ratio test  χ2 (8) 
 
744.22*** 
Goodness-of-fit test  
Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 (8) 
 
10.51ns 
Correct classification  95.2% 
Note: ***significant at 5% level; ns: not significant  
 
MODEL 6 
In dealing with the high percent of households with no children under the age of 
five we grouped the households according to total number of children aged 
under five years. The households were categorized into 4 groups: households 
with no children under the age of five, households with 1 child under the age of 
five, households with 2 children under the age of five, and households with 3 or 
more children under the age of five. We then ran the logistic regression with 
presence of children under the age of five years as a categorized variable. 
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The following model was used: 
logit (health card membership)= f(sex of main earner, household size, 
socioeconomic status of household, presence of Village Health Posts in the 
village, membership in NGOs, household group based on total number of children 
aged under 5 years, presence of pregnant women in the household, mean age of 
household members, mean level of education of household members) 
TABLE 15: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL (MODEL 6; HOUSEHOLD 
CATEGORIZED ACCORDING TO TOTAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF FIVE YEARS), CHAKARIA 1999 
Variables  Membership status at CCHP health card 
scheme (yes=1; no=0) 
Co-
efficient 
(S.E.) 
z 
(p value) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Constant -4.49 
(.259) 
-17.34 
(0.000) 
0.01 
(0.007-0.019) 
Household size 
 
0.09 
(0.010) 
8.91 
(0.000) 
1.10 
(1.074-1.118) 
Sex of main earner  
(binary – ‘female’ is ref cat) 
0.21 
(0.206) 
1.03 
(0.304) 
1.24 
(0.825-1.852) 
Socioeconomic status  
(binary – ‘better-off’ is ref cat) 
-0.34 
(0.075) 
-4.55 
(0.000) 
0.71 
(0.615-0.824) 
Village has VHP? (binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 1.36 
(0.085) 
16.01 
(0.000) 
3.90 
(3.305-4.613) 
Any NGO membership in HH? 
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.38 
(0.070) 
5.40 
(0.000) 
1.46 
(1.272-1.672) 
HH category based on total number of 
children under the age of five years: 
(categorical-‘no HH member under the 
age of five years’) 
   
HH with 1 child under the age of 5 
 
0.18 
(0.089) 
2.01 
(0.044) 
1.20 
(1.004-1.422) 
HHwith 2 children under the age of 5 
 
0.24 
(0.098) 
2.47 
(0.013) 
1.28 
(1.052-1.547) 
HH with 3 or more children under the age 
of 5 
-0.03 
(0.141) 
-0.20 
(0.839) 
0.97 
(0.737-1.281) 
Presence of pregnant women in HH 
(binary- ‘no’ is ref cat) 
-0.09 
(0.098) 
-0.94 
(0.346) 
0.91 
(0.754-1.104) 
Mean household education  0.18 
(0.012) 
14.61 
(0.000) 
1.19 
(1.163-1.219) 
Mean household age -0.00 
(0.005) 
-0.22 
(0.823) 
1.00 
(0.989-1.009) 
Test  
Overall model evaluation  
Likelihood ratio test  χ2 (8) 
754.75*** 
Goodness-of-fit test  
Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 (8) 
 
14.82**  
Correct classification  95.2% 
Note: *** significant at 5% level ** significant at 10% level; HH: Household 
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As we can see from Table 15 households with 1 and 2 children aged under five 
years are significantly more likely to join the health card scheme compared to 
those with no children under the age of five. The odds of households with 1 child 
aged five or less years joining the scheme was 1.2 times of households with no 
children under the age of five. For households with two children under the age of 
five the odds of joining the scheme was 1.3 times of households with no children 
under the age of five. 
RESULTS FROM 2004 SURVEY: 
The models that we ran for 1999 dataset were then run for 2004 data. The 
outcomes are reported in the following section. 
MODEL 7:  
The following model was used to analyze influencing factors for membership at 
Chakaria health card scheme in 2004. Model 7 includes all the independent 
variables originally identified. 
logit (health card membership)2004= f(sex of main earner, household size, 
socioeconomic status of household, presence of Village Health Posts in the 
village, membership in NGOs, presence children aged under five years in the 
household, presence of pregnant women in the household, mean age of 
household members, mean level of education of household members) 
Results from the logistic regression showed that household size, existence of 
VHP in the villages and mean household education continued to have significant 
positive influence on membership status even in 2004. Households with higher 
number of members are more likely to join health card scheme than those with 
fewer members. The odds of households living in villages with VHPs being a 
member of the health card scheme was 3.7 times that of households in villages 
without any VHPs. Higher educated households were more likely to join the 
scheme than those with a low level of mean household education. On the other 
hand, the influence of socioeconomic status, NGO membership and presence of 
children under the age of five in the household cease to have significant influence 
on membership of the health card scheme. Sex of main earner, presence of 
pregnant women and mean household age also did not have significant impact 
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on household membership of the health card scheme which follows the trend 
observed in 1999 (Table 16). 
TABLE 16: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL (MODEL 7), CHAKARIA 2004 
Variables  Membership status of health card scheme 
(yes=1; no=0) 
Co-efficient 
(S.E.) 
z 
(p value) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Constant  
 
-3.90 
(0.325) 
-11.99 
(0.000) 
0.020 
(0.011-0.038) 
Household size 
 
0.08 
(0.018) 
4.58 
(0.000) 
1.087 
(1.049-1.126) 
Sex of main earner  
(binary – ‘female’ is ref cat) 
-0.22 
(0.193) 
-1.15 
(0.250) 
0.800 
(0.549-1.170) 
Socioeconomic status  
(binary – ‘better-off’ is ref cat) 
-0.21 
(0.136) 
-1.50 
(0.133) 
0.815 
(0.624-1.064) 
Village has VHP?  
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
1.31 
(0.170) 
7.73 
(0.000) 
3.700 
(2.653-5.150) 
Any NGO membership in HH? 
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.09 
(0.114) 
0.82 
(0.411) 
1.100 
(0.880-1.373) 
Presence of children <5 years of age in 
HH?  
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.24 
(0.156) 
1.54 
(0.123) 
1.273 
(0.937-1.729) 
Presence of pregnant women in HH  
(binary- ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.20 
(0.151) 
1.30 
(0.195) 
1.216 
(0.905-1.633) 
Mean household education  
 
0.19 
(0.028) 
6.62 
(0.000) 
1.203 
(1.139-1.271) 
Mean household age  
 
-0.02 
(0.010) 
-1.46 
(0.145) 
0.985 
(0.966-1.005) 
Test  
Overall model evaluation  
Likelihood ratio test  χ2 (8) 
146.24*** 
Goodness-of-fit test  
Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 (8) 
 
7.68ns 
Correct classification  94.6% 
Note: ***significant at 5% level; ns: not significant  
 
MODEL 8:  
As we did with 1999 data set it was assumed mean household age and presence 
of children under the age of five could be correlated. The correlation was found 
to be 0.5. So we ran logistic regressions dropping each of these two variables, 
one at a time. Model 8 excludes ‘presence of children under the age of five’. 
logit (health card membership)2004= f(sex of main earner, household size, 
socioeconomic status of household, presence of Village Health Posts in the 
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village, membership in NGOs, presence of pregnant women in the household, 
mean age of household members, mean level of education of household 
members) 
Table 17 shows that as the variable “presence of children under the age of five” 
was taken off the model, mean household age began to have significant negative 
impact on membership. This indicates that households with lower mean age 
were more likely to join the scheme.  
All other variables remained to have similar effect on membership status as that 
of model 7. 
TABLE 17: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL (MODEL 8; DROPPING 
PRESENCE OF CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF FIVE), CHAKARIA 2004 
Note: ***significant at 5% level; ns: not significant  
 
 
Variables  Membership status of health card scheme (yes=1; 
no=0) 
Co-efficient 
(S.E.) 
z 
(p value) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Constant  
 
-3.657 
(0.017) 
-12.86 
(0.000) 
0.026 
(0.015-0.045) 
Household size 
 
0.092 
(0.192) 
5.31 
(0.000) 
1.096 
(1.060-1.134) 
Sex of main earner  
(binary – ‘female’ is ref cat) 
-0.198 
(0.192) 
-1.03 
(0.304) 
0.820 
(0.563-1.196) 
Socioeconomic status  
(binary – ‘better-off’ is ref cat) 
-0.221 
(0.136) 
-1.63 
(0.103) 
0.801 
(0.614-1.046) 
Village has VHP?  
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
1.310 
(0.169) 
7.75 
(0.000) 
3.706 
(2.660-5.163) 
Any NGO membership in HH? 
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.086 
(0.114) 
0.76 
(0.449) 
1.090 
(0.872-1.363) 
Presence of pregnant women in HH  
(binary- ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.229 
(0.149) 
1.53 
(0.126) 
1.257 
(0.938-1.685) 
Mean household education  0.171 
(0.027) 
6.45 
(0.000) 
1.187 
(1.127-1.250) 
Mean household age  
 
-0.019 
(0.010) 
-1.99 
(0.047) 
0.981 
(0.962-1.000) 
Test  
Overall model evaluation  
Likelihood ratio test  χ2 (8) 
143.83*** 
Goodness-of-fit test  
Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 (8) 
8.90ns 
Correct classification  94.6% 
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MODEL 9: 
Model 9 excludes mean household age and keeps the variable ‘presence of 
children under the age of five’ in the model.  
The model:  
logit (health card membership)2004= f(sex of main earner, household size, 
socioeconomic status of household, presence of Village Health Posts in the 
village, membership in NGOs, presence children aged under five years in the 
household, presence of pregnant women in the household, mean level of 
education of household members) 
In this current model once ‘mean household age’ was taken off ‘presence of 
children under the age of five’ began to have significant effect on decision to 
enroll in health card scheme. All other variables have the same effect as they did 
in model 7 where all the initial variables were included (Table 18). 
TABLE 18: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL (MODEL 9; DROPPING MEAN 
HOUSEHOLD AGE), CHAKARIA 2004 
Variables  Membership status at CCHP health card 
scheme (yes=1; no=0) 
Co-efficient 
(S.E.) 
z 
(p value) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Constant  
 
-4.193 
(0.258) 
-16.26 
(0.000) 
0.015 
(0.010-0.025) 
Household size 
 
0.085 
(0.018) 
4.67 
(0.000) 
1.088 
(1.050-1.128) 
Sex of main earner  
(binary – ‘female’ is ref cat) 
-0.249 
(0.192) 
-1.30 
(0.194) 
0.780 
(0.535-1.135) 
Socioeconomic status  
(binary – ‘better-off’ is ref cat) 
-0.214 
(0.136) 
-1.57 
(0.117) 
0.808 
(0.618-1.055) 
Village has VHP?  
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
1.309 
(0.169) 
7.74 
(0.000) 
3.703 
(2.658-5.160) 
Any NGO membership in HH? 
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.094 
(0.114) 
0.82 
(0.410) 
1.098 
(0.878-1.374) 
Presence of children <5 years of age in 
HH? (binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.309 
(0.150) 
2.07 
(0.039) 
1.362 
(1.016-1.826) 
Presence of pregnant women in HH  
(binary- ‘no’ is ref cat) 
-0.191 
(0.151) 
1.27 
(0.206) 
1.210 
(0.901-1.626) 
Mean household education  
 
0.167 
(0.025) 
6.70 
(0.000) 
1.181 
(1.125-1.241) 
Test  
Overall model evaluation  
Likelihood ratio test  χ2 (8) 
 
144.04*** 
Goodness-of-fit test  
Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 (8) 
 
6.33ns 
Correct classification  94.6% 
Note: ***significant at 5% level; ns: not significant  
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MODEL 10:  
To observe the impact of total number of children under the age of five within a 
household instead of looking only at presence of them the following model was 
tested: 
logit (health card membership)2004= f(sex of main earner, household size, 
socioeconomic status of household, presence of Village Health Posts in the 
village, membership in NGOs, total number of children aged under five years in 
the household, presence of pregnant women in the household, mean age of 
household members, mean level of education of household members) 
Results showed that total number of children had positive significant effect on 
enrollment. Households with higher number of children under the age of five 
were more likely to join the scheme than their counterpart. Effect of the other 
variables remained to be the same compared to model 7 (Table 19).  
TABLE 19: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL (MODEL 10; IMPACT OF 
TOTAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN AGED UNDER FIVE YEARS IN HOUSEHOLD), CHAKARIA 2004 
Variables  Membership status of health card scheme 
(yes=1; no=0) 
Co-efficient 
(S.E.) 
z 
(p value) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Constant  
 
-3.885 
(0.298) 
-13.04 
(0.000) 
0.021 
(0.011-0.037) 
Household size 
 
0.062 
(0.021) 
2.93 
(0.003) 
1.064 
(1.021-1.109) 
Sex of main earner  
(binary – ‘female’ is ref cat) 
-0.212 
(0.192) 
-1.10 
(0.271) 
0.809 
(0.555-1.180) 
Socioeconomic status  
(binary – ‘better-off’ is ref cat) 
-0.195 
(0.136) 
-1.43 
(0.154) 
0.823 
(0.630-1.076) 
Village has VHP?  
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
1.312 
(0.169) 
7.75 
(0.000) 
3.715 
(2.666-5.178) 
Any NGO membership in HH? 
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.105 
(0.114) 
0.92 
(0.357) 
1.111 
(0.888-1.390) 
Total number of children under the age of 
5 in household 
0.166 
(0.067) 
2.46 
(0.014) 
1.180 
(1.034-1.347) 
Presence of pregnant women in HH  
(binary- ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.164 
(0.152) 
1.08 
(0.280) 
1.178 
(0.875-1.587) 
Mean household education  
 
0.195 
(0.028) 
6.92 
(0.000) 
1.215 
(1.150-1.284) 
Mean household age  
 
-0.013 
(0.010) 
-1.31 
(0.190) 
0.987 
(0.968-1.006) 
Test  
Overall model evaluation  
Likelihood ratio test  χ2 (8) 
149.82*** 
 
Goodness-of-fit test  
Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 (8) 
12.24ns 
Correct classification  94.6% 
Note: ***significant at 5% level; ns: not significant  
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MODEL 11:  
We then categorized households according to the total number of children under 
the age of five years and ran a model with this new variable along with the other 
independent variables for the year 2004. The assumption was that number of 
households with no children under the age of five might have influenced the 
results we got for the variable representing total number of children under the 
age of five within a household. Therefore we categorized households into the 
following groups: ‘no child under the age of five’, ‘1 child under the age of five’, ‘2 
children under the age of five’ and ‘3 or more children under the age of five’. This 
way it was possible to separate the effect of no children under the age of five 
from the other categories. Results are presented in Table 20. 
The following model was used: 
logit (health card membership)2004= f(sex of main earner, household size, 
socioeconomic status of household, presence of Village Health Posts in the 
village, membership in NGOs, household group based on presence of children 
aged under 5 years, presence of pregnant women in the household, mean age of 
household members, mean level of education of household members) 
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TABLE 20: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL (MODEL 11; HOUSEHOLD 
CATEGORIZED ACCORDING TO TOTAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF FIVE YEARS), CHAKARIA 2004 
Variables  Membership status at CCHP health card 
scheme (yes=1; no=0) 
Co-efficient 
(S.E.) 
z 
(p value) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Constant  
 
-3.959 
(0.327) 
-12.09 
(0.000 
0.020 
0.011-0.036 
Household size 
 
0.073 
(0.020) 
3.66 
(0.000) 
1.075 
1.034-1.117 
Sex of main earner  
(binary – ‘female’ is ref cat) 
-0.230 
(0.193) 
-1.19 
(0.233) 
0.798 
0.547-1.165 
Socioeconomic status  
(binary – ‘better-off’ is ref cat) 
-0.195 
(0.137) 
-1.43 
(0.153) 
0.822 
0.629-1.074) 
Village has VHP?  
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
1.310 
(0.170) 
7.74 
(0.000) 
3.704 
(2.659-5.161) 
Any NGO membership in HH? 
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.102 
(0.114) 
0.089 
(0.373) 
1.107 
(0.885-1.385) 
Household category based on total number of 
children under the age of five years: 
(categorical-‘no household member under the age of 
five years’ is ref cat) 
 
 
 
 
Household with 1 child under the age of 5 
 
0.190 
(0.166) 
1.15 
(0.251) 
1.210 
(0.874-1.674) 
Household with 2 children under the age of 5 
 
0.368 
(0.189) 
1.95 
(0.051) 
1.445 
(0.998-2.091) 
Household with 3 or more children under the  
age of 5 
0.470 
(0.241) 
1.95 
(0.052) 
1.599 
(0.996-2.567) 
 
Presence of pregnant women in HH  
(binary- ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.172 
(0.152) 
1.13 
(0.258) 
1.187 
(0.882-1.598) 
Mean household education  
 
0.194 
(0.029) 
6.79 
(0.000) 
1.214 
(1.148-1.283) 
Mean household age  
 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
-1.21 
(0.228) 
0.988 
(0.968-1.008) 
Test  
Overall model evaluation  
Likelihood ratio test  χ2 (11) 
148.58*** 
Goodness-of-fit test  
Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 (8) 
12.57ns 
Correct classification  94.6% 
Note: ***significant at 5% level; ns: not significant  
 
Once we categorized the households according to the number of children aged 
under five years we found that households with greater number of children 
under the age of five (atleast 2) were more likely to join health card scheme than 
those with none. However, this result was significant only at 10% level. The odds 
of membership in households with 2 children under the age of five was 1.4 times 
of those having none and the odds of membership in households having 3 or 
more children under the age of five was 1.6 times of those with no children 
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under the age of five. Household size, existence of VHPs in villages and mean 
household education remain to have significant effect on enrolment decision.  
 
RESULTS FROM 2005 SURVEY 
The initial model with all the variables was then run with 2005 data to observe 
whether the effect of the independent variables on enrolment decision changed 
during 2005.  
 
MODEL 12:  
The following model including all the initial independent variables was run for 
2005 data: 
logit (health card membership)2005= f(sex of main earner, household size, 
socioeconomic status of household, presence of Village Health Posts in the 
village, membership in NGOs, presence children aged under five years in the 
household, presence of pregnant women in the household, mean age of 
household members, mean level of education of household members) 
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TABLE 21: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL (MODEL 12), CHAKARIA 
2005 
Variables  Membership status at CCHP health card scheme 
(yes=1; no=0) 
Co-efficient 
(S.E.) 
z 
(p value) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Constant  
 
-4.089 
(0.535) 
-7.64 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.006-0.048) 
Household size 
 
0.042 
(0.027) 
1.58 
(0.115)  
1.043 
(0.990-1.100) 
Sex of main earner  
(binary – ‘female’ is ref cat) 
-0.298 
(0.288) 
-1.03 
(0.302) 
0.743 
(0.422-1.307) 
Socioeconomic status  
(binary – ‘better-off’ is ref cat) 
-0.919 
(0.205) 
-4.48 
(0.000) 
0.399 
(0.267-0.596) 
Village has VHP?  
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
1.207 
(0.261) 
4.63 
(0.000) 
3.342 
(2.005-5.571) 
Any NGO membership in HH? 
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.616 
(0.177) 
3.47 
(0.001) 
1.851 
(1.308-2.620) 
Presence of children <5 years of age in 
HH? (binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.307 
(0.249) 
1.23 
(0.219) 
1.359 
(0.833-2.215) 
Presence of pregnant women in HH  
(binary- ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.268 
(0.220) 
1.22 
(0.224) 
1.307 
(0.849-2.012) 
Mean household education  
 
0.189 
(0.041) 
4.56 
(0.000) 
1.207 
(1.113-1.309) 
Mean household age  
 
-0.029 
(0.016) 
-1.80 
(0.072) 
0.972 
(0.942-1.003) 
Test  
Overall model evaluation  
Likelihood ratio test  χ2 (8) 
112.11*** 
Goodness-of-fit test  
Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 (8) 
5.23ns 
 
Correct classification  98.1% 
Note: ***significant at 5% level; ns: not significant  
Results showed more similar trends with 1999 findings. Socioeconomic status, 
existence of VHPs in villages, membership in NGO development programs, and 
mean household education had significant impact on decision to enroll for a 
household in 2005. The odds of a poor household joining the health card scheme 
were lower than that of better-off households (odds ratio 0.4). Households living 
in villages that had a VHP within its boundary were more likely to join with odds 
being 3.34 times that of households living in villages without any VHPs. 
Membership in NGO development programmes influenced enrolment positively 
(odds were 1.85 times of non NGO-member households). Households with 
higher mean education were as always more likely to join the scheme. Household 
size, presence of pregnant women, presence of children under the age of five, sex 
of main earner, and mean household age did not influence membership 
significantly (Table 21). 
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MODEL 13:  
We then excluded presence of children under the age of five from our model to 
observe if correlation between mean household age and presence of children 
under the age of five has any effect on the estimated coefficients. 
The model: 
logit (health card membership)2005= f(sex of main earner, household size, SES of 
household, presence of Village Health Posts in the village, membership in NGOs, 
presence of pregnant women in the household, mean age of household members, 
mean education level of household members) 
TABLE 22: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL (MODEL 13; DROPPING 
“PRESENCE OF CHILDREN AGED UNDER FIVE” VARIABLE), CHAKARIA 2005 
Variables  Membership status at CCHP health card scheme 
(yes=1; no=0) 
Co-efficient 
(S.E.) 
z 
(p value) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Constant  
 
-3.77 
(0.467 
-8.08 
(0.000) 
0.023 
(0.01-0.06) 
Household size 
 
0.051 
(0.025 
2.02 
(0.044) 
1.05 
(1.00-1.11) 
Sex of main earner  
(binary – ‘female’ is ref cat) 
-0.263 
(0.287 
-0.91 
(0.360) 
0.77 
(0.44-1.35) 
Socioeconomic status  
(binary – ‘better-off’ is ref cat) 
-0.944 
(0.204 
-4.62 
(0.000) 
0.39 
(0.26-0.58) 
Village has VHP?  
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
1.197 
(0.261 
4.59 
(0.000) 
3.31 
(1.99-5.52) 
Any NGO membership in HH? 
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.615 
(0.177 
3.47 
(0.001) 
1.85 
(1.31-2.62) 
Presence of pregnant women in HH  
(binary- ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.317 
(0.218 
1.46 
(0.145) 
1.37 
(0.90-2.10) 
Mean household education  
 
0.173 
(0.040 
4.37 
(0.000) 
1.19 
(1.10-1.29) 
Mean household age  
 
-0.035 
(0.015 
-2.31 
(0.021) 
0.97 
(0.94-1.00) 
Test  
Overall model evaluation  
Likelihood ratio test  χ2 (8) 
110.57*** 
Goodness-of-fit test  
Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 (8) 
5.05ns 
 
Correct classification  98.1% 
Note: ***significant at 5% level; ns: not significant  
Mean household age was found to have significant negative effect on 
membership once the variable “presence of children under the age of five” was 
dropped indicating a fall in membership with increasing mean household age.  
(detailed results are presented in Table 22). One other change observed was that 
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household size was no more insignificant. Larger households were found to be 
more likely to join the scheme than the smaller ones. All other findings remained 
the same compared to model 12. 
MODEL 14: 
Model 14 excludes ‘mean household age’ and plugs back ‘presence of children 
under the age of five’ in the regression analysis for the year 2005.  
The model: 
logit (health card membership)2005= f(sex of main earner, household size, 
socioeconomic status of household, presence of Village Health Posts in the 
village, membership in NGOs, presence children aged under five years in the 
household, presence of pregnant women in the household, mean level of 
education of household members) 
TABLE 23: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL (MODEL 14; DROPPING 
MEAN HOUSEHOLD AGE), CHAKARIA 2005 
Variables  Membership status of  health card scheme 
(yes=1; no=0) 
Co-efficient 
(S.E.) 
z 
(p value) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Constant  
 
-4.795 
(0.39) 
-12.39 
(0.000) 
0.01 
(0.00-0.02) 
Household size 
 
0.041 
(0.027) 
1.52 
(0.128) 
1.04 
(1.00-1.12) 
Sex of main earner  
(binary – ‘female’ is ref cat) 
-0.318 
(0.288) 
-1.10 
(0.270) 
0.728 
(0.41-1.28) 
Socioeconomic status  
(binary – ‘better-off’ is ref cat) 
-0.910 
(0.204) 
-4.45 
(0.000) 
0.40 
(0.27-0.60) 
Village has VHP?  
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
1.223 
(0.260) 
4.70 
(0.000) 
3.40 
(2.04-5.66) 
Any NGO membership in HH? 
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.630 
(0.177) 
3.55 
(0.000) 
1.88 
(1.33-2.70) 
Presence of children <5 years of age in 
HH? (binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.469 
(0.234) 
2.00 
(0.045) 
1.60 
(1.01-2.53) 
Presence of pregnant women in HH  
(binary- ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.278 
(0.220) 
1.26 
(0.207) 
1.32 
(0.86-2.03) 
Mean household education  
 
0.169 
(0.039) 
4.35 
(0.000) 
1.18 
(1.10-1.28) 
Test  
Overall model evaluation  
Likelihood ratio test  χ2 (8) 
108.52*** 
Goodness-of-fit test  
Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 (8) 
5.56ns 
Correct classification  98.1% 
Note: ***significant at 5% level; ns: not significant  
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Presence of children under the age of five years was found to have significant 
positive effect on enrolment once the variable “mean household age” was 
dropped. The odds of households with atleast one child under the age of five 
joining the health card scheme was 1.6 times of those having none. All other 
variables continue to have similar effect as found in model 12 (Table 23). 
MODEL 15: 
The following model was run to observe the impact of total number of children 
aged under five years in 2005: 
logit (health card membership)2005= f(sex of main earner, household size, 
socioeconomic status of household, presence of Village Health Posts in the 
village, membership in NGOs, total number of children aged under five years in 
the household, presence of pregnant women in the household, mean age of 
household members, mean level of education of household members) 
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TABLE 24: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL (MODEL 15; IMPACT OF 
TOTAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN AGED UNDER FIVE YEARS IN HOUSEHOLD), CHAKARIA 2005 
Note: ***significant at 5% level; ns: not significant  
Changing the variable to demonstrate the effect of children aged under five years 
in household into a continuous variable did not alter the relationships in the 
model (Table 24).  
 
MODEL 16: 
Again for 2005 data households were grouped according to the total number of 
children under the age of five within a household. A model including this 
categorized variable was then run.  
 
Variables  Membership status at CCHP health card 
scheme 
(yes=1; no=0) 
Co-efficient 
(S.E.) 
z 
(p value) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Constant  
 
-4.05 
(0.486) 
-8.34 
(0.000) 
0.018 
(0.01-0.05) 
Household size 
 
0.016 
(0.031) 
0.52 
(0.605) 
1.02 
(0.956-1.08) 
Sex of main earner  
(binary – ‘female’ is ref cat) 
-0.300 
(0.29) 
-1.02 
(0.308) 
0.746 
(0.425-1.311) 
Socioeconomic status  
(binary – ‘better-off’ is ref cat) 
-0.900 
(0.21) 
-4.36 
(0.000) 
0.408 
(0.272-0.610) 
Village has VHP?  
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
1.203 
(0.26) 
4.61 
(0.000) 
3.33 
(2.00-5.55) 
Any NGO membership in HH? 
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.62 
(0.18) 
3.49 
(0.000) 
1.86 
(1.31-2.63) 
Total number of children under the 
age of 5 in HH 
0.220 
(0.113) 
1.94 
(0.052) 
1.25 
(0.997-1.56) 
Presence of pregnant women in HH  
(binary- ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.195 
(0.23) 
0.86 
(0.391) 
1.215 
(0.78-1.90) 
Mean household education  
 
0.198 
(0.04) 
4.79 
(0.000) 
1.22 
(1.12-1.32) 
Mean household age  
 
-0.026 
(0.02) 
-1.64 
(0.101) 
0.975 
(0.945-1.00) 
Tests 
Overall model evaluation  
Likelihood ratio test  χ2 (8) 
114.29*** 
Goodness-of-fit test  
Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 (8) 
7.30ns 
0.42 
Correct classification  98.1% 
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The model: 
logit (health card membership)2005= f(sex of main earner, household size, 
socioeconomic status of household, presence of Village Health Posts in the 
village, membership in NGOs, household group based on total number of children 
aged under 5 years, presence of pregnant women in the household, mean age of 
household members, mean level of education of household members) 
TABLE 25: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL (MODEL 16; HOUSEHOLD 
CATEGORIZED ACCORDING TO TOTAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF FIVE YEARS), CHAKARIA 2005 
Variables  Membership status of health card 
scheme (yes=1; no=0) 
Co-
efficient 
(S.E.) 
Z 
(p value) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Constant  
 
-4.130 
(0.540) 
-7.67 
(0.000) 
0.016 
(0.006-0.046) 
Household size 0.031 
(0.030) 
1.06 
(0.289) 
1.032 
(0.974-1.093) 
Sex of main earner   
(binary – ‘female’ is ref cat) 
-0.307 
(0.289) 
-1.06 
(0.287) 
0.735 
(0.418-1.295) 
Socioeconomic status  
(binary – ‘better-off’ is ref cat) 
-0.906 
(0.206) 
-4.40 
(0.000) 
0.404 
(0.270-0.605) 
Village has VHP?  
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
1.207 
(0.261) 
4.63 
(0.000) 
3.342 
(2.006-5.570) 
Any NGO membership in HH? 
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.619 
(0.177) 
3.49 
(0.000) 
1.860 
(1.312-2.629) 
HH category based on total number of 
children under the age of five years: 
(categorical-‘no HH member under the age 
of 5 years’ is ref cat) 
 
HH with 1 child under the age of 5 0.270 
(0.260) 
1.04 
(0.299) 
1.310 
(0.787-2.180) 
HH with 2 children under the age of 5 
 
0.432 
(0.303) 
1.42 
(0.154) 
1.540 
(0.850-2.792) 
HH with 3 or more children under the age 
of 5 
0.570 
(0.408) 
1.40 
(0.163) 
1.767 
(0.795-3.930) 
Presence of pregnant women in HH  
(binary- ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.216 
(0.228) 
0.95 
(0.342) 
1.241 
(0.794-1.939) 
Mean household education  0.195 
(0.042) 
4.66 
(0.000) 
1.215 
(1.120-1.319) 
Mean household age  -0.026 
(0.016) 
-1.61 
(0.107) 
0.974 
(0.944-1.006) 
Test  
Overall model evaluation  
Likelihood ratio test  χ2 (11) 
113.03*** 
Goodness-of-fit test  
Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 (8) 
4.00ns 
Correct classification  98.1% 
Note: ***significant at 5% level; ns: not significant ; HH: Household 
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Changing the variable “total number of children under the age of five” into a 
categorized one to reflect household groups according to total number of 
children aged five or less did not change the outcome of the model compared to 
model 12 (Table 25).  
RESULTS FROM PANEL DATA ANALYSIS (COMBINING 1999, 2004, AND 2005 
DATASETS) 
In order to observe whether the relationship between enrolment decision and 
the influencing factors change over time we created a panel dataset comprising 
of data from all the three surveys, i.e. 1999, 2004 and 2005. The models that we 
used previously were then run for the panel data. The results are presented in 
the following section:  
MODEL 17:  
The initial model results for the panel data showed that household size, 
socioeconomic status, presence of VHP in villages, membership in NGO 
development programs, mean household age and mean household education 
continue to have significant impact on membership at the health card scheme 
over the years. On the other hand, sex of main income earner, presence of 
children under the age of five and presence of any pregnant women in household 
did not have any significant influence on membership status over time (Table 
26).  
Similar to the findings of each year the panel data results showed that 
households with increased number of members, those with higher mean 
education level, and households with lower mean age were more likely to join 
the scheme. The odds of poorer households joining the scheme was lower than 
the better-off households (odds ratio 0.58) indicating poorer households being 
less likely to enroll compared to the better-offs. The odds of households living in 
villages with VHPs enrolling into the scheme were 5.18 times that of households 
living in villages without any VHPs. Over time the odds of households having 
membership in NGO development programs being member of the health card 
scheme was found to be 1.23 times of those not being a part of any NGO 
programs. 
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TABLE 26: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL (MODEL 17), CHAKARIA 
(1999, 2004, 2005) 
Note: ***significant at 5% level 
 
MODEL 18:  
The correlation between independent variable presence of children under the 
age of five and mean household age was found to be 0.56 and hence we decided 
to run a model excluding the two variables one at a time. Model 18 drops 
‘presence of children under the age of five in the households’ and keeps ‘mean 
household age’ variable in the model.  
The results remained unchanged and factors that had significant relationship 
with membership status continue to do so (Table 27). 
 
 
Variables  Membership status of health card scheme 
(yes=1; no=0) 
Co-efficient 
(S.E.) 
z 
(p value) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Constant  -5.08 
(0.256) 
-19.82 
(0.000) 
0.006 
(0.004-0.010) 
Household size 0.082                    
(0.010) 
7.87 
(0.000) 
1.085 
(1.063-1.107) 
Sex of main earner  
(binary – ‘female’ is ref cat) 
0.193 
(0.148) 
1.30 
(0.195) 
1.212 
(0.906-1.622) 
Socioeconomic status  
(binary – ‘better-off’ is ref cat) 
-0.545 
(0.072) 
-7.56 
(0.000) 
0.580 
(0.503-0.668) 
Village has VHP? (binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 1.644 
(0.105) 
15.61 
(0.000) 
5.175 
(4.210-6.362) 
Any NGO membership in HH? 
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.208 
(0.066) 
3.18 
(0.001) 
1.232 
(1.083-1.400) 
Presence of children <5 years of age in 
HH? (binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.121 
(0.082) 
1.48 
(0.139) 
1.127 
(0.960-1.322) 
Presence of pregnant women in HH 
(binary- ‘no’ is ref cat) 
-0.093 
(0.089) 
-1.05 
(0.296) 
0.911 
(0.765-1.085) 
Mean household education 0.182 
(0.013) 
14.07 
(0.000) 
1.20 
(1.169-1.230) 
Mean household age  -0.013 
(0.005) 
-2.69 
(0.007) 
0.987 
(0.977-0.996) 
Tests  
Overall model significance  
Wald   (9) 
 
578.07*** 
Likelihood ratio test        (01) 100.72*** 
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TABLE 27: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL (MODEL 18), CHAKARIA 
(1999, 2004, 2005) 
Note: ***significant at 5% level 
 
MODEL 19: 
Model 19 drops ‘mean household age’ to observe whether the correlation 
between ‘presence of children under the age of five’ influences the relationship 
between the independent variables and membership status.  
Results show that ‘presence of children under the age of five’ now has significant 
influence on enrollment, which was insignificant in our initial model that 
included both “presence of children under the age of five” and “mean household 
age” variables. All other variables continue to hold the same relationship with 
decision to enroll (Table 28).  
Variables  Membership status of health card scheme 
(yes=1; no=0) 
Co-efficient 
(S.E.) 
z 
(p value) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Constant  -4.959 
(0.239 ) 
-20.69 
(0.000) 
0.007 
(0.004-0.011) 
Household size 0.085 
(0.010 ) 
8.45 
(0.000) 
1.089 
(1.068-1.110) 
Sex of main earner  
(binary – ‘female’ is ref cat) 
0.205 
(0.148 ) 
1.38 
(0.166) 
1.228 
(0.918-1.643) 
Socioeconomic status  
(binary – ‘better-off’ is ref cat) 
-0.546 
(0.072) 
-7.56 
(0.000) 
0.579 
(0.503-0.667) 
Village has VHP? (binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 1.647 
(0.105 ) 
15.63 
(0.000) 
5.191 
(4.223-6.381) 
Any NGO membership in HH? 
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.206 
(0.065 ) 
3.15 
(0.002 ) 
 
1.229 
(1.081-1.398) 
Presence of pregnant women in HH 
(binary- ‘no’ is ref cat) 
-0.079 
(0.088) 
-0.90 
(0.368 ) 
 
0.923 
(0.776-1.098) 
Mean household education 0.181 
(0.013)  
13.99 
(0.000) 
1.198 
(1.168-1.229) 
Mean household age  -0.017 
(0.004)  
-3.89 
(0.000) 
0.983 
(0.975-0.992) 
Tests  
Overall model significance  
Wald χ (8) 
 
576.11*** 
Likelihood ratio test  χ    (01) 100.70*** 
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TABLE 28: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL (MODEL 19), CHAKARIA 
(1999, 2004, 2005) 
Note: ***significant at 5% level 
 
MODEL 20:  
Model 20 tests whether total number of children in a household has any impact 
on decision to enroll instead of only looking into the impact of presence of 
children under the age of five.  
Total number of children under the age of five was not found to have any 
significant impact on decision to enroll. All other results remain the same (Table 
29).  
 
 
 
Variables  Membership status of health card scheme 
(yes=1; no=0) 
Co-efficient 
(S.E.) 
z 
(p value) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Constant  -5.440 
(0.228) 
-23.87 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.003-0.007) 
Household size 0.082 
      (0.010) 
7.87 
(0.000) 
1.085 
(1.063-1.107) 
Sex of main earner  
(binary – ‘female’ is ref cat) 
0.194 
       (0.148) 
1.31 
(0.191) 
1.214 
(0.908-1.622) 
Socioeconomic status  
(binary – ‘better-off’ is ref cat) 
-0.541 
       (0.072) 
-7.52 
(0.000) 
0.582 
(0.505-0.670) 
Village has VHP? (binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 1.645 
      (0.105) 
15.65        
(0.000)  
5.182 
(4.217-6.367) 
Any NGO membership in HH? 
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.210 
(0.066) 
3.21 
(0.001) 
1.234 
(1.085-1.403) 
Presence of children <5 years of age in 
HH? (binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.232 
       (0.071) 
3.25        
(0.001) 
1.261 
(1.096-1.449) 
Presence of pregnant women in HH 
(binary- ‘no’ is ref cat) 
-0.096 
          (0.089) 
-1.08 
(0.281) 
0.909 
(0.763-1.082) 
Mean household education 0.176 
       (0.013) 
13.94 
(0.000) 
1.192 
(1.163-1.222) 
Tests 
Overall model significance  
Wald   *(8) 
 
578.53*** 
Likelihood ratio test       (01) 100.47*** 
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TABLE 29: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL (MODEL 20), CHAKARIA 
(1999, 2004, 2005) 
Variables  Membership status of health card scheme 
(yes=1; no=0) 
Co-
efficient 
(S.E.) 
z 
(p value) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Constant -4.979 
(0.247) 
-20.15 
(0.000) 
0.007 
(0.004-0.011) 
Household size 0.083 
(0.011) 
7.27 
(0.000) 
1.087 
(1.063-1.111) 
Sex of main earner  
(binary – ‘female’ is ref cat) 
0.204 
(0.148) 
1.38 
(0.169) 
1.227 
(0.918-1.641) 
Socioeconomic status  
(binary – ‘better-off’ is ref cat) 
-0.545 
(0.072) 
-7.56 
(0.000) 
0.581 
(0.504-0.669) 
Village has VHP?  
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
1.647 
(0.105) 
15.63 
(0.000) 
5.168 
(4.207-6.348) 
Any NGO membership in HH? 
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.207 
(0.066) 
3.16 
(0.002) 
1.230 
(1.082-1.399) 
Total number of children under the 
age of 5 in household 
0.012 
(0.036) 
0.34 
(0.736) 
1.012 
(0.943-1.086) 
Presence of pregnant women in HH  
(binary- ‘no’ is ref cat) 
-0.083 
(0.089) 
-0.93 
(0.352) 
0.921 
(0.773-1.096) 
Mean household education  
 
0.181 
(0.013) 
13.98 
(0.000) 
1.198 
(1.168-1.229) 
Mean household age  
 
-0.016 
(0.005) 
-3.31 
(0.001) 
0.984 
(0.975-0.993) 
Tests  
Overall model significance  
Wald   (9) 
 
576.05*** 
Likelihood ratio test       (01) 100.80*** 
Note: ***significant at 5% level  
 
MODEL 21: 
The fact that 32% of the households did not have any children under the age of 
five might influence the impact of the variable “total number of children under 
the age of five” on enrollment decision. As a result we decided to group 
households according to the total number of children under the age of five. 
Households as before were categorized into 4 groups: “households with no 
children under the age of five”, “households with 1 child under the age of five”, 
“households with 2 children under the age of five”, “households with 3 or more 
children under the age of five”. 
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Logistic results including this grouping did not show any significant difference. 
Only the households that had 2 children under the age of five showed positive 
influence on membership but at 10% level of significance. None of the household 
categories showed any significant impact on membership at 5% level. All other 
results remained the same (Table 30).  
TABLE 30: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL (MODEL 21), CHAKARIA 
(1999, 2004, 2005) 
Variables  Membership status of health card 
scheme (yes=1; no=0) 
Co-
efficient 
(S.E.) 
z 
(p value) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Constant  
 
-5.099    
(0.257)    
-19.80    
(0.000)     
0.01        
0.00-0.01) 
Household size  0.085   
 (0.011)      
7.72    
(0.000)      
1.09        
(1.07-1.11) 
Sex of main earner  
(binary – ‘female’ is ref cat) 
0.185 
   (0.148)      
1.25    
(0.213)     
1.204 
(0.900-1.611) 
Socioeconomic status  
(binary – ‘better-off’ is ref cat) 
-0.547      
(0.072)    
-7.58    
(0.000)     
0.58        
(0.50-0.67) 
Village has VHP?  
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
1.644 
   (0.105)     
15.62   
 (0.000)      
5.18   
(4.21-6.37) 
Any NGO membership in HH? 
(binary – ‘no’ is ref cat) 
0.207     
(0.066)      
3.15  
  (0.002)      
1.23        
(1.08-1.40) 
HH category based on total number of children 
under the age of 5 years: 
(categorical-‘no HH member under the age of 5 
years’ is ref cat) 
 
HH with 1 child under the age of 5 0.101    
(0.086)      
1.17    
(0.242)     
1.11       
(0.93-1.31) 
HH with 2 children under the age of 5 
 
0.171 
   (0.096)      
1.77   
 (0.076)     
1.19       
 (0.98-1.43) 
HH with 3 or more children under the age of 5   -0.007    
(0.133)     
-0.05    
(0.959)     
0.99        
(0.76-1.29) 
Presence of pregnant women in HH  
(binary- ‘no’ is ref cat) 
-0.087 
   (0.090)     
-0.98    
(0.328)     
0.92        
(0.77-1.09) 
Mean household education  0.182   
(0.013)     
14.04   
 (0.000)      
1.20       
( 1.17-1.23) 
Mean household age   -0.013    
(0.005)    
-2.64    
(0.008)      
0.99        
(0.98-1.00) 
Test  
Overall model significance  
Wald   (11) 
 
579.51*** 
Likelihood ratio test       (01) 100.61*** 
Note: ***= significant at 5% level; **= significant at 10% level, ns= not significant; HH=Household 
 
 
  
  
SUMMARY FINDINGS:  
The following table (Table 31) provides a snapshot of the 21 models that were run as a part of quantitative analysis. 
TABLE 31: SUMMARY TABLE OF VARIABLES INCLUDED IN EACH OF THE MODELS 
List of Independent 
Variables 
 
Model no. (year) 
1 (1999) 2 (1999) 
7 (2004) 
12 (2005) 
17 (1999,2004,2005) 
3 (1999) 
8 (2004) 
13 (2005) 
18 (1999,2004,2005) 
4 (1999) 
9 (2004) 
14 (2005) 
19 (1999,2004,2005) 
5 (1999) 
10 (2004) 
15 (2005) 
20 (1999,2004,2005) 
6 (1999) 
11 (2004) 
16 (2005) 
21 (1999,2004,2005) 
Individual 
level 
Household level Household level Household level Household level Household level 
Household Size √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Sex of main earner √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Socioeconomic status √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Village has VHP? √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Any NGO membership in 
household? 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
Any child under the age 
of 5? 
√ √ × √ × × 
Total number of children 
under the age of 5 
× × × × √ × 
Household category 
based on total number of 
children under the age 5 
× × × × × √ 
Any pregnant woman in 
household 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
Mean household 
education 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
Mean household age √ √ √ × √ √ 
1
1
6
 
  
 
 
The results from the 21 models run are summarized in the following table (Table 32) to provide an overview of variables that had 
significant influence on membership of health card scheme in each of these models. 
TABLE 32: SIGNIFCANCE OF IMPACT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ON MEMBERSHIP OF HEALTH CARD SCHEME 
Year of survey 
(level of analysis) 
Models Independent variables 
HH 
size 
Sex of 
main 
earner 
SES Village 
has 
VHP? 
Any NGO 
membership 
in HH? 
Any 
child<5 
yrs ? 
Total 
children< 
5 yrs  
HH category 
based on total 
children < 5yrs 
Any 
pregnant 
woman in 
HH? 
Mean HH 
education 
Mean 
HH 
age 
1999  
(individual level) 
Model 1 *** NS *** *** *** *** - - NS *** NS 
1999 
(household level) 
Model 2 *** NS *** *** *** *** - - NS *** NS 
Model 3 *** NS *** *** *** - - - NS *** NS 
Model 4 *** NS *** *** *** *** - - NS *** - 
Model 5 *** NS *** *** *** - NS - NS *** NS 
Model 6 *** NS *** *** *** - - *** for upto 2 
children<5 yrs in 
HH 
NS for 3 or more 
children<5yrs in 
HH 
 
 
 
NS *** NS 
1
1
7
 
  
  
Year of survey 
(level of analysis) 
Models Independent variables 
HH 
size 
Sex of 
main 
earner 
SES Village 
has 
VHP? 
Any NGO 
membership 
in HH? 
Any 
child<5 
yrs ? 
Total 
children< 
5 yrs  
HH category 
based on total 
children < 5yrs 
Any 
pregnant 
woman in 
HH? 
Mean HH 
education 
Mean 
HH 
age 
2004 
(household level) 
Model 7 *** NS NS *** NS NS - - NS *** NS 
Model 8 *** NS NS *** NS - - - NS *** *** 
Model 9 *** NS NS *** NS *** - - NS *** - 
Model 10 *** NS NS *** NS - *** - NS *** NS 
Model 11 *** NS NS *** NS - - ** for 2 or more 
children<5yrs in 
HH 
NS for 1 
child<5yrs in HH 
 
NS *** NS 
2005 
(household level) 
Model 12 NS NS *** *** *** NS - - NS *** ** 
Model 13 *** NS *** *** *** - - - NS *** *** 
Model 14 NS NS *** *** *** *** - - NS *** - 
Model 15 NS NS *** *** *** - ** - NS *** NS 
Model 16 NS NS *** *** *** - - NS NS *** NS 
1999, 2004, 2005 
(household level) 
Model 17 *** NS *** *** *** NS - - NS *** *** 
Model 18 *** NS *** *** *** - - - NS *** *** 
Model 19 *** NS *** *** *** *** - - NS *** - 
Model 20 *** NS *** *** *** - NS - NS *** *** 
Model 21 *** NS *** *** *** - - NS NS *** *** 
Note: ***= significant at 5%; **=significant at 10%; NS= not significant; HH=household; SES=socioeconomic status 
 
1
1
8
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As we can see from Table 32 the 21 models that were run to observe the effect of 
the socio-economic and demographic variables on the decision to enroll into the 
Chakaria health card scheme showed a few salient patterns. From the nine 
independent variables that were included in our analysis we found that two, 
namely existence of Village Health Post in the villages and mean level of 
household education, continued to have statistically significant impact on 
membership decision across all the survey years and over the 3 year time period 
as evident from the panel data analysis. This leads us to conclude that these two 
variables impact the decision to enroll irrespective of time and variation in 
models.  
Membership at the health card scheme increased with increasing household size. 
Larger households were significantly more likely to join the scheme compared to 
the smaller ones. Travel time and cost influenced decision to enroll as reflected 
by the significant positive impact of presence of VHP within the villages where 
the households are located. Among the socioeconomic characters, mean 
household education had positive influence on enrollment where households 
with higher mean education were more likely to join the scheme compared to 
households with lower mean education.  
Household size was found to have significant effect on membership in 1999 and 
in 2004 and in panel data. However, the effect was not significant in the year 
2005. Two other variables showed significant influence on membership status in 
both 1999 and 2005 and also over time as found in panel data. These variables 
were socioeconomic status of the household and membership at any NGO 
development program. Poor households were less likely to join the health card 
scheme compared to the better-offs and households with NGO membership were 
more likely to join than their counterpart. However, none of these variables 
showed significant impact on membership in the year 2004. The fact that SES did 
not have significant influence on membership in 2004 indicates that in 2004 
there were no differences in membership based on SES. This could be a result of 
the additional effort that was taken in 2004 in Chakaria to boost up membership 
of health card scheme. As a result households from all SES joined the scheme and 
the SES difference was minimized.  
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Among the other variables ‘presence of children under the age of five in 
household’ did not show any consistent impact throughout the years except for 
1999 when it had significant impact for all the models. Presence of pregnant 
women, mean household age, and sex of main earner are the three variables that 
did not conform to our hypothesis as they showed almost no statistically 
significant impact on decision to enroll. The fact that in Bangladesh over 90% of 
the pregnant women has home delivery could be an explanation behind safe 
motherhood services not encouraging enrollment. Sex of main earner on the 
other hand did not influence membership as expected. The very low share of 
female main earner (only 4.5%) could be a reason behind this result.  
Based on the findings that evolved from our 21 models one could easily 
understand the multi facet nature of the demand-influencing factors of MHI. The 
factors are a mix of both direct and indirect determinants of micro health 
insurance.  Factors that are not necessarily determinants of demand for any 
insurance mechanism have been found to influence decision to enroll. This 
indicates the importance of paying attention to factors that are not determinants 
of any financing mechanism but could be related to the client’s characteristics 
regarding preference for certain services or providers. Its only when we 
incorporate all these factors in designing MHI schemes will we be able to 
increase enrollment and satisfy the ‘law of large numbers’ which is the basis of 
sustaining any insurance scheme. 
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CHAPTER 6: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES OF MHI IN RURAL 
BANGLADESH: FROM THE EYES OF CONSUMERS, PROVIDERS AND 
POLICY MAKERS 
 
One of the objectives of my thesis was to explore the various dimensions of the 
market for MHI in Bangladesh with a holistic approach. In particular, the study 
synthesized qualitative data from the three major actors in the market for micro 
health insurance (MHI) in Bangladesh. These include, community members who 
form the client base for an MHI scheme, the program people in charge of 
designing, implementing and troubleshooting schemes to ensure acceptability, 
access and sustainability, and lastly the policy makers validating the relevance, 
need and adoptability of MHI schemes for attaining the ultimate goal of ‘health 
for all’ in Bangladesh (1, 2). A number of distinct themes evolved from the 
discussion with the respondents in each of these three groups. The current 
chapter gives a synopsis of these themes from the interviews. The findings 
presented in this chapter have evolved from the indepth interviews with the 
community members and the key informant interviews carried out with the 
program personnel and the policy makers.  
For community perception regarding MHI, indepth interviews with members as 
well as non members of the Chakaria health card scheme (1998-2005) were 
conducted. Even though the scheme seized operation in 2005 people were able 
to give information on the reasons behind their interest in the scheme or non-
interest for that matter. The scheme being one of its kinds at that time in the area 
helped people to recall information easily. Through these interviews we tried to 
investigate the factors that influence people's decision to join MHI schemes in 
general and in Chakaria in particular. Engaging MHI members for longer terms, 
i.e. getting people to renew membership, has been a major challenge for 
sustaining such schemes in developing countries (3). Therefore with these 
interviews we tried to focus on factors that resulted in people to discontinue 
membership. Complementing the information relating to the Chakaria scheme 
we also presented a hypothetical scheme (Table 33) in front of the respondents 
using a vignette method (4) to see their present state of thought regarding MHI. 
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Information on preference between health service provision under the 
government system and the system under insurance mechanism was also 
collected. 
Table 33: Hypothetical MHI scheme 
Benefit 
type  
Service Cost  Payment 
mechanism 
Benefit ceiling  
(1 USD=Tk. 84, 
2012 est.) 
Premium  
(1 USD=Tk. 84, 
2012 est.) 
Out-
patient 
services 
Consultation 
at designated 
health 
centres 
Free of 
charge  
No point of 
service payment 
Maximum of 6 
members per 
household per 
year is covered 
under the 
scheme 
 
Benefit ceiling 
of Tk. 54,000/ 
household/ 
year 
And individual 
household 
member 
ceiling of Tk. 
9,000/ 
household/ 
year 
Tk. 1000/ 
household/year 
Diagnostic 
tests 
20% 
discount on 
market 
price 
Patient pay 80% 
of the price out-
of-pocket  
Medicine  20% 
discount on 
market 
price  
Patient pay 80% 
of the price out-
of-pocket 
In-
patient 
services  
Hospital 
stay, 
operation, 
medicine and 
diagnostic 
No out-of-
pocket 
expenses 
for costs 
not 
exceeding 
Tk 9,000/ 
individual/ 
year 
Patients pay 
costs exceeding 
the ceiling 
 
For program perspective we interviewed six staff members who were involved 
with the Chakaria health card scheme during its operation. Opinions were sought 
regarding the challenges they faced in implementing the scheme and introducing 
a new concept like insurance in a remote rural area of Bangladesh, the innovative 
techniques they adopted to get buy-in from the villagers, factors that helped or 
hindered operation of the scheme, skilled that they felt the need for to run such a 
scheme.  
The policy perspective for health insurance (micro health insurance or national 
health insurance) in Bangladesh was assessed from views of five high officials 
involved in health policy making in Bangladesh based at the Ministry of Health 
and Family Welfare and the Director General Health Services within the ministry. 
They were asked to express their personal views regarding the scope of 
introducing a social health insurance as an alternate health financing mechanism 
 123 
 
for Bangladesh, the pros and cons of introducing such a mechanism, the related 
legal aspects, and finally whether an insurance mechanism can make the health 
systems of Bangladesh, a low-income country, more efficient. Detailed 
methodology for the qualitative data and its analysis can be found in chapter 2. 
The findings in this chapter will be presented in three separate sections: the first 
will focus on the opinion of the community members, the second on the findings 
from the interviews with the program people and third on the views of the policy 
makers.  
 
COMMUNITY PERCEPTION ABOUT MICRO HEALTH INSURANCE AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MHI: FINDINGS FROM CHAKARIA 
UNDERSTANDING OF MHI  
Fifteen out of 40 respondents had no understanding about micro health 
insurance. The level of understanding was greater among the better-off1 
households. Among the 15 households who did not know what health insurance 
was or how it works 9 were poor households and the rest were better-off 
households. Those who had some degree of understanding regarding what an 
MHI scheme is and how it operates described it as a mechanism where people 
pay in advance to secure future healthcare. In expressing their understanding of 
MHI the respondents said:  
“There is no guarantee of future. Anyone can get sick any time. So even if we have 
to pay something now this will secure our health for future. And this will reduce our 
cost of treatment in case of major illnesses.” 
“Good health is not a certain thing and MHI can cover this uncertainty.” 
“We are not sure whether there will be any natural calamity, still we store food for 
those difficult days. Why? Because we want assurance for our future and we want 
                                                        
1 Households were categorized into two socioeconomic groups based on involvement of any of the 
households members in selling menial labour. Households who had atleast one member engaged in menial 
labour was categorized as poor and whose who had no members engaged in menial labor was categorized 
as better-off. 
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to avoid the risk of starving. To me this is what micro health insurance is. It is 
insuring against future financing risks resulting from illness.” 
Some are aware of the fact that in MHI people pay premium irrespective of their 
health condition at the time of payment and this in exchange covers their 
healthcare cost when they get sick and require healthcare. People saw MHI as a 
system where one can take care of a large amount of healthcare cost, which is 
termed as catastrophic cost of illness in literature, with a comparatively lower 
contribution (i.e. premium). As one of the household member puts it:  
“MHI is of great help in case of major illnesses. This is because the premium will 
then cover a large amount of treatment cost.” 
Some were aware of the fact that in MHI people get treatment whenever they fall 
sick but on the other hand they would get nothing in exchange of the premium if 
they do not require healthcare. One of the respondents puts this in a very 
interesting manner. To her:  
“MHI is like a lottery. Sometimes one can get 50,000 Tk by investing only 2,000 TK 
and sometimes one will get nothing out of this 2, 000 Tk.” 
Some were even happy to think of this premium as a donation in case they don’t 
need healthcare during the insured period. To them:  “ We have to sacrifice small 
things in order to get greater benefit.” 
“It will benefit either me or my neighbour. It is the same to me.” 
Some of the respondents expressed that in MHI villagers together with each 
other make an arrangement for healthcare. It is a system that will work when a 
group of people agrees to buy into the scheme. It can not operate with only one 
or two members.  
Some households described MHI in terms of its advantages. They could 
understand that once they pay the premium they don’t have to worry about 
treatment related expenses even when they have no savings to pay for it. To 
them MHI eliminates the need for sudden additional cost to cover healthcare 
expenses. For majority of the households in the villages of a low income country 
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like Bangladesh having this additional fund available at all time is not common. 
In most cases this cost has to be recovered by withholding regular household 
expenses or by taking out loans.  
Respondents define premium as a onetime payment that secures healthcare for 
the rest of the year. To their understanding MHI gives access to quality 
healthcare on time at a lower cost. According to one of the respondents:  
“MHI is like advance payment for treatment at any time round the year.” 
Those who were not so much aware of the term health insurance and its 
mechanism saw it as a means of gaining access to quality healthcare. As they 
trust the provider organization (i.e. ICDDR,B) they knew that health centres 
operated under the supervision of this organization will be of good quality. 
People also calculated that the premium they have to pay to cover their entire 
household will most likely be lower than the amount they would have to pay 
taking care of a few episodes of illness of the household members. Some 
respondents expressed that:  
“MHI will help people, it might not always be me but it will be someone living close 
to me” 
 
BENEFIT OF MHI  
People were asked whether they expect MHI to be beneficial for them. The 
reasons behind their thoughts were also looked into. Sixteen households thought 
MHI to be beneficial for the health of their family. Majority of the respondents 
who had a positive thought about MHI were from better-off households (12 vs. 4 
households). Some of the respondents agreed that MHI will help them to gain 
access to quality healthcare at all time. However, their ability to pay for premium 
constrained their willingness to join such schemes. 
 
 Again the trust in provider organization played an important role in the way 
people thought about MHI and its benefits. Its only because they trust ICDDR,B 
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(the organization that would operate the MHI scheme in Chakaria) they thought 
MHI would be beneficial in terms of getting proper healthcare and they believed 
that they would get the value for money if they invest in schemes operated by 
ICDDR,B. 
Reduction in uncertain household expenditure, access to quality treatment at all 
time, securing future healthcare, elimination of the need to borrow to pay for 
catastrophic healthcare cost, minimizing healthcare cost, having a fixed and 
known place for treatment, were among the benefits of MHI mentioned by these 
respondents. 
On the other hand 4 of the respondents thought MHI can be of no use to them. 
They were not willing to buy any MHI scheme to avoid the risk of losing their 
money. They preferred paying for healthcare as and when needed to avoid any 
uncertainty associated with insurance packages. Others thought they would not 
be able to reap any benefit from the scheme as they will not be able to afford the 
premium. Some respondents preferred to be treated by doctors practicing in the 
city and therefore if MHI doesn’t cover their choice of provider then it would not 
be beneficial for them.  The rest had no opinion on whether MHI can benefit 
them in any ways.  
 
WILLINGNESS TO JOIN MHI SCHEMES AND REASONS BEHIND 
Willingness to join MHI schemes and the reasons behind was assessed with the 
help of the hypothetical scheme (Table 33) mentioned above. Securing family’s 
future good health, minimizing healthcare cost, eliminating the need to borrow 
money to pay for sudden catastrophic cost, access to quality healthcare, were 
among the most frequently mentioned reasons for people willing to insure 
themselves. The respondents said:  
“This will secure our future by taking care of our health”  
“We wont have to sell our assets or take loan when we need treatment” 
Some respondents also mentioned that with MHI they will not need any cash at 
the point of service and this will ease access to treatment. As the villagers of 
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Chakaria were exposed to the health card scheme during 1998-2005, their 
responses were very much influenced by their previous experience. Some of the 
respondents willing to join MHI scheme mentioned issues like transport cost, 
pediatric treatment, availability of medicine at discounted rate, reduced need for 
accompanying person for patients, as additional features that would attract them 
to the scheme. They knew that the health centers through which ICDDR,B is 
planning to operate the MHI scheme will be placed within the boundary of the 
villages. This will reduce the transport cost and the need for accompanying 
person when any of the family members need healthcare. This indicates that 
although these issues are not necessarily associated with MHI, they can play a 
vital role in making MHI accessible and attractive to the villagers and therefore 
need to be catered-for for the scheme to be successful in a developing country 
setting. Some respondents wanted to join simply because they trusted the 
provider organization and believed that whatever service they would provide 
would be of superior quality. 
One of the respondents said: 
“The healthcare center can also provide us with information as we are not aware of 
which place to seek treatment from in times of need.”  
“We will have fixed doctors which will make things easier. The doctors will know 
me and I will know the doctors. Will have trust on the doctors.” 
As membership of the hypothetical scheme was described to be at household 
level larger households showed more interest in joining the scheme for obvious 
reasons. This might give rise to moral hazard given that the provider doesn’t 
have a built-in mechanism to counter this market failure. As one of the 
respondents said: 
“Our family size is large and MHI will reduce our healthcare cost” 
There were respondents who were willing to join in principle. But they knew 
that they will not be able to pay for the whole amount of premium at a time. 
Some even suggested that if the scheme offers payment of premium in 
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installments it would be accessible to many other households who otherwise will 
not opt for it. 
 On the other hand there were people who were not willing to join MHI schemes. 
Affordability of the premium came out to be the major reason for people not 
willing to join. Villagers from lower socioeconomic strata tend to depend on 
spiritual will and power for their day to day life including their healthcare. This is 
mainly due to the lack of additional fund to pay for these services. For them 
making both ends meal for the family is what matters the most. As the 
respondents puts it:  
“As we have little money it is better for us to pay for healthcare only when we need 
it. It is difficult for us to pay the premium at a time. If we are in trouble and don’t 
have money we will still be able to manage by borrowing from someone to pay for 
treatment.” 
“Other expenses like kid’s education come first. Securing future health is not our 
priority” 
 “Allah will look after us when we get sick. We will manage somehow.” (Depending 
on spiritual power as they can not afford to pay in advance for healthcare) 
A few respondents were doubtful about how these schemes work and how their 
invested money is going to be utilized. They said:  
“ If I think the provider will cheat me then I wont join.” 
Another respondent said:  
“I don’t trust this type of schemes. I don’t know what they will do with my money” 
Some of the respondents were simply not comfortable with the health financing 
mechanism under MHI where people have to pay in advance for healthcare and 
return to this fund is not guaranteed. Some of the families did not experience any 
major illness so far and thus were not concerned about catastrophic healthcare 
cost. They count on their healthy state and thought that they will pay for 
healthcare if and when needed.  
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CONTINUING MHI MEMBERSHIP 
For majority of the MHI schemes in developing countries high dropout rates have 
been a major threat to sustainability of the schemes. Even if the schemes succeed 
in attracting people from the various socioeconomic strata, many a times they 
fail to keep them interested in the scheme and renew membership. In our 
questionnaire we tried to investigate factors that would make people hold on to 
their membership year after year in the proposed scheme. In other words, we 
were trying to find which features of MHI ensure the right value for the money 
invested and therefore encourage people to continue insuring themselves with 
the same provider. As it turned out from the responses recorded quality of 
treatment and the qualification of the doctors were among the major concerns of 
the villagers. People prefer schemes that give them access to qualified healthcare 
provider and quality treatment no matter what the financing mechanism might 
be. To them if they insure themselves then the scheme must give them access to 
24 hour medical services.  
“The payment is not what we will worry about, treatment has to be effective. We 
will see whether the treatment is curing us or not.” 
It was observed that villagers want to fulfill their requirements that are not 
satisfied at the public healthcare centres. At public services doctors don’t allow 
adequate time for consultation due to patient load, shortage of manpower and 
their behaviour towards the patients is not always acceptable (5). As a result 
people long for places where they will have enough time on consultation and 
where they will be treated with respect. This is reflected in the response 
regarding features of MHI scheme that would make them hold on to the 
membership.  
Respondents also talked about shortages of medicine supply which is a common 
phenomenon at the public healthcare centers. Therefore people would like to 
attach themselves with schemes that ensure availability of necessary medicines 
at all times. Finally majority of the respondents said that the scheme has to keep 
its promise. The benefits that are mentioned in the MHI package should be real 
and not for the sake of attracting clients. As the respondents put it: 
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“Their word and work has to match” 
“We will observe whether they were able to keep all their promises or some of their 
promises or none of their promises” 
 As mentioned earlier very few respondents were exposed to the concept of MHI 
and many are not comfortable with the fact that they would have to pay for 
services in advance and in the event of no illness in the family their invested 
money will not be returned to them. Some of the respondents said they would 
renew membership only if they get services in return otherwise they will quite. 
One of the respondents said:  
“I will renew membership only if I or my family get treatment. I have to get service 
equal to the money invested.” 
Responses of some of the people from poorer SES were: 
 “If we don’t require healthcare during the one year we wont renew membership” 
“ if we had money then we would have been happy to see others getting services 
even when we are not getting any out of it.” 
 
This shows that even if people prefer healthcare financing through insurance 
mechanism, lack of available fund to pay for premium holds them from being a 
part of it or reaping any advantage out of such schemes.  
 
NECESSITY OF MHI SCHEMES IN PROVISION OF QUALITY HEALTHCARE  
Twelve better-off households said MHI is necessary for provision of quality 
health service in Chakaria. Eleven respondents from the poorer households said 
MHI is necessary. However their opinion was only in principle. In reality they 
thought MHI might not be good for the poor people mainly due to their 
affordability. Two of the respondents from the better-off households said MHI 
will not be useful. The rest of the respondents from both the SES were either not 
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sure or not willing to comment on the necessity of MHI for healthcare provision 
in Chakaria.  
 As mentioned earlier most of the respondents don’t understand what MHI is or 
how it’s financing mechanism works. Some said MHI is necessary because the 
health centres through which it will operate will be nearby. What they really 
thought of when we talked about MHI is that the provider will setup a health 
center, equipped with qualified healthcare personnel, that is close to them and 
that will ease access to quality treatment on time. The opportunity cost of getting 
treatment (transport cost, lost wage and time etc) is what the villagers prioritize 
not so much the mechanism behind the provision of health service. This is even 
more explicit when we investigate the responses of those who identified MHI as 
necessary for healthcare provision in the area. The reasons mentioned are 
mostly to do with quality of treatment, access to treatment and the like and not 
with the efficiency of healthcare financing under MHI. Some of the responses are 
noted below: 
“There is no added benefit when we pay in cash without insurance. MHI offers 
discount and other benefits. But the premium must be kept at a reasonable 
amount” 
Some said MHI is necessary, as with this arrangement their purchasing power 
will enable them to demand for quality health services. Unlike the public health 
centres all members of the scheme will be treated with equal importance and 
care.  
“We will have a fixed place for treatment where we will be treated with respect.” 
To some MHI will ease utilization of hospital services, as the scheme will have 
contracts with local and central hospitals.  
“The insurance provider will have a deal with the hospital. This will make 
hospitalization easy for the insured. Utilizing hospital services will be hassle free.” 
Some identified MHI to provide the opportunity for the better-offs to get 
involved in social services as the premium they pay will help others even if it 
doesn’t help themselves. To them, in any case if there is an emergency in a poor 
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family of the village the better-offs have to contribute in managing the fund for 
treatment. With MHI this will be done in an efficient manner. One of the 
respondents said: 
“There will be a pool of fund that will help everyone in time of need. If for nothing 
else, we should join the scheme for the sake of social service “Jonokolyan”. 
According to some MHI will reduce the necessity for emergency fund to pay for 
healthcare and most likely will reduce healthcare expenses. 
“Health insurance will take care of the high treatment cost which otherwise we 
have to bear. Now we don’t have to pay that much” 
“if we don’t have MHI we will end up spending a lot more for healthcare in the 
event of a major illness in the family” 
Some of the respondents who thought MHI can be beneficial and is necessary to 
provide quality healthcare also had concerns regarding resource allocation: 
“....However if the doctors are not available on time and we don’t get the benefits as 
promised this will be of no help” 
On the other hand according to some of the poorer households: 
“ it (MHI) will only be beneficial if we have money to pay for premium. Otherwise 
we wont get any benefit out of it.” 
 “It will also be good for those who are wealthy or have enough money to put aside 
for health in advance”  
 “MHI is not good for poor people. They are better-off paying when it is needed 
(nogode). They will somehow manage the money for treatment in times of 
emergency, be it by borrowing or by taking out loan” 
Some were not sure if MHI is a better option for healthcare provision in the area. 
They would rather wait and observe its operation for sometime before they 
comment on its usefulness.  
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 “Not sure whether this will ensure quality treatment. After some years if we see it 
to succeed then we will believe in it.” 
Some respondents opted not to comment on this, as they had no understanding 
of MHI. 
 
CURRENT GOVERNMENT FINANCING VS. FINANCING UNDER MHI 
Again responses were not so much about the financing mechanism or the 
technical management of health service under the two systems. For many, 
preference was more towards anti-government services (24 out of the total 40 
respondents). The public system is not fulfilling their demand and thus they 
would like to opt for an alternate source of healthcare. Those who preferred MHI 
over public healthcare (23 out of 40) mentioned that utilizing healthcare services 
under the public system is a hassle for most of the people, particularly for 
patients belonging to the lower SES. With very high patient-doctor ratio there is 
always a long queue to get treated at government facilities. On top of this, 
absenteeism is a common feature among the doctors and staff at the public 
health facilities. Doctors don’t have a fixed time of availability and all these make 
healthcare utilization time consuming.  As the respondents said: 
“Time is money. It’s important to save time” 
“....But with government services we have to queue up for a long time to get 
treated”  
“it takes thrice  the time than normal to get treated (at the government facility)” 
 
Furthermore, with inadequate supply of medicine and human resource crisis the 
public healthcare suffers from corruption where under the table payment is a 
common practice in accessing most of its services. Some of the respondents also 
mentioned MHI will reduce the need for cash at the point of service. Public 
healthcare although is suppose to be free of cost at the primary level, it actually 
involves illegal payments at various stages as stated by the respondents. People 
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are not satisfied with the quality of treatment and even though the medicine is 
suppose to be provided free of cost most of the time the patients have to buy 
them from outside. Even when free medicine is available it is not of adequate 
quantity. They add: 
“With government service there is under the table payment. It requires more time 
and the doctors are not there all the time.” 
“....when we need to get admitted, the admission is free but it involves other illegal 
payments and that increases cost.” 
“We have to pay extra (bribe) to get treatment.” 
“They (staff at the public health centers) don’t give the complete dose of medicines 
even if they have stock” 
“You are lucky if you can get medicine from a government health center” 
“They only provide immunization, vitamins and family planning services.”  
However, many of those who preferred to have MHI for healthcare provision 
mentioned that the process has to be honest and transparent for them to have 
trust on the providers. Some even said: 
“If it (public health service) was properly functional then we would prefer 
government service.” 
Public healthcare, on the other hand, were preferred over MHI by 3 of the 
respondents. Some of the respondents thought MHI will increase administrative 
difficulties and they will have to maintain proper documentation of their 
membership to get benefit out of the scheme. To them maintaining a card is 
troublesome. Also the respondents preferred not to have MHI as then they would 
have to pay in advance for healthcare and this money will not be returned to 
them in case they don’t require healthcare. Some thought they are better-off 
using the public services and paying for healthcare as and when needed. Trust in 
insurance provider was also an issue for some. One of the respondents said: 
“I don’t trust the insurance people. I am not sure what they will do with my money.” 
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One distinct feature was observed from the responses of the people from the two 
different SES. None of the respondents from the lower SES preferred government 
service. The 3 respondents who preferred government services over MHI were 
from the better-off households.  
 
Fourteen respondents did not express their preference clearly. Nine among these 
14 respondents expressed their frustration about government health service 
provision. However, they were not in a position to vote for MHI over government 
services due to lack of understanding and experience with MHI. 
 
FINDINGS ON CHAKARIA HEALTH CARD SCHEME  
REASON FOR ENROLMENT  
Half of the respondents (20 out of 40) interviewed were members of the MHI 
scheme during 1998-2005. Among these 20 respondents 9 were from the lower 
SES. The interviews with the members gave information on the factors that 
attracted them to the scheme.  Majority of the members (18 out of 20) said that 
they joined the scheme to receive quality treatment. They knew that the doctors 
were qualified and they could access healthcare without much delay. About one-
third of the members mentioned no or low transport cost was another deciding 
factor as the healthcare centers were situated within the villages. It also made 
access to healthcare easy as any family member could visit the health center and 
there was no need for an additional person to accompany the patient in most 
cases. Eight of the members said that they had joined the scheme following their 
peers or being advised by other villagers and the volunteers of the scheme.  
“Other villagers got membership. So I did too.”  
According to one-fifth of the members the health card scheme offered lower 
consultation fee and this reduced healthcare expenses for them. As the doctors 
were fixed and had built a good rapport with the villagers, for some this was a 
major reason to join the scheme. Acquaintance with the doctors and trust in 
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them made the villagers comfortable in utilizing healthcare at these health 
centres. The fact that the health centres worked as a one-stop facility for all the 
family members to access healthcare also helped in attracting people. Some also 
mentioned that availability of good quality medicine at discounted price helped 
them in completing treatment. Only one of the members mentioned that they 
became members to secure their future health need.  
One of the members mentioned an interesting reason for his trust in the scheme. 
At times visitors from the foreign donor agency that funded the scheme used to 
come to Chakaria to monitor the progress of the scheme and its activities. This 
attracted people. As to them, visit of foreign people increases the importance of 
any activity in the villages.  
“once a foreign doctor visited the health centers. So I decided to join the scheme” 
This is a very common phenomenon in the context of the villages of Bangladesh 
where they rarely see people from outside the country. Therefore any affiliation 
of a program with a foreign country and its people makes the program lucrative 
to them.  
 
BENEFIT TO THE PEOPLE 
Respondents were asked what benefits they received from being member of the 
scheme. According to majority of the members (14 of the 21) the greatest benefit 
was that the scheme reduced their average healthcare cost accumulating from 
the lower consultation fee, provision of discount on medicine price and no or 
very low transport cost. Some mentioned that the health centres being nearby it 
gave them the option of accessing healthcare by any of the family members.  
 
Access to quality treatment without delay was in the benefit list of 13 member 
respondents. Members also accrued benefit from the relationship they had with 
the doctors and other staff. The patients were known faces and were treated 
with respect at the health centres and this was a valuable feature of the scheme 
 137 
 
according to many of the members. They also mentioned that having a health 
card made access to healthcare convenient as this ensured that their history of 
illness was recorded.  
“With card we were treated as regular patients at the centers and this gave us 
added advantages “puran roogi, beshi shubidha” 
Their trust in the doctors resulted in trusting the treatment they were receiving. 
One of the respondents said: 
“ I could rely on them in case of emergency.” 
Some said the scheme reduced the need for cash at the point of service. 
Treatment was guaranteed for people with or without money. One of the 
respondents mentioned that availability of consultation and medicine at a single 
place was very convenient for them. Also the fact that treatment was available 
for family members of all age group was an added advantage. The health centres 
provided safe motherhood and delivery services and also pediatric treatment, 
which were mentioned as benefits under the scheme.  
However, 4 of the members mentioned that they could never reap any benefit 
from the membership of the health card due to the fact that the doctors were 
available at the health centers only twice a week for half a day. These members 
required treatment after hours and therefore had to consult other doctors in the 
city.  
 
REASON FOR NOT JOINING  
The highest response (7 respondents) in expressing reasons for never enrolling 
into the scheme was that people were healthy and they did not feel the need to 
pay in advance for healthcare. Six of the respondents mentioned that they 
preferred to consult doctors practicing in the cities and they had greater trust in 
them. They were not sure about the quality of the doctors who were providing 
services under the health card scheme. Some (two of the respondents) pointed 
out the unavailability of health service round the clock as the reason for them not 
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to enroll. Some thought that the health centres were good for pediatric treatment 
and as they had no children they were not interested to join. Village doctors are a 
popular option in the villages of Bangladesh and the villagers in most cases have 
very strong rapport with them (6-8). This was reflected in the responses as some 
mentioned that they preferred accessing treatment from village doctors to 
treatment from the doctors providing healthcare under the scheme. As the health 
centres provided primary healthcare, some of the respondents preferred self-
medication in taking care of minor illnesses and they relied on the drug stores 
from where they could purchase their choice of medicine. It should be mentioned 
that Bangladesh having no strong regulation on authority to sell prescription 
medicines people can buy any medicine from the drug stores (9). A few of the 
respondents expressed that they were simply reluctant in joining any such 
schemes and therefore were unaware of its activities and benefits as such.  
 
DISCONTINUATION OF MEMBERSHIP 
Twelve of the members continued their membership for more than one year. The 
rest nine members opted out of the membership of the scheme. This was due to 
the fact that people expect to get benefit out of the premium they pay for 
insuring themselves and in the event of non utilization of healthcare during the 
specific time period they take it as a loss. For many in a developing country 
setting this investment is unaffordable. As mentioned by some of the 
respondents who did not renew membership 
“Other household expenses get priority over paying for healthcare in advance. I 
cant afford to pay and lose the money if I don’t need healthcare.” 
Five of the respondents said that as they did not need treatment to the extent 
they expected they discontinued membership. The human resource constraint of 
the scheme also averted people from continuing membership at the scheme. As 
three of the respondents mentioned that the non availability of doctors at all 
time was the reason for them not to renew membership. 
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PREFERENCE BETWEEN HEALTH SERVICE WITH OR WITHOUT HEALTH CARD 
People were asked whether they would prefer a health service system with 
health card or not. According to half of the respondents the health card scheme 
provided better health service compared to the other available options of health 
services.  Reason for preferring health card scheme was similar to the factors 
that attracted people to the scheme at the first place. To the respondents health 
card scheme reduced their overall healthcare cost by means of lower consultancy 
fee, discounted medicine price and reduced transportation cost. They also 
mentioned the lower opportunity cost in accessing healthcare from the Village 
Health Post as one of the beneficial aspects of the scheme. As the health centres 
were nearby the patient in most cases did not require an additional person to 
accompany him or her. And in that case income earners did not have to forego 
wages to arrange for treatment of their family members. Also there were no 
delays in receiving treatment and on time treatment saved expenses which 
otherwise would have accrued in terms of lost income and time. The issue of 
patients being treated with respect irrespective of their SES was a source of 
attraction for many. They said as they had a fixed place for treatment and they 
owned the card the doctors and staff could recognize them right away.  
“if I have a card there is no additional hassle. The doctors know me. It makes 
getting treatment easier.” 
This was valued highly by the villagers who most often are deprived of proper 
behavior and adequate consultation time at other healthcare centers, 
particularly at the public health centers where primary healthcare is suppose to 
be free for all.  
 
The respondents also mentioned a very useful aspect of having a fixed and 
known place for treatment. They said that majority of the villagers are not aware 
of proper places for treatment of the various illnesses they experience. The VHPs 
acted as sort of an information hub. People could consult with the doctors at the 
VHPs about where to seek higher level healthcare in case the illness was not 
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managed at the VHPs. This saved them from repeated visits to various providers 
before they could access the right kind of treatment.  
Those who did not prefer healthcare under the health card scheme showed 
concern regarding the resource constraint of the scheme, particularly the 
availability of doctors for a very limited time every week. According to them  
“It is not guaranteed that I will get sick the day the doctors are here.” 
Respondents who did not prefer the idea of paying in advance for healthcare 
voted against the health card scheme. To them it is better to pay for healthcare as 
and when needed. Respondents who considered themselves healthy and free of 
any diseases preferred not to go for any scheme where they need to pay in 
advance.  
One of the respondents said there is no need for any scheme what we need is 
access to quality treatment and qualified doctors. As he puts it: 
“If the doctors are good we don’t need any special scheme. Schemes don’t add any 
benefit” 
Fourteen of the respondents were either not sure or not in a position to 
comment due to their unawareness about the benefits of the scheme. These 
respondents mostly included people who never became members of the scheme. 
According to some of these respondents they would prefer the system that 
provides them quality treatment, be it under the health card scheme or any other 
arrangement.  
 
IMPLEMENTING MICRO HEALTH INSURANCE IN RURAL BANGLADESH: THE 
PROGRAM PERSPECTIVE 
In order to understand the programmatic challenges and opportunities of 
implementing a micro health insurance scheme in a rural setup in Bangladesh 
the current study interviewed six program people who were directly involved 
with operating the scheme at the field level. In particular we tried to explore the 
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level of understanding about MHI and its mechanism amongst the program 
people, techniques used to explain MHI to the villagers who barely had any 
knowledge of health insurance and enroll them to the scheme, operational and 
programmatic challenges faced in implementation, their opinion on the 
importance of MHI or any other form of health insurance for delivering 
healthcare in Bangladesh and finally to their opinion what could have made the 
scheme more efficient.  
Opinions were sought from project staff involved in all forms of operations 
including healthcare provision, marketing of the scheme, administrative 
functions including maintenance of client portfolio, transactions, organizational 
work including networking and organizing community groups; research related 
to monitoring and reporting of scheme performance and finally central 
management. All but one of the respondents was involved in the project during 
its complete span of operational, i.e. 1998-2005. 
 
UNDERSTANDING OF HEALTH INSURANCE  
HEALTH INSURANCE VS. OTHER FORMS OF INSURANCE 
Questions were asked to explore how far the project people themselves 
understood the concept of health insurance and micro health insurance in 
particular. In doing so we asked them to distinguish health insurance from other 
forms of insurance.  
The respondents viewed the difference between health insurance and other 
forms of insurance in terms of profitability of the insurance product and the 
nature and condition of benefit offered. According to the respondents, with 
health insurance health care is guaranteed whereas with other forms of 
insurance healthcare is not provided. On the other hand, with other insurance 
products benefit is guaranteed after a certain period of time (e.g. life insurance).  
However, with health insurance one only benefits when they get ill and no 
benefit is received in their healthy state. This might result in insured person 
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getting no benefit out of the premium they paid, while this is not the case for 
other insurance products.   
One of the staff opined that if it were private health insurance then he/she would 
see very little difference between health insurance and other forms of insurance 
as all of them are for profit organizations. However, when it comes to micro 
health insurance there is the crucial element of community participation and 
ownership. Health insurance gives them a sense of right, ownership in the 
program and a right to decision making which he/she thinks is not offered by 
other forms of insurances available in the market. The other major difference 
identified was that micro health insurance is not for profit, it only covers the 
operational cost which is not the case for other insurance products.  
 
HEALTH INSURANCE VS. SAVINGS 
In many countries where health insurance is comparatively a new concept 
clients easily get lost between the mechanism of savings and insurance and as a 
result by the end of insurance period they expect a guaranteed return. Failure to 
explain the difference between the two to the clients would then result in serious 
misunderstanding and mistrust on the scheme. Thus we tried to explore whether 
this was carefully handled within the scheme. When asked about the difference 
between savings and insurance the project staff could easily distinguish the two. 
They said with savings one gets the money back for sure whereas with insurance 
you only get your money back once the incidence happens. Further they also 
added that with health insurance one gets a significant support in time of need. 
One interesting quote from a respondent was  
“Insurance is like money with an expiry date” 
 
EXPLAINING HEALTH INSURANCE TO VILLAGERS 
The villagers not being familiar with the concept of health insurance, the biggest 
challenge for the program personnel were to get people to invest in health even 
when they are healthy. Furthermore, Bangladesh is a low-income country and 
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majority of the people in the rural areas struggle to make both ends meal. In the 
face of serious financial hardship paying the premium to insure against the risk 
of an uncertain health outcome is not easily understood. As a result the program 
people had to continuously look for innovative ways to explain the mechanism of 
the scheme and get more people interested to buy insurance. Techniques like 
using popular and already known concepts to explain micro health insurance 
was used. Instead of insurance the term that was used more commonly was 
‘health card’. People knew that with the premium they could buy the health card 
that would entitle their family with primary healthcare services at the 
designated health centres, namely the Village Health Posts (VHPs).  At the time of 
operation of the scheme, the villagers were aware of the concept of life insurance 
due to the long presence of private life insurance companies and other NGOs 
offering life insurance in the area. The program people therefore also tried to use 
the example of life insurance and then add that unlike life insurance, micro 
health insurance does not promise guaranteed return. With health insurance the 
client will only receive benefit when they are sick and that also in terms of 
services. However, soon the staff realized that experience with insurance has not 
been very positive among the villagers and as a result the term ‘health card’ was 
more convenient to use.  
OPERATIONAL AND PROGRAMMATIC CHALLENGES 
PAYING FOR HEALTHCARE WHILE PUBLIC HEALTHCARE IS FREE 
The program being first of its kind in the locality it was challenging for the 
program people to engage the villagers in any discussion about the initiative. 
People at the beginning expected that the health services would be provided free 
of charge. This is a result of the so called ‘relief mentality’  (10,11) that rooted 
from the development agencies’ (e.g. United Nations, World Bank) assistance/aid  
during times of difficultly in Bangladesh where different services were provided 
free of charge. Getting people out of this mentality and actually pay for their own 
healthcare was a challenge even when the charge is minimal. In addition, public 
health service in the area was officially free. People used to question every 
activity related to the scheme. Extensive motivation programs had to be 
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designed to develop people’s understanding and the necessity and benefit of 
insuring against the risk of ill health.  
 
DISTANCE TO HEALTH CENTERS 
The other challenge was distance to health centers from where the patients live. 
Even though, the health card was provided to the poor at a subsidized rate, only 
people living close to the health centers joined the scheme and used the health 
services.  
SUPPLY INADEQUACY: HUMAN RESOURCE SHORTAGE 
Human resource shortage was a challenge for the scheme. The available fund for 
the scheme allowed having only two physicians and the scheme had seven 
service centers covering a population of 140,000. For this the doctors were 
available only twice a week for half a day at each of these centers. Absence of 
round-the-clock availability of doctors, or at least every day of the week was a 
hindrance in attracting people to the scheme and retaining members.  
COMPETITIVE MARKET FOR HEALTHCARE 
The scheme faced competition from the village doctors who were available 
round-the-clock to the villagers and on top they used to provide treatment on 
credit. Even though the treatment provided through the scheme was from 
qualified physicians, villagers were inclined to take treatment from the informal 
healthcare providers (e.g. village doctors) mostly due to availability, familiarity 
with the provider and ease of payment mechanism. In addition some of the 
village doctors tried to convince people that the doctors at the VHPs are of poor 
quality as the services are being provided at a very low cost. They even said  
“Low price means low quality” 
CULTURAL AND OTHER COMMUNICATION BARRIERS  
Some of the project staff were recruited from outside the locality. Chakaria, has a 
distinct culture and the dialect used is different from other parts of the country. 
Thus cultural adjustment and adapting to the local language and ways of 
communication was a challenge for some of the program people.  
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LACK OF TECHNICAL SKILL 
The program people reported lack of trained personnel to perform the role of 
midwives, paramedics, pharmacists, and also lack of some specific skills like 
marketing, effective communication and motivation. The midwives and the 
paramedics were in fact local people trained at the health centers by the 
physicians. The training did not take place at any formal institute.  One of the 
staff reported,  
“We had lack of knowledge on proper marketing strategy and with no formal 
training it was difficult at the beginning to motivate the villagers to be involved 
with something new.”  
PACKAGE DESIGN 
The scheme offered limited benefit which only covered primary healthcare. Not 
having any referral services covered by the scheme or laboratory services 
included in the package, was seen as a limitation by the program people to 
attract more villagers. As patients requiring secondary level care ultimately had 
to travel to other healthcare centers, they began to lose interest in the scheme.  
 
NEED OF MHI FOR THE POOR 
Majority of the program people firmly believed that micro health insurance had 
the potential to help the poor. To them MHI can protect the poor from the 
adverse effect of financial catastrophe resulting from ill health. They opined that 
at time of need, the poor often have to sell valuable assets or borrow at high 
interest rates to pay for healthcare which brings further financial hardship. With 
MHI they will no longer have to arrange for such sudden payments and take 
drastic decisions like selling assets and the like.  On the other hand, two of the 
staff thought that MHI can help the poor only when it can offer a subsidized 
package for them. One of them said, 
“Micro health insurance can benefit poor only when the scheme is (financially) 
stable and is in a position to provide safety net for the poor”.  
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So according to this staff, MHI can help poor at a later stage of scheme operation 
when it will have enough financial leverage to design a built-in subsidized 
package for the poor. One also suggested using flexible payment methods like 
paying premium in installment, to increase accessibility among the poor.  
One of the staff pointed out that alongside subsidizing for the poor there will 
need to be enough cross subsidization which will ensure building an effective 
package. If the scheme is aimed to serve only the people with low ability to pay 
then it will end up being a poorly designed product and thereby get caught into a 
cycle where a weak financial base results in a poorly designed product and 
thereby not being attractive to the well-off.  
 
NEED FOR MHI AND HOW IT SCORES AGAINST EXISTING SYSTEM OF HEALTH FINANCING  
To some of the staff, MHI or some form of health insurance is necessary to ensure 
quality healthcare in Bangladesh. They believe MHI has the potential to reduce 
out-of-pocket expenses. They think that poor should have equal access to public 
and private services and that financial barrier should not hinder their access to 
quality healthcare. With MHI it is possible to design products that ensure access 
to quality healthcare at a rate affordable to the poor.  
In comparing the existing revenue based health financing with health insurance 
some of the staff were skeptic about the level of acceptance of health insurance 
or MHI in particular, in the face of free public health provision. So even if they 
feel the mechanism under MHI to be efficient they are not sure how far it can 
attract the required number of people to keep the pool large enough for a 
sustainable model.  
Some opined that it would have been better if we could have health financing 
through health insurance at the national level. But at the same time they doubt 
how far benefit will reach the needy. One of the staff said, 
“MHI can act as complement to existing system of health financing” 
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According to one other staff the existing health financing system of the 
government is efficient which is visible from the achievements gained so far in 
health sector even with limited resources. However, he also added that health 
insurance can design its scheme in a way that has a built in incentive mechanism 
to attract better qualified physicians to the rural areas which currently is not the 
case. He thought using both the systems (current government financing and 
health insurance) in a complementary manner can prove to be efficient. He said,  
“MHI can help raise additional fund and contribute in the total health expenditure 
of the country.” 
 
LEVEL OF SKILL OF PROGRAM PEOPLE 
Majority of the staff members felt that they did not have adequate skill to run 
such schemes. As mentioned above marketing techniques, motivational skill, 
actuarial calculation to arrive at a financially viable premium, were among the 
frequently mentioned expertise that the staff felt not competent in. They also felt 
the need for an active monitoring tool to prevent fraud and increase efficiency of 
the scheme.  
 
Further, the staff members felt that they needed more theoretical knowledge on 
health insurance and its mechanism. Other areas of expertise mentioned by the 
staff members included management of primary healthcare, claim settlement, 
medicine dispensing.  
 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR MHI IN CHAKARIA 
The program people who were interviewed mentioned a few factors that made 
their job of convincing people to buy MHI in Chakaria easier. First and foremost, 
ICDDR,B had its existence in Chakaria for quite a few years before launching the 
health card scheme . The involvement of ICDDR,B in Chakaria was aimed at 
increasing community empowerment and it embedded the concept of self-help 
among villagers to improve their livelihood. The concept of self-help encouraged 
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the villagers to participate by own contribution. As a part of this initiative 
villagers were encouraged to work towards improving the status of their health. 
With technical support from ICDDR,B the villagers had established health centers 
and ICDDR,B assisted them by appointing physicians to serve these health 
centers. This was a major factor supporting introduction of health card in the 
area. According to the respondents, the villagers had a sense of ownership for the 
health centers from where the health card scheme was providing health services. 
The physicians at the health centers were also people they had known earlier 
and people who they trust. One of the respondents mentioned this trusted 
relationship between the community and ICDDR,B as a positive features of the 
scheme:  
“The identity of ICDDR,B in the area was very helpful in convincing people. ICDDR,B 
gained popularity in the country through their ORS (Oral Rehydration Solution) 
programme” 
 
In addition, a group of volunteers from the locality helped to spread the word 
around and convince people to join the scheme. The community health workers 
who took midwifery training from ICDDR,B also worked to convince people. 
Further, some of the staff members were from the locality making access to 
villagers easier for the team as one staff member said, 
“As I was from the locality people were more comfortable talking to me and they 
trusted me.” 
The identity of ICDDR,B as a trusted organization therefore was a positive factor. 
Further, the transport system in the villages were not good during the time of the 
project and the health centers were constructed within the village boundaries 
bringing health service to people's doorstep. This attracted a lot of people to the 
scheme as then they would have the opportunity to get healthcare more 
conveniently at a reduced travel cost and time.  
The package was financially beneficial as the consultancy rate was much lower 
than market rate and drug was also provided at a discounted price. In addition, 
the one stop service of consultation and drug made access to healthcare easier 
and cost saving. The benefit of midwifery services within the package attracted 
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more people towards the scheme. All these, according to the program people 
were opportunities that the health card scheme could bank on and thereby 
convince people to join the scheme.  
 
MHI EN ROUTE TO UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE: POLICY PERSPECTIVE 
The opinions of the five policy makers interviewed as a part of our current study 
is presented in this section. The discussion mainly evolved around issue like 
acceptance of micro health insurance or a social health insurance as an alternate 
health financing tool for Bangladesh among the policy makers, readiness of 
health policy to embrace a new financing mechanism like health insurance, legal 
and other concerns regarding health insurance and its prospects and challenges 
in ensuring universal health coverage for Bangladesh.  
 
MHI AS AN ALTERNATE HEALTH FINANCING TOOL FOR HEATH IN BANGLADESH: IS 
POLICY IN FAVOR? 
When asked about whether the current health policy of Bangladesh is in favor of 
implementing health insurance, mixed opinions were expressed by the policy 
makers we interviewed. Those who thought health policy is in support of MHI or 
any form of health insurance for that matter were then asked to mention aspects 
of our health policy or health systems that they think are favorable. It is a fact 
that the health sector of Bangladesh suffers from insufficient resource to 
maintain a minimum standard of healthcare. Health insurance, to these 
respondents, can on one hand ensure increased resource through premium 
collection and efficiency through risk pooling on the other. As one of the 
respondent said  
“Health insurance can increase resources” 
Some also mentioned that the health policy of Bangladesh also gives hint about 
the necessity of health insurance although it is not elaborated in that particular 
document. The 2010 strategic paper of the government and the HPNSDP also 
mentions that resource in health is not enough to cover the expenses.  
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The respondents added that the public sector infrastructure for health in 
Bangladesh is very strong with facilities at the community level.  This will be 
supportive if we wish to cover people at hard to reach areas. Without proper 
infrastructure and supply adequacy health insurance can not be successful. 
The other factor mentioned is that the private sector is very strong in Bangladesh 
and some of our respondents thought that health insurance can make use of this 
sector to strengthen service delivery by out sourcing various services. Some 
opined that health insurance will contribute in reducing out-of-pocket expenses.  
One of the respondents mentioned that Act 15 and 18 of health policy mentions 
that government is responsible to ensure healthcare for all in Bangladesh. The 6th 
5-yr plan and the health policy all points out the scarcity of resources for which 
government alone wont be able to finance universal healthcare. According to this 
policy maker there is a need for alternate health financing mechanism and health 
insurance can be considered in this regard.  
Respondents also mentioned that a health financing strategy is being planned for 
the country where health insurance will be provided for only the people living 
below the poverty line. The package will cover in-patient service only and the 
government will subsidize 100% of premium for these people. In a later stage 
there is plan to extend the services to include out-patient care and also cover rest 
of the population gradually.  
 
BARRIERS IN IMPLEMENTING HEALTH INSURANCE 
Respondents who did not think health policy supports implementation of any 
form of health insurance mentioned that there not enough support for health 
insurance in the country and even within the government as of yet. At the user 
end people are not very accustomed to the concept of health insurance. In other 
words, the culture of insuring against the risk of ill health is widely missing in the 
country. They also had doubt about the financial capacity of the government to 
support such schemes at national level.  
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One of the respondent mentioned that the government of Bangladesh is planning 
to go for health insurance which will initiate its activities by covering people 
living below poverty line (BPL).  Government is planning to subsidize the 
premium for the BPL population. This raises concern regarding available 
resource for health. The respondent added that whether this will put extra 
burden on the government budget is something we need to think about. Health 
insurance should not be a burden for the government.  
Another concern mentioned was regarding the freedom to choose from 
providers available in the market. If people are allowed to choose any healthcare 
provider then they might opt for private healthcare providers as there is a pre 
existing preference for them in the market. This might take away demand from 
government health services, which is not what government would want. In such 
case, this will be a waste of resources. The respondent said  
“We should put our efforts together to make the existing services more efficient and 
utilized.” 
There is concern on political ground that if the government starts charging 
premium then whether this will influence the ruling party’s popularity. In 
addition, charging people according to ability to pay may create confusion and 
loss of support from people. Thus, the respondents were skeptic about whether 
government will want to continue doing this. 
Furthermore to this the respondents mentioned that currently there is a 
program approach in carrying out public health services (TB program, EPI 
program, specialized hospital, high-tech hospital program, Family Planning 
program) in Bangladesh. One of the respondent raised the issue that when health 
insurance will initiate within government system whether this will take away 
resources from the different programs to fed the insurance system. Will the 
programs be then incorporated within the insurance mechanism or will the 
government carry on with both the approaches simultaneously was something 
we need to be clear about, said the respondent.  
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CAN MHI MAKE HEALTH FINANCING MORE EFFICIENT? 
According to one of our policy respondents health insurance has the potential to 
use resources more efficiently given that it uses the right payment mechanism. 
He mentioned for example, Thailand uses a capitation method and India uses a 
case based payment mechanism. Bangladesh is thinking of using a case based 
payment method which will have 3 separate parts: hospital expenses, patient 
expenses and doctor’s incentive. This is expected to make better use of 
resources. The incentive mechanism will encourage good behavior from the 
doctors which is currently lacking in our public health service provision.  This 
mechanism is also expected to increase utilization and thereby make better use 
of resources.  
Others mentioned that efficiency of health insurance will depend on a few 
factors. One of the factors is that whether services can be made accountable 
through this mechanism. At the same time the system has to ensure quality of 
care without which it will end up being a more expensive health financing 
mechanism. 
One of the policy makers expressed that health insurance can make health 
financing more efficient as it has the ability to increase resource pool for 
healthcare and at the same time decrease out-of-pocket spending. However, 
overall economic structure has to be supportive. A social safety net to support 
the poor will have to be built in for health insurance to be efficient.  
 
POLICY MAKERS PREFERENCE FOR MHI 
All of the respondents thought that Bangladesh being a low income country, 
health insurance for this country must be one that protects the poor and 
provides them with a safety net. According to one of the respondents: 
“Health insurance provides extra security for well-off people. So health insurance is 
not necessarily for them.” 
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According to this respondents the well-off can always get their required health 
service in exchange of out-of-pocket expenses and this doesn’t put extra burden 
on them. However, for the poor and needy when they are insured it can save 
them from an expensive medical bill and the financial catastrophe resulting from 
it.  
Suggestions were made to privatize health insurance as government alone 
doesn’t have the capacity to handle the complexities in operating an insurance 
scheme (e.g. claim settlement, service delivery etc.). Some also suggested that the 
program can start with including formal sector employees and make health 
insurance compulsory amongst them. Government can also think of collecting 
premium through general tax. For informal sector a different scheme considering 
their ability to pay and demand for services can then be designed.  
Whatever form of health insurance is designed, it needs to be made sure that the 
benefit package is attractive among clients from all socioeconomic status and 
that quality of services is ensured. In ensuring quality of services the providers 
can also think of using a portion of the profit earned for facility improvement and 
incentive for the healthcare providers.  
 
Response from the health economics unit of the ministry of health and family 
welfare mentioned that government currently is planning to experiment with 
micro health insurance scheme in a few Upazilas (sub-districts) and then with 
successful trial extend it to some form of social health insurance to cover all 
population of Bangladesh. The current scheme will cover only the below poverty 
line population with 100% subsidy on premium and will only provide in-patient 
services. Outpatient service and rest of the population will be included at a later 
stage during scale up.  
 
POLICY/LEGISLATIVE CHANGES NEEDED TO INTRODUCE MHI 
In principle health insurance is endorsed in government health policy of 
Bangladesh. However, the policy makers opined that an insurance Act including 
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specific laws on claim settlement, fee retention, local use of fund, finance 
authority to local government, etc. will need to be developed and enacted. The 
respondent from the health economics unit mentioned that the health insurance 
scheme under construction for the government will need to be accompanied by 
legislative changes to empower the hospitals to manage locally acquired money. 
This will eventually move towards hospital autonomy and delegate control over 
finance. He said “All these will have to be brought under a specific insurance act 
which is currently missing.” Some did not want to comment on legislative matters 
as they said they did not have much knowledge on it.  
Firm determination from the government will also be needed with regard to 
placing health insurance in the policy agenda along with its due importance, said 
one of the respondents. An independent body will have to be formed to oversee 
the activities of the insurance program which will include tasks like monitoring 
and regulating, identifying poor and other beneficiaries, fund management, MIS 
system. Institutional capacity will have to be built as well. One of the respondents 
mentioned the need for a managing authority, for example a national health 
security office, to look over the activities of health insurance mechanism. There is 
also lack of well trained people for health insurance in the country. A cadre of 
people will thus have to be trained for efficient operation of such a program.  
One major issue raised was that, currently there is lack of coordination between 
the different ministries of the government (e.g. ministry of finance and public 
administration, ministry of health and family welfare etc.) and between the 
central and local government. This hampers smooth functioning for many 
development programs. Most of the policy makers we interviewed talked about 
this and suggested that there needs to be a mechanism to better coordinate and 
ensure efficient functioning of the programs. There will also need to be proper 
and effective coordination with the donor community for implementation of the 
insurance scheme country wide.  
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MHI AND ITS BENEFIT TO THE PEOPLE 
All of the policy makers believed that micro health insurance can help poor gain 
access to quality healthcare and protect them from financial catastrophe. But at 
the same time they emphasized on the need for a safety net program that will 
offer the insurance product at a subsidized rate (according to ability to pay) to 
the poor and ensure accessibility of the services. One of the respondents said 
that although a subsidized rate is required for the poor, it should never be free of 
charge as free service is often perceived to be of poorer quality.  One concern 
raised was that if health insurance provides freedom of choice for healthcare 
providers then the whole sector may become private sector biased. Demand may 
shift significantly from public to private sector resulting in underutilization of 
public sector investment in health.  
 
MHI AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO IMPROVE QUALITY OF HEALTHCARE  
Majority of the policy makers thought health insurance is necessary for 
improving quality of services in health. Some highlighted the need to increase 
resource to improve quality of care and the role of health insurance in it by 
saying,  
“I believe health insurance is the only solution for Bangladesh. Currently only 3.5% 
of national budget is spent on health which has to be increased to 8% according to 
WHO recommendation in order to maintain quality of care. This increase in 
resource calls for an alternate health financing option and health insurance will be 
an effective solution in this regard.” 
Further it was mentioned that health insurance can bring in a healthy 
competition in the market given it provides freedom of choice for healthcare 
providers which will eventually encourage improvement in quality of services 
provided. On the other hand, introducing a provider incentive can also improve 
quality of services through health insurance as mentioned by the respondents.  
While majority of the policy makers thought of health insurance to be a necessity 
in improving quality, one of them thought health insurance is not at all necessary 
for improving quality of health services. According to him, 
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“Health service can be made efficient and pro-poor and the quality can be improved 
without any health insurance. Health insurance is not the only solution and thus it 
is not necessary.” 
Another respondent said “Health insurance is not the only thing that can help 
improve quality of services. It is one of the tools to improve service delivery. 
Quality is multi facet and accessibility, health service quality are all part of it.” 
Having said this, the respondent believed that health insurance can improve 
quality to a great extend.  
 
EFFICIENCY IN BUDGET UTILIZATION: MHI VS. CURRENT FINANCING SYSTEM  
The responses were mixed. Some thought health insurance can increase 
efficiency by increasing utilization and collecting more resources for health. 
According to one of the respondents introducing a case based provider payment 
mechanism can help increase efficiency and quality of care.  
For those who thought the existing health financing mechanism is more efficient 
compared to health insurance opined that health insurance might challenge 
access if everyone has to pay for the premium. Lower utilization will  then lead to 
inefficiency in the system. One of the respondents said,  
“The existing health financing system is efficient as it works on very limited budget 
and the outcome is remarkable. We have universal coverage with the existing 
public health infrastructure; all we have to do is to ensure quality of services.” 
One of the respondents was not ready to compare insurance against the existing 
system as health insurance in Bangladesh is still at a planning stage. He said, 
“As health insurance is yet to be implemented and there are only speculations on its 
outcome, I would not want to comment on its efficiency. Only thing I would like to 
say is that there need to be accountability for it to attain its potential.” 
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SUMMARY  
COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVE 
The indepth interviews with villagers shed light on the level of understanding 
about health insurance or micro health insurance among the villagers of 
Chakaria. A few very interesting terms and ways of explaining health insurance 
evolved from the discussion with the villagers. Although half of the respondents 
had not idea about health insurance and its mechanism, for those who 
understood explained it as a means of securing future healthcare and access to 
quality healthcare at affordable cost in time of need. Some even compared MHI 
with a lottery due to its uncertain nature. Some expressed that for micro health 
insurance to succeed it must involve as many people as possible which indicates 
solidarity among the villagers could be a winning solution for MHI to work.  
Opinions were then sought on factors that influence demand for health insurance 
or micro health insurance in a rural area in Bangladesh. The major reasons 
mentioned included reduced consultancy fee and discounted medicine price, 
trust in provider organization, acquaintance with doctors, and proximity to the 
health centers. Particularly for the Chakaria health card scheme, the villagers’ 
trust in ICDDR,B (the provider organization) made them trust the scheme and 
services provided through it. Some of the respondents from the better-off 
households said that they would like to join such schemes to fulfill their social 
obligations if not for their own good. According to them, they have to donate 
money when a poor villager is in trouble and if they do not benefit from MHI they 
will take this as a donation for improving the health of the area.  
Looking carefully into these factors we see that they are not all necessarily linked 
directly with micro health insurance and its mechanism but are reflection of 
people’s unmet need at the available healthcare options. In many cases 
respondents preferred to have micro health insurance in place of the existing 
public health services due to their dissatisfaction at these government facilities. 
According to the respondents the doctors at the public facilities don’t allow 
adequate time for consultation due to patient load, shortage of manpower and 
their behavior towards the patients is not always acceptable. As a result people 
long for places where they will have enough time on consultation and where they 
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will be treated with respect. It was interesting to find that those who preferred 
services from the public health facilities in our study were all from better-off 
households, none of the poor households voted for public health facilities.  
Further it was observed that in comparing micro health insurance vs. other form 
of health financing, the opportunity cost of getting treatment (transport cost, lost 
wage and time etc.) is what the villagers prioritize not so much the mechanism 
behind the provision of health service. This indicates that although these issues 
are not necessarily associated with MHI, they can play a vital role in making MHI 
accessible and attractive to the villagers and therefore need to be catered-for for 
the scheme to be successful in a developing country setting. 
On the other hand, major reasons for people who chose not to join the health 
card scheme in Chakaria or even any other micro health insurance scheme 
included affordability of the premium, the healthy not feeling or realizing the 
need for insuring against the risk of ill health, preference for informal health care 
providers over the doctors at the MHI health centers. 
When asked about the benefit of micro health insurance the villagers mentioned 
reduction in uncertain household expenditure, access to quality treatment at all 
time, securing future healthcare, elimination of the need to borrow to pay for 
catastrophic healthcare cost, minimizing healthcare cost, having a fixed and 
known place for treatment, were among the top.  The respondents also 
mentioned a very useful aspect of having a fixed and known place for treatment. 
They said that majority of the villagers are not aware of proper places for 
treatment of the various illnesses they experience. The VHPs acted as sort of an 
information hub. People could consult with the doctors at the VHPs about where 
to seek higher level healthcare in case the illness was not managed at the VHPs. 
This saved them from repeated visits to various providers before they could 
access the right kind of treatment.  
 
Some of the respondents also opined that MHI could give them the purchasing 
power that will allow them to negotiate with the doctors and demand for quality 
healthcare. The fact that the health centers worked as a one-stop facility for all 
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the family members to access healthcare also helped in attracting people. The 
Chakaria health card scheme provided identification cards to the registered 
members and this was a feature preferred by many. They thought that having an 
identification card made accessing healthcare easier as their history of illness 
was recorded under with that card. According to some, the scheme gave access 
to good quality medicine at discounted price, which helped them in completing 
treatment. However, many of those who preferred to have MHI for healthcare 
mentioned that the process has to be honest and transparent for them to have 
trust on the providers. 
In terms of renewal of scheme membership quality of treatment and 
qualification of doctors were among the major deciding factors. Another 
important factor was whether people received any benefit out of the scheme 
during the time they were insured. As the villagers had little understanding of 
health insurance, many took this as a loss in investment and further investment 
in the scheme were not attractive to them. For the particular case of Chakaria 
health card shortage of human resource, which resulted in unavailability of 
doctors round the clock, was a major reason that made people opt out of the 
program.  
 
PROGRAM PERSPECTIVE  
The indepth interviews shed light on some of the significant programmatic views 
around implementing MHI. The discussion highlighted the fact that the concept 
of health insurance is new not only to the villagers/clients but also to the 
program people themselves. As mentioned in their opinion regarding felt need 
for further skill enhancement, a more elaborated and rigorous understanding 
about health insurance and its mechanism would have made their work more 
effective.  
Explaining health insurance to the villagers was not a simple task either. To 
make it understandable and easy to grasp the staff of the scheme had to take help 
of already existing terms that relate to the mechanism of health insurance. At the 
same time, life insurance had given rise to controversies in many areas of 
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Bangladesh and a few frauds have been reported in places. Therefore, the staff 
felt it was better to avoid the word “insurance” and use much general terms such 
as ‘health card’ to make it acceptable to the people.  
According to the program people the scheme faced both internal and external 
challenges. Major external challenge was the competition in the health market 
where in one hand public service was being provided free (although unofficial 
payments exceeds cost of healthcare at many other sources) and on the other the 
informal healthcare providers were providing healthcare round-the-clock with 
provision  of treatment on credit. Internal challenges included limited resource, 
lack of adequate technical and operational skill, limitation of the benefit package 
to include many services due to the small pool, including villagers in scheme who 
lived far from the Village Health Posts.  
Regarding the potential of MHI in improving healthcare and its provision in 
Bangladesh, the program people thought that MHI is promising. At the same time 
some were also skeptic about its ability to scale up and serve a larger population. 
They thought that MHI could instead complement the national system by 
including people and raising fund at the local level. MHI can also open 
opportunities for the people, poor and better-offs alike, to have access to private 
as well as public healthcare services. It can potentially reduce out-of-pocket 
expenses.  
A few suggestions to implement MHI in a low-income setting that emerged from 
the discussion with the program people of Chakaria health card scheme can be 
summarized as: 
 The scheme should operate at a local level taking health service as close to 
people as possible as travel time and cost comes out to be a significant 
determinant of healthcare seeking irrespective of source and mode of care 
provision. 
 For MHI to be universal and cover people with no or minimum ability to 
pay, the scheme should incorporate a safety net where the product is 
available to the poor at a subsidized rate or even at free of cost if possible.  
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 For MHI to be sustainable it needs to ensure enough cross subsidization 
and for that it will need to attract people from all socioeconomic status. 
The benefit package will therefore need to be carefully designed to attract 
larger pool of clients.  
 MHI can be complementary to a national health insurance system and 
help raise fund by including people at the local level. 
 Before launching a scheme, supply adequacy need to be ensured. Without 
required human resource and other supplies the scheme will fail to keep 
its promise to the clients and ultimately clients will lose trust and 
discontinue their membership. 
 A team of properly trained people is necessary to make the scheme 
effective. Convincing people with attractive marketing techniques, 
maintaining transparency in fund management and efficient claim 
settlement all help in creating a lucrative demonstration effect for the 
potential clients. With trained staff it is possible to make sensible 
forecasts for the scheme and avoid unnecessary losses and ensure 
financial sustainability.  
 An ownership feeling encourages people to join such movements and 
Chakaria is a good example for this as the self-help organizations and the 
community participation projects in the area played important role in 
introducing the scheme to the villagers. These types of groups are usually 
formed taking the group ‘solidarity’ as a capital. MHI schemes in other 
setting could also think of banking on people’s solidarity. 
 
POLICY PERSPECTIVE 
In general, majority of the policy makers opined that the health policy is in line 
with exploring alternate health financing mechanism for Bangladesh which can 
raise more funds, make efficient use of the collected fund and at the same time 
ensure access to quality healthcare for all. However, the reaction to use of a 
social health insurance mechanism in this connection was mixed. For those who 
supported health insurance thought that it could potentially deal with the 
existing inadequacy in resource mobilization and inefficiency in allocation. At the 
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same time they also mentioned that for a health insurance program to be 
effective in a low-income country like Bangladesh, it would have to have a safety 
net program, which will protect the poor from the catastrophic health expenses 
by subsidizing the premium to a level affordable by them. Cautions were 
mentioned about checking the pros and cons of introducing an insurance 
mechanism for health, a concept that is almost alien in Bangladesh. Concerns 
were there with regards to government’s ability to keep pace with the expected 
increase in demand due to introduction of insurance, universal participation to 
ensure financial sustainability, preference for private sector diverting clients 
away from public sector and thus resulting in underutilization of public 
resources and inefficiency resulting from it. Concerns are there regarding scaling 
up the insurance program to national level. Further if it involves subsidizing 
services for the poor then in absence of adequate cross subsidization whether it 
will result in increased liability for the government was also a concern raised by 
the respondents. From legal point of view, the policy makers mentioned, for 
health insurance to be effective in Bangladesh an independent body of authority 
will need to be set up to oversee activities like monitoring and regulating, 
identifying poor and other beneficiaries, fund management, claim settlement, 
and overall MIS system. The need for a health insurance act was also mentioned 
by all the respondents.  
The study respondents also mentioned that increased coordination between the 
different ministries and the local government would be a must in order for this 
new financing tool to be successfully implemented. Lack of coordination between 
the planning wing, the finance ministry and the various other ministries make it 
difficult for the concerned ministries to carry out their planned objectives. Even 
within the ministries when we talked with the health economics unit, embedded 
within the MoHFW, who are responsible for advising MoHFW on the health 
financing mechanism we felt some degree of inconsistency between the opinions 
of the official from the two wings. Even though the health economics unit thinks 
MHI is much needed to access additional fund in financing healthcare for the 
country, MoHFW has doubt on how efficiently MHI can take the burden off the 
national account. Some even expressed their concern that MHI schemes may 
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result in increasing national expenditure instead of decreasing. On the other 
hand, the official from MoHFW informed us that without the timely act of the 
ministry of finance and planning ministry they cannot realize their planned 
projects. This is a general challenge in conducting any project through the public 
system in Bangladesh and has been documented earlier by other authors (12, 
13). Therefore, effective and timely communication between the ministries 
needs to be ensured for any new project to take off in Bangladesh.  
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CHAPTER 7: MICRO HEALTH INSURANCE EN ROUTE TO UNIVERSAL 
COVERAGE FOR HEALTH: EXPERIENCE FROM LOW AND MIDDLE 
INCOME COUNTRIES 
 
 
The potential of micro health insurance (MHI) in providing financial protection 
to the poor in low and middle income countries has been evident in various 
countries around the world (1) (2, 3). MHI has made significant contribution in 
dealing with ‘health care crisis’ arising in different regions of developing world in 
the last decade (1, 4, 5).  In many of these countries micro health insurance has 
served as a transitional mechanism for establishing an insurance system to 
achieve universal health coverage (6-12). Empirical evidence shows that when 
public funding in health is low, micro health insurance can assist countries to 
build capacity and provide financial protection for a certain segment of the 
population, particularly those who are left out of the national system.  Skills 
gained in running micro health insurance schemes particularly in low-income 
setting may later be useful in managing publicly funded schemes as they expand. 
Health insurance can provide financial security for the poor in developing 
countries as long as they are appropriately managed to play a positive role in 
improving access and equity in health services. 
In Bangladesh, the very use of health insurance as a means to finance healthcare 
is rather new. So far the experience around health insurance in Bangladesh is 
limited to a few micro health insurance schemes and private health insurance 
with very minimum reach. In the public sector Bangladesh government has 
recently committed to test the feasibility of using health insurance to achieve 
universal coverage in the country. A pilot project, “Shasthya Shurokkha 
Karjokrom (SSK)”, is underway to try-out the potential of health insurance in 
ensuring healthcare for the population living below poverty line. The challenges 
ahead are daunting but with careful thinking around the policy environment and 
implementation strategy Bangladesh too can take the advantage of health 
protection schemes to protect its people from the adverse effect of catastrophic 
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health expenses. The learning from countries, particularly the low and middle 
income ones, that are successfully using health insurance schemes to achieve 
universal coverage and that have previous experience with MHI schemes are 
thus important for Bangladesh. At the same time, we need to bear in mind that 
while success encourages countries to opt for micro health insurance, studying 
challenges faced by these countries and the ways they were dealt with is even 
more important. It gives the opportunity to prepare for risks that accompany 
implementation. Thus, studying the prepayment mechanism adopted by other 
countries can provide us with valuable input in designing a prepayment 
mechanism for health for Bangladesh. These schemes can help us understand the 
dynamics of health insurance market and the ways to develop a system that 
would make access to quality health service easier for its population, particularly 
the poor. In addition, many of these countries have built on experience from 
small-scale micro health insurance schemes to design and implement a large-
scale nation wide health insurance mechanism.  This is of particular interest for 
Bangladesh as currently all Bangladesh have is experience of some small scale 
micro health insurance schemes and the experience of the other countries will 
facilitate the transition towards a health insurance scheme that would operate 
on a larger scale and extend coverage to those who need it the most.  
The chapter takes a case study approach in studying the experience of health 
insurance schemes in different countries. Three low, middle and upper-middle 
income country case studies, namely, Ghana, India and Thailand have been 
chosen. A health-financing framework based on the three essential roles of 
health financing, namely revenue collection, pooling and purchasing, was used to 
study the experience in each of these countries (9). Alongside the discussion also 
will highlight the instigating factors for evolution of social health insurance, the 
policy environment, and details of implementing health insurance schemes (e.g. 
provider payment mechanism, designing benefit package) and challenges faced 
en route to universal coverage by means of health insurance in the these 
countries. For the purpose of the study an extensive country specific literature 
review was conducted. 
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The three countries were selected based on their stage and mode of health 
protection scheme implementation to achieve universal coverage. Thailand is an 
example of a country, which has achieved universal coverage in a comparatively 
short period of time by covering majority of its population through a few large 
scale health insurance schemes. Although per capita health expenditure in 
Thailand is much higher than that in Bangladesh (Table 34), the country started 
out with a comparatively low public expenditure on health and gradually moved 
towards increasing public contribution with strong political commitment. The 
path to universal coverage in Thailand offers valuable learnings for countries at 
any stage of UHC implementation. Ghana, on the other hand, initiated health 
insurance schemes to finance and ensure access to quality healthcare in 2005. 
Within almost 7 years of operation, coverage has reached to about 35% as of 
2012. Ghana characterizes a large informal sector and the national system is 
aiming at incorporating this sector via their national health insurance schemes. 
India, the third case study country, is an example of targeted insurance schemes. 
The major national health insurance schemes are mostly targeted towards 
ensuring quality healthcare for the below poverty line. Public expenditure as a 
percent of total health expenditure is similar in India and in Bangladesh. India 
also shares similarities in terms of a wide range of socio-cultural and financial 
characteristics with Bangladesh. Therefore challenges faced by India in 
implementing a nationwide health protection scheme, are likely to be more 
relevant incase of Bangladesh. The Bangladesh government is currently 
following the model of RSBY scheme in India to design and implement health 
protection schemes for its below poverty line population. Few summary 
statistics depicting state of health and other relevant indicators of these 3 
countries in contrast with Bangladesh is presented in Table 34 which will enable 
us to have a comparative picture of health outcomes in each of these countries. 
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TABLE 34: SALIENT ECONOMIC, SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC, HEALTH SYSTEMS, AND HEALTH STATUS INDICATORS IN 
THE CASE STUDY COUNTRIES IN COMPARISON WITH BANGLADESH 
Country  Thailand Ghana India Bangladesh 
Population (millions) 66.78 25.36 1240 152.9 
GDP per capita (current USD)  
(2013 est) 
5779 1850.2 1499 829 
Poverty*  
(% of population) 
13.2  
(2011 est) 
24.2  
(2012 est) 
21.9  
(2012 est) 
31.5  
(2010 est) 
Life expectancy at birth  
(2012 est) 
75 62 66 70  
Maternal mortality 
(per 100,000 live births) 
26  
(2012 est) 
380 
(2013 est) 
190 
(2013 est) 
170 
(2013 est) 
Under-five mortality  
(per 1,000 live births) 
(2013 est) 
13 78 53 41 
Per capita health expenditure 
(current USD) (2012 est) 
215 83 61 26 
Government spending on 
health (% of total spending on 
health) (2012 est) 
76.4 57.1 33.1 34.4 
Out-of-pocket expenses (% of 
total health expenditure) 
(2012 est) 
13.1 28.7 57.6 63.3 
Doctor per 10,000 population  3.93 0.96 7.02 3.56 
Note: * measured by headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP) 
Source: (13-15) 
 
THE THREE COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 
THAILAND: THE GREAT ACHIEVER OF UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE 
THE HEALTH SYSTEMS OF THAILAND 
Thailand has a pluralistic public/private mix health care system in terms of both 
healthcare providers and financing agencies. Majority of the health service in 
Thailand is provided through the public health facilities which were rapidly 
expanded nationwide since 1961 in Thailand (16, 17). Since 1994, the numbers 
of hospitals and beds have also increased remarkably (17). In 2012 government 
spending on health was 76.4% of the total 215 USD spent per capita in Thailand 
(14). This high public expenditure on health indicates the intense investment by 
government in its health sector. 
It is one of the developing countries in the world that has achieved near 
universal coverage for healthcare. Currently around 98% of the population is 
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covered for primary healthcare through a mix of health protection schemes (18). 
The quest for achieving universal coverage for health in Thailand holds a long 
history dating back to 1970s (19). By the year 2000, four health insurance 
schemes were in place to serve around 75% of the population. These schemes 
are: Civil Servants Medical Benefits Scheme (CSMBS), Medical Welfare Scheme 
(MWS), Health card scheme (voluntary public health insurance), and the 
Compulsory Social Security Scheme (SSS).  
 
HEALTH PROTECTION SCHEMES OF THAILAND 
Health systems financing through health insurance started in Thailand as early 
as in 1963 with the establishment of the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme 
(CSMBS) which was formed to cover civil servants and public employees and 
their family members. The CSBMS was fully funded from general tax revenue 
through the Ministry of Finance. 
In 1975 Thailand introduced the Medical Welfare Scheme (MWS) funded from 
general taxation to provide free health services for its low income population. 
The MWS initially provided free medical services at the public facilities for the 
low income population and later on included children, elderly, veterans, 
disabled, monks and priests in the beneficiary list.  
Thailand also has a community financed voluntary scheme in place which is the 
Health Card Scheme. The scheme came into operation in 1983 in the form of a 
community financed project and then in a later stage in early 1990s took the 
form of a publicly subsidized voluntary health insurance scheme. Coverage was 
limited to near-poor population as no government support was there to reach 
the poorest segment. However, the voluntary nature of the scheme resulted in 
selection bias. 
The Compulsory Social Security Scheme was initiated in 1992 for the private 
employees. The employer, employee and the central government contribute in 
funding the scheme. With time the scheme now covers all formally employed 
people, including those engaged in small businesses.  
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By 2000 the objective of providing universal coverage for essential health 
services became central to the health systems of Thailand and the political party 
‘Thai Rak Thai’ that won the election in 2001 included this in their election 
agenda. Soon after their victory the party introduced the new “30 Baht to treat all 
diseases” scheme in fulfillment of their election commitment. The scheme 
entitled the insured a comprehensive benefit package covering both preventive 
and curative care with a co-payment of 30 Baht (1.9 constant 2005 PPP $) per 
medical visit (16, 20). The scheme was predominantly financed from tax 
revenues and public hospitals are the main provider of services (21). This new 
scheme combined the MWS and the voluntary Health card scheme and expanded 
coverage to an additional 18 million people. Legislative changes accompanied the 
introduction of this new scheme when in 2002 the new Thai government passed 
the National health Security Act. This act is known to be the most important 
policy change for the reform of Thai health systems (19, 21). In November 2006, 
the new government abolished the 30 Baht copayment and made the universal 
coverage scheme free of charge (21, 22).  
The universal coverage scheme of Thailand so far has achieved some very 
positive outcomes including increasing utilization, equity in service provision, 
increasing quality of care and financial risk protection with decreasing 
catastrophic expenditure on health for its population (16, 23, 24). The incidence 
of medical impoverishment went very low and between 2004 and 2009 The UCS 
prevented atleast 3,00,000 households from becoming poor due to healthcare 
expenditures (25). Some distinct features of the Thai health systems instigated 
these positive changes and these can assist countries that are willing to redesign 
their health systems with an aim to achieve universal coverage by means of 
health protection schemes. An account of these features is provided in the 
following section.   
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FACTORS INSTIGATING UNIVERSAL COVERAGE THROUGH HEALTH PROTECTION IN 
THAILAND 
STRONG POLITICAL COMMITMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT:  
Above all the strong and sustained political commitment towards achieving 
universal coverage for health for the population of Thailand which is also known 
as the big bang policy reform was the major driving force behind the success of 
UCS. The civil society also played an active role in pushing through the goal of 
achieving universal coverage in Thailand (26).  
 
EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF PUBLIC HEALTH FACILITY: 
The universal coverage scheme operates by providing services mostly through 
the public health facilities. The extensive geographical coverage of public health 
facilities in Thailand, which was initiated in 1963 ensured access to health 
service for majority of the population (17, 26). The government of Thailand 
shifted health budget from urban to rural facilities to support this infrastructural 
development in the rural areas (22, 27). 
 
EQUITY IN HEALTH HUMAN RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION:  
In late 70s there was a 21-fold difference in physician density between Bangkok 
and the rural Northeast regions, which was reduced to a five-fold difference by 
2009. During this same period there was an 18 fold gap in nurse density which 
came down to a three-fold difference.  
All this was possible due to the policy actions of the Thai government. After 1975 
a monthly hardship allowance was introduced for rural recruitment and 
retention, which worked as an incentive to retain staff in remote rural areas. The 
incentive rate was adjusted in 1997 to further reduce disparity (28). Currently 
the Thai government mandates new medical graduates to undertake 
employment in rural health services for three years. This policy change was 
brought about in response to the internal brain drain of trained professionals 
from rural public hospitals to urban private hospitals (29). As a result the mal-
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distribution of healthcare providers within the country is now minimized to 
some extent. The community and village health volunteers and nurses also 
played a key role in primary care services, particularly in remote areas (22, 30). 
 
EFFICIENT PURCHASING:  
The fact that majority of health service is provided through the public health 
facilities also means the National Health Security Office is the single purchaser 
for three-quarter of the country’s population. This gives government a 
substantial bargaining power with which it negotiates heavily to bring down the 
price of medicine, medical products and interventions (28).  
 
GREATER INTEGRATION BETWEEN LOCAL SCHEMES AND THE PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM:  
The Thai government has been involved in community financing for long through 
the health card scheme. This led to increasing integration between schemes and 
the public health system starting at the district level, then at regional and finally 
at provincial level (31). The integration helped develop inter-regional risk 
pooling and re-insurance, which in turn contributes to improved technical and 
managerial expertise and financial sustainability of the schemes. 
 
EXPENDITURE MINIMIZING EFFORTS AT NATIONAL LEVEL:  
The government of Thailand adopted a few expenditure management 
approaches which enhanced coverage for the UCS. These included closed-ended 
capitation contracting with diagnosis related group hospital payment, strong 
gate-keeping for primary care, tough negotiation with pharmaceuticals, and 
finally the focus of the system being on primary care.  Additional at one point the 
Thai government took contractionary fiscal measures to cut down on 
expenditures and increase revenue collection to safeguard public spending on 
healthcare and social safety net (26).  
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CONTINUING EFFORT ON IMPROVING QUALITY OF SERVICES:  
Varied measures have been taken by the Thai government in increasing 
productivity of the workers and improving the quality of health services. These 
include assuring an adequate basic salary, offering financial incentives like 
overtime rates, hardship allowances, non-private practice incentives, and long-
service allowances and nonfinancial incentives like an annual prize for the best 
rural doctor or nurse, supporting career advancement, and permitting off-hour 
private practice. Currently a pay-for-performance model is also being piloted in 
selected hospitals (28).  
 
TECHNICAL KNOW-HOW:  
The public health insurance schemes in Thailand maintain a national centralized 
online registration database to link the providers with the schemes. Beneficiaries 
are required to register with an enlisted primary care unit in their home area. 
These primary care units work as gate-keepers for access to care and they refer 
patients to specialists or hospitals if required. Treatment outside the home area 
is limited to accidents and emergency care only. This well managed national MIS 
system assists efficient scheme management (16, 26).  
 
STRONG RESEARCH CAPACITY:  
Thailand possesses a relatively strong health systems research institute that 
enabled evidence based decision making and designing schemes appropriate to 
serve the healthcare need of the country (26, 27). 
 
CHALLENGES FACED BY THE UNIVERSAL COVERAGE SCHEME IN THAILAND 
One of the major challenges Thailand is facing today despite its achievement in 
providing healthcare to its population is harmonizing the three insurance 
schemes currently in place (32). This has resulted from political interest and 
from other power dynamics of institutional reform (26). The schemes differ in 
terms of benefit paid out and fund management (28). Failure to integrate these 
schemes undermines both efficiency and equity for health systems of Thailand 
(33). It increases administrative costs and can potentially lead to cream 
 173 
 
skimming. With varied scheme structures it is extremely difficult to assess 
whether the subsidies are equitably channeled to the target population. A 
harmonized revenue collection system and a body to oversight the payment 
mechanism could be an option for the Thai government (16).  
Despite the concentrated effort of the Thai government to increase health 
workforce and to achieve equity in distribution major challenges still remain in 
health worker production, distribution, and performance for meeting the 
country’s health care demand (16, 28). 
A few lessons emerge from the Thailand experience of achieving universal 
coverage by means of health protection schemes, which we have presented in 
Table 35. Countries at different stages of implementing health protection 
schemes with a view to achieve universal coverage can learn from these lessons. 
The usefulness of these lessons will depend on their applicability in the 
respective context of each country. 
 
GHANA: ENSURING QUALITY HEALTHCARE BY MEANS OF HEALTH INSURANCE 
HEALTH SYSTEMS OF GHANA 
After independence in 1957 the health systems of Ghana was designed to 
provide public health service free of cost to its citizens which was financed by tax 
revenue (34) (35-38). With time, demand for healthcare increased due to 
increase in utilization which was partly due to moral hazard resulting from free 
service provision. This posed serious budget constraint for the government. With 
the Hospital fee decree of 1969 the government, therefore, introduced a small 
user fee which was taken as a token money for healthcare consultation (39).  
Further with the economic stagnation in 1970s the health systems of Ghana 
became financially unstable and the government cut down on its health spending 
as a result during the time period 1970s and 1980s (35, 37). Decreasing budget 
in health sector resulted in shortage of supply and deteriorating quality of health 
service in many of the facilities in the districts of Ghana (37). In 1988, the Health 
fee Act of 1971 was then amended to increase the user fee to charge full cost of 
drugs and consultation(39). Before this amendment a fixed amount was being 
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paid by patients to cover consultation, investigation, drugs etc. (39). In 1992 the 
health systems of Ghana changed from free public healthcare provision to 
charging full cost which was then known as “cash and carry”(39, 40). This system 
was also called the “revolving drug fund”. This fund was established with the aim 
to finance 15% of the recurrent cost in health sector (39, 40). However, the ‘cash 
and carry’ system soon failed in many aspects. Particularly with this system, the 
poor and indigent people were deprived of any healthcare as they lack the ability 
to pay for services out-of-pocket. The failure of cash and carry system and its 
negative impact on healthcare utilization particularly by the poor initiated an 
anti-cash and carry movement in the country. The main political opposition 
party demanded for the abolition of “cash and carry” and they used this for their 
campaign in the election of 2000. It has been documented that this was a major 
factor that lead to change in political power in 2000 in Ghana (35, 41). The new 
government in fulfillment of their election commitment, decided to change the 
health systems of Ghana from a user financed system to a national health 
insurance scheme. the foundation of a national health insurance scheme was also 
backed by the experience of micro health insurance schemes that were  initiated 
in different parts of Ghana by the NGOs in early 1990s in an attempt to ensure 
access to quality services (42) (35, 41). The MHI schemes proliferated in Ghana 
and from only three in 1999 the number reached 259 by 2003. Community 
solidarity principle was the driving force behind these schemes and inspired the 
culture of insurance for health. In 2003, the government then passed a national 
health insurance act known as ACT 650. The “National Health Insurance Scheme’ 
(NHIS) was established in Ghana under this act (34, 35, 37-39, 41, 43). With the 
aim to provide broad range of healthcare through the district mutual and private 
health insurance schemes and increase affordability and utilization of health 
services, particularly for the poor NHIS started its operation in 2005 (35, 37-39, 
43). From 2005 till date Ghana’s health system is operated by NHIS and the 
people of Ghana are benefiting from this new system.  
The remainder of this section provides a synopsis of the operation of NHIS and 
the challenges it faced at different stage of implementation. The learnings are 
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useful for any country planning on implementing a nation-wide health insurance 
scheme to ensure universal health coverage for its population.  
 
GHANA NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME (NHIS) AT A GLANCE: 
Ghana National Health Insurance Scheme, as mentioned earlier, was created by 
the national health insurance ACT 650 of 2003 and started its activities in 2005 
(38). The NHIS was established with the aim to provide financial access to 
quality basic healthcare services for the people of Ghana, particularly for the 
poor and indigents. NHIS follows a purchaser- provider split model (44) where it 
covers both public and private health care providers at all levels of the health 
system to provide the basic healthcare service package subject to their 
accreditation by the NHIA (12). The system is unique in the sense that it 
combines the concept of social health insurance and mutual health insurance 
(45). The mutual health insurance is implemented at the district and regional 
level known as the District Mutual Health Insurance Scheme (DMHIS) and this 
allows decentralization of management and ensures accountability of 
stakeholders (40). The DMHIS is by far the most common form of health 
insurance scheme found in 155 district offices in the country. These schemes are 
public noncommercial ones, and they receive financial support from the 
government (39). A management body, the National Health Insurance Authority 
(NHIA), had been formed with the mandate to secure implementation of NHIS. 
The NHIA is responsible for the registration, licensing and regulation of health 
insurance schemes. It is also responsible for granting accreditation to healthcare 
providers and monitoring their performance for efficient and good quality 
service delivery. The National Health Insurance Fund is managed by NHIA. 
Finally and most importantly the NHIA ensures that the services of NHIS reach 
the indigents (40, 45). Currently 155 district schemes are in operation in 
Ghana(40). Coverage by the end of 2012 was 8.8 million people which represent 
35% of the population of Ghana (40).  
The NHIS runs on a single benefit package set by the legislative instrument 1809 
(45). The package covers 95% disease conditions, outpatient services including 
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diagnostics, operation (e.g. hernia repair), most of the inpatient services, 
specialist care, most surgeries, hospital accommodation (general ward), oral 
health treatment, all maternity care services including caesarian delivery, 
emergency care, all drug on NHIA list. The package excludes expensive 
procedure like certain surgeries, cancer treatment, organ transplant, and 
dialysis, cosmetic surgery, high profile items like HIV antiretroviral drugs (39, 
40).  
There is no limit on what NHIS pay in medical bills as long as the care is within 
the provision of the benefits package. Finally, no co-payments, co-insurance, or 
deductibles are required (35). Members of NHIS are required to pay a premium 
and a registration fee to become members. The groups that are exempt from 
paying premiums are required to pay the registration fee.  
Premium for NHIS members, although is set according to ability to pay and is 
linked to a person’s income, in practice this happens only for the formal sector 
comprising 3% of the population. The informal sector comprising majority of the 
population pay a flat rate of premium set by the district NHIS. However there are 
certain group of people who are exempt from this premium. They include 
children aged less than 18 years if both parents are registered, aged population 
(aged 70 or over), pregnant women, and core poor. The registration fee, 
however, is payable by all members.  
Beneficiaries of NHIS are given cards that can be used to seek treatment in any 
hospital in the country. Bills are sent to the scheme providers for payment. 
Furthermore, portability allows NHIS members to access services outside their 
own district (39). 
The NHIS is financed from different sources including VAT on goods and services 
(a VAT of 2.5% is charged which is called the National health insurance lavy 
NHIL  and represents the largest source accounting for 70% of the revenue), 
portion of social security tax from formal sector workers (23%), premiums (5%), 
others including investment return, parliament and donor (2%) (37, 40).  
The DMHIS collects all the premiums either from paying beneficiaries or from 
the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) that provides subsidies for the 
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exempt groups. At the beginning the NHIF paid an annual premium per 
beneficiary equivalent to 8 GH¢, but this gradually increased to 14 GH¢. During 
2011 the NHIA covered premiums amounting to 74.53 million GH¢. The NHIA is 
subsidizing more than 82 percent of total expenditure.  
Purchasing under NHIS was initially based on fee for services in 2004. Later from 
2008 NHIS started to follow provider payment system of diagnostic related 
groupings for services (46). However, there are delays in claim processing under 
NHIS which is mostly due to the manual processing of claim.  
 
INSTIGATING FACTORS 
POLITICAL COMMITMENT: like Thailand, the national health insurance scheme in 
Ghana was also brought about by a major political shift. National health 
insurance being central to the national health strategy of Ghana, made is possible 
for the NHIS to be established.  
 
PROGRESSIVE GENERAL TAXATION:  
NHIS relies on progressive general taxation and it covers most of the funding in 
the system. Along with it the redistributive function of the NHIS pool made cross 
subsidization more effective.  
 
MHI CREATING CULTURE OF HEALTH INSURANCE:  
The NHIS benefited from the experience of the MHI schemes that were in 
operation in Ghana since 1990s. Despite the low population coverage of the MHI 
schemes the sheer number of these schemes throughout the country had the 
effect of validating the concept of health insurance and preparing the population 
for the national health insurance system. At the same time this legitimized the 
use of such tools to finance healthcare in front of the policy makers and other 
stakeholders including the donors (47).  
 
Once the NHIS was on board, the government offered the existing MHIs a choice 
between affiliating with NHIS and thereby receiving government subsidies and 
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other support, or remaining independent and streamline their benefit package to 
satisfy the new regulations. Given the financial incentive most of the schemes 
chose to affiliate with government plan and the rest scaled back coverage and 
provided supplementary products like medicine, cash for transfer etc. The 
amalgamation of MHI and NHIS increased coverage for Ghana by 30 fold and 
reached 35% of total population (42).  
 
CHALLENGES FACED AND SOLUTIONS TRIED 
LACK OF ADEQUATE MARKETING: NHIS suffers from lack of adequate marketing 
technique to increase knowledge about NHIS among the population. This results 
in low awareness, trust and interest of people in the scheme.  
To raise awareness and knowledge about NHIS the program ran a 13 week radio 
campaign with 5 radio stations.  NHIA also developed public education materials 
on NHIS for educating people. ‘Community darbar’ is another technique that has 
been used to publicize NHIS (38, 40).   
To improve communication between NHIA, clients and stakeholders, call centers 
to answer queries from clients were set up in 2012. The data from the call 
centers are also providing feedback for management decision-making (40). 
Ghana is also testing the mechanism of ‘mystery shopping’ through call centers 
to identify inefficiencies, and abuse in the system (40). 
CHILDREN’S ACCESS TO NHIS SERVICES: The NHIS exempts children from paying 
any premium given both the parents are enrolled with NHIS. This creates a bar in 
accessing services of NHIS for children who don’t have both their parents 
enrolled (39).  
A new rule called ‘decoupling’ is being used in some of the districts where it does 
not mandate both parents to be enrolled (39) and is expected to ease children’s 
access to free NHIS benefits. 
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POOR ROAD NETWORK AND HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE HINDERS ACCESS:   
The NHIS is adopting community registration to ease registration process for the 
people living in remote areas. Also institutional and group registration to 
increase active members are being tried (40). To reduce fund collection time and 
to expedite membership process NHIS is trying mobile money payment system. 
 
SUPPLY SHORTAGE, DELAY IN REIMBURSEMENT, AND LACK  OF COORDINATION:  
There is lack of adequate supply, human resource and infrastructure in NHIS. 
Timely supply of fund is a problem for DMHIS. Lack of coordination and 
operational differences within NHIS hampers efficiency of the scheme.  
So far, temporary solutions of increasing supply have been tried but providers 
are looking for more permanent solutions like owning offices, vehicles for the 
scheme.  
For timely provider payment ‘capitation’, a process to ensure prior allocation of 
funds to service providers to cover estimated cost of facility utilization by the 
insured, is being piloted in some of the districts (38). Although majority of the 
districts where this provider payment method has been tried expressed 
satisfaction with the method, it is being criticized by many stakeholders in the 
recent times. Indeed, capitation can result in under provision of services and 
thereby compromise quality. On the other hand, in some cases it can also result 
in provider induced moral hazard. Studies have shown that a strong regulatory 
system of quality control, usage and audit along with a reliable information 
system can help countries to reach the goal of controlled cost through capitation 
(48).  
The new National Health insurance act 2012 (ACT 852) has been passed to 
facilitate harmonization of NHIS operation for effective and efficient delivery of 
services (40). 
In places the providers are not cooperative and some are accepting illegal fees. 
To prevent this strong monitoring mechanism needs to be in place to minimize 
fraud and ensure quality.  
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DELAY IN CLAIM REIMBURSEMENT:  
Delay in claim reimbursement can discourage members from continuing 
membership with NHIS. Establishment of claims processing centres with sole 
responsibility of processing claims efficiently on time is one of the latest reforms 
of NHIS (40). 
 
FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY OF THE SCHEME:  
NHIS is facing challenges regarding its financial sustainability. NHIA is thinking 
of identifying high return and relatively safe investment opportunity which can 
contribute in the pool of NHIS (40).  
 
SERVICE MAY NOT BE PRO-POOR:  
Only 2% of Ghana’s population is registered as Indigents (poorest members of 
the society) in the scheme. Whereas, 28% of the population of Ghana live below 
the poverty line (as of 2006 Ghana living standard survey) (47). Studies have 
mentioned corruption in identification of the poor (39). The government of 
Ghana is thinking of introducing biometric registration and instant issuance of 
cards to avoid this sort of irregularities in the system (40).  
 
POLITICIZATION OF THE SCHEME:  
This is a challenge that is yet to be resolved mostly due to the difficulty of 
avoiding it. Ghana did not start with a foolproof blue print of national health 
insurance scheme, rather the country incorporated and are still incorporating 
changes to rectify challenges in implementation. So far Ghana has succeeded in 
reaching 35% of its population through NHIS and is showing promise in ensuring 
universal health coverage for health (40). The success and challenges of Ghana’s 
NHIS scheme is believed to provide valuable lessons for other African countries 
as well as the developing world where countries are trying to initiate such 
schemes to achieve universal coverage. Bangladesh can benefit from the 
learnings as well. Key lessons learnt from Ghana’s experience are listed in Table 
35. 
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INDIA: PAVING THE WAY TOWARDS UNIVERSAL COVERAGE WITH A PRO-
POOR HEALTH INSURANCE MECHANISM 
India shares quite a few common challenges in health care provision and 
financing as that of Bangladesh. Very low level of total health expenditure as a 
percent of GDP, low public health expenditure, high OOP, dominance of informal 
sector workers in the economy are a few of these health systems challenges. 
India has a few health insurance schemes which are specially designed to serve 
the poor and disadvantaged population. The learning from these schemes can 
prove to be valuable for Bangladesh as well.  
 
HEALTH SYSTEMS IN INDIA 
Health service delivery in India is dominated by the private sector providers. 
People utilize around 80% of out-patient and 60% of in-patient care from private 
practitioners (49). Although the public facilities including primary, secondary 
and tertiary level care in principle is available to the entire population, it 
constitutes only 20% of outpatient care and 40%of inpatient care utilization 
(50).  
Healthcare in India is financed through 4 major sources: out-of-pocket spending 
by households, tax-revenue, social insurance schemes for formal private sector 
workers, civil servants, and military and railway employees and private 
voluntary health insurance schemes. A new source that added to this pool is the 
government sponsored schemes. The remaining share is borne by the private 
firm, external agencies and others. Although the private facilities cost much 
higher than the government facilities, the government services are not free and 
includes OOP expenses for user fees, medicine and other supplies. Informal 
payment, like many other developing countries, is also in existence at these  
public facilities (51, 52).  
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HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEMES IN INDIA 
Health financing through health insurance is present in India. The insurance 
schemes in existence in India can be categorized into three groups: private 
health insurance, community health insurance, government/state sponsored 
health insurance. Although it is difficult to ascertain the exact proportion of 
population covered through any sort of insurance it is estimated that these 
schemes together cover around 25% to 26% of the population as of 2010 (53, 
54). The government sponsored schemes share characteristics common to 
community health insurance in the sense that the schemes are voluntary in 
nature. However, management is not in the hand of the community rather the 
state manages the schemes.  
Health insurance in India was initiated with the aim to ensure access to quality 
healthcare for its population, particularly for the poor (55, 56). Health insurance 
started in India as early as in 1940 when the government of India introduced the 
Employees’ state insurance scheme (ESIS) for formal workers employed in 
private sector. In mid 50s another scheme was rolled out known as the Central 
Government Health Scheme (CGHS)(57). CGHS provided comprehensive medical 
coverage for the central government employees and their families. The scheme 
was funded by contributions from the employee, the employer and government 
subsidies. A few other government schemes also emerged for the railway, 
defense and other civil servants shortly after independence in 1947. In addition, 
the community based health insurance came into existence in India as early as in 
1952 with the establishment of the Student Health Home which was one of the 
outcomes of the communist movement in West Bengal (58) (56). In late 1990s 
the microfinance movement along with the community based health insurance 
led to the introduction of many small scale community-based health insurance 
schemes (56).  
After a long gap, in 2003 the central government of India introduced the 
Universal Health Insurance Scheme (UHIS) to cover poor households mainly 
involved in the informal sector (50, 59). However the scheme could only reach 
3.7 million by the end of 2009. Yeshasvini, a scheme for the members of rural 
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cooperative societies was also introduced in 2003 in the Karnataka state of the 
country.  
However, the formation of the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) in 2005 
aiming at provision of quality healthcare through health insurance initiated the 
big push towards the establishment of various health protection schemes 
throughout the country. A good number of these schemes were government 
sponsored. Among them were the Aarogyasri schemes initiated in two states of 
India, one starting in 2007 and the other in 2009. Both the schemes targeted 
below poverty line population and focuses on tertiary level inpatient care. At the 
national level, the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) established in 2008 is 
the largest voluntary scheme that operates across all states of India targeting the 
below poverty line population and covers inpatient services with secondary care 
focus (60-62). RSBY currently covers more than 33.57 million families (117 
million persons) across 28 States and Union Territories of India (63). In 2010 to 
provide additional benefit on top of RSBY the RSBY plus was launched in the 
state of Himachal Pradesh and it included tertiary care for inpatient services. 
RSBY being the scheme operating on national level the discussion around 
learning from Indian experience in this chapter will mostly focus on experience 
of India with RSBY. 
Service delivery under RSBY which follows a purchaser-provider split model 
(44), is the responsibility of private voluntary health insurance companies. 
However, oversight remains with the state nodal agency. The insurance 
companies empanel hospitals for RSBY. As of July 2010, around 6,000 hospitals 
have been added to the RSBY service delivery network and 70% of these 
hospitals are private. The hospitals bill the insurance companies and the 
hospitals are reimbursed based on a basic form of diagnostic related groups 
(DRG) with a certain cap on reimbursement (up to a maximum of US$ 600 per 
family per year). As most of the DRGs are within the cap limit the patient ends up 
getting a cashless transaction (62).  
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Premium for the social health insurance for the formal sector employees is 
financed by contributions made by the employee and the employer and 
government subsidies. The premium of the government sponsored schemes is 
paid from the government and the state via general tax revenue. There is a 
nominal registration fee that the clients have to pay to become members (62). 
There is no cash payment at the point of service by the clients for the 
government sponsored schemes. The voluntary private health insurance, on the 
other hand, is financed by contribution made by the individuals and the 
employers.   
Health insurance in India has experienced positive gains in some aspects while 
challenges remain in others. The share of social security contribution (including 
CHI, not mandatory health insurance) in private health expenditure in India rose 
from 1.1 to 4.6% between 2000 and 2011 and out-of-pocket expenditure as a 
proportion of private health expenditure dropped from 91.8 to 86.3% over the 
same period (15). Utilization of health services has been documented to increase 
as a result of health insurance (64-66). Particularly the cashless system under 
RSBY is expected to increase utilization significantly (62). Studies have also 
found that health insurance is providing financial protection to its clients in India 
(66). As compared with non-insured, the share of borrowing in total expenses for 
healthcare is found to be lower among the insured (67). At the same time, the 
challenges faced by the national level health insurance scheme in India (RSBY) 
offers valuable learnings in terms of country preparedness in implementing such 
schemes. This is of particular importance for Bangladesh as the current plan of 
the government is to pilot a health insurance scheme that will later be scaled up 
to national level. And most importantly the model that is being designed relies 
heavily on the RSBY model of India.  
 
INSTIGATING FACTORS 
STRONG POLITICAL WILL:  
The major health insurance scheme in India is initiated by the government. It 
was the government that felt the need for a national health insurance mechanism 
 185 
 
to provide financial security to the vulnerable group of society. With a strong 
political push the RSBY was launched initially targeting the below poverty line 
population.  
CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT FOR POOLING RISK FOR HEALTH:  
In 1999, India opened up its insurance market. A regulatory body, the Insurance 
Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA), was set up to regulate and 
promote any types of insurance in India in the best interest of the policy holders. 
An elaborated institutional framework was also established (56, 68). The micro 
health insurance schemes and other schemes of this sort are also regulated 
through this body, which puts a mandate on these schemes to serve the rural and 
below poverty line population (68). Further in 2005, another body named the 
National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) was setup with the primary aim to 
provide quality healthcare particularly to the poor. In 2007 NRHM elaborated its 
policy framework to develop pro-poor health insurance programs (69). At the 
same time the national planning commission also set up a working group on 
healthcare financing.  
 
CBHI CREATING CULTURE OF HEALTH INSURANCE:  
The community based health insurance schemes also contributed in creating an 
enabling environment for health risk protection through health insurance in 
India.  The schemes have provided the health systems of India a useful platform 
to explain the principle of health insurance to the community and mechanism of 
collecting premiums and claims and reimbursement process (70). All the 
government sponsored schemes have used in one way or other the experience 
from the community based schemes that were established earlier. Indian 
government thus welcomes CBHI as a way towards achieving universal coverage 
as well as source of inspiration (56).  
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PARTNERSHIP WITH VARIOUS STAKEHOLDERS:  
From the very beginning of RSBY the scheme took onboard its various 
stakeholders. With the private players RSBY formed a partnership. 
 
STRONG ONLINE CLAIM PROCESSING AND PAPERLESS TRANSACTION:  
RSBY operates on a paperless mode and has a very strong online claim 
processing mechanism which enables efficient management of the scheme. All 
empanelled hospitals install the necessary hardware and software to carryout 
transaction through the smartcard process and to connect to the district server 
of the insurance company. This enables almost real-time data transfer.  
 
FLOURISHING PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET:  
With the private insurance market flourishing in India, competitiveness between 
the existing insurers is increasing. This has resulted in benefiting the 
government schemes as insurers are now willing to quote lower bids against a 
premium rate offered by the government.  
 
CHALLENGES FACED AND SOLUTIONS TRIED 
GAINING SUPPORT OF VARIOUS STAKEHOLDERS: at the initial stage of implementing 
RSBY one of the major challenges was to obtain buy in of government and state 
officials as well as the insurance companies through which services were to be 
delivered. Also the industries providing logistical support (e.g. smartcard for 
identification of beneficiaries) had to be convinced of the potential of such 
national level health insurance schemes. Continued and intensive meetings 
helped in getting everyone onboard by involving them in the scheme design and 
other managerial activities.  
 
BENEFIT LIMITED TO INPATIENT CARE:  
The major government sponsored health insurance scheme in India covers 
inpatient services only and does not cover out-patient care, primary care or high 
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level tertiary care (71). This limits the extent of financial protection provided by 
the schemes.  
 
LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY:  
Although NRHM increased funding for healthcare in India resulting in improved 
infrastructure and increased human resource for health, accountability 
regarding health service provision still remains a challenge for the health 
systems (57).  
 
LACK OF PROVIDER REGULATION:  
This is becoming a major concern for healthcare provision under the health 
protection schemes of the country. This results in low quality of care. Studies 
have found that the insured are not getting any better care than the uninsured 
(72). Over prescription and fee for service is still in existence (56). Clients don’t 
have an effective customer care center to deal with this.  
 
LIMITED RISK POOL:  
The ceiling on maximum number of household members that can be enrolled 
restricts larger households from joining such schemes and thereby limit the pool.  
 
LACK OF AWARENESS:  
Comparatively lower awareness about health insurance is again prevalent in 
India like the other developing countries. This is all the more important as India 
runs a voluntary insurance mechanism. For many of the CBHI schemes of India 
level of awareness among the members about the benefit of the health insurance 
scheme was found to be low or limited. It is more of a concern for schemes that 
are tied to other development activities (e.g. micro finance) (73). It is thus 
suggested that educational and awareness raising activities accompany such 
schemes to make the most out of them.   
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LOW UTILIZATION:  
Although some studies have shown healthcare utilization to increase among the 
insured in India, low utilization is still a problem for the very poor and those 
living in remote areas. The limited utilization of the scheme only benefits the 
insurer and the premium paid out by the government can be considered a sunk 
cost as the scheme is failing to reach those in  greater need (61). This also limits 
the ability of the government sponsored schemes to rescue the poor and needy 
from the catastrophic healthcare costs.  
 
DEVELOPING A FULL PROOF SECURE SYSTEM:   
Preventing fraud through a full proof system was a major challenge. India 
managed to develop a key management system to minimize fraud and ensure 
security. In addition, India managed to standardize all the software and 
hardware and a common guideline regarding usage which ensues 
synchronization between the various state schemes.  
 
  
 
 
SUMMARY FINDINGS  
The salient characteristics of the three country case studies on health insurance are presented in Table 35. 
TABLE 35: SUMMARY FINDINGS ON FACTORS INFLUENCING EVOLUTION OF HEALTH INSURANCE IN CASE STUDY COUNTRIES AND LESSONS LEART 
Country  Factors initiating 
insurance mechanism 
for financing healthcare 
Prepared 
environment before 
launching health 
insurance?  
Challenges faced What worked/ 
measures taken so 
far 
Lessons learnt 
Thailand  Active participation by 
the civil society to push 
for health insurance. 
 
Strong political will in 
face of financial crisis. 
 
Stron stewardship from 
government. 
 
Overall economic 
growth. 
 
Yes. 
 
National health 
insurance act 
passed. 
 
Used experience 
from previous 
health insurance 
schemes  
 
Prepared health 
service delivery 
system to handle 
supply inadequacy.   
Harmonization of the 3 
schemes that coexist in 
Thailand which is 
increasing cost, 
decreasing efficiency. 
 
Lack of cross 
subsidization among 
the different schemes 
results in difference in 
benefit paid out per 
beneficiary, quality and 
range of services. 
 
Human resource 
shortage, mal-
distribution impedes 
Extensive coverage 
under public health 
facility. 
 
Incentive for rural 
recruitment and 
retention of health 
workers helped 
deal with mal-
distribution. 
 
Recent mandate for 
medical graduates 
to undertake 
employment in 
rural areas for 3 
years minimized 
Strong and sustained political 
commitment and civil society 
engagement proved to be the 
strongest driving force. 
 
Strong and well established service 
delivery base facilitates translation of 
entitlements into improved service 
use and health. 
 
Continued effort is required to 
increase quality of services and 
productivity of providers.  
 
Legislative support can tackle 
impediments in implementation. 
 
1
8
9
 
  
 
Country  Factors initiating 
insurance mechanism 
for financing healthcare 
Prepared 
environment before 
launching health 
insurance?  
Challenges faced What worked/ 
measures taken so 
far 
Lessons learnt 
service delivery under 
UCS. 
 
The copayment of 30 
baht deterred coverage 
among the poor and 
informal sector 
workers.   
internal brain 
drain from rural to 
urban facilities. 
 
Strengthening of 
national health 
security office to 
negotiate with 
providers. 
 
Copayment of 30 
baht was 
substituted by tax 
funding which 
increased coverage 
among the poor.  
Increasing government budget by 
multi facet measures like expenditure 
cut, increasing overall national budget 
and shuffling budget from less priority 
areas to serve the disadvantages can 
strengthen health insurance schemes. 
 
Community based/ micro health 
insurance schemes can be a 
temporary way to increase coverage 
for informal sector. 
 
Building research capacity to inform 
policy is necessary  
 
A well managed national MIS system 
can assist efficient scheme 
management. 
 
Technical know-how has been a key 
factor behind success of UCS. 
Ghana Failure of user fee to 
improve quality and 
utilization  
 
Decreasing utilization 
Yes. 
 
A national health 
insurance act was 
passed before 
Educating people about 
risk pooling and pre-
payment for health.  
 
Supply inadequacy. 
Claim settlement 
unit to ensure 
timely 
reimbursement of 
claims and efficient 
Supply adequacy should be ensured 
before initiation of insurance scheme. 
 
Trained human resource is a pre-
requisite for successfully 
1
9
0
 
  
 
Country  Factors initiating 
insurance mechanism 
for financing healthcare 
Prepared 
environment before 
launching health 
insurance?  
Challenges faced What worked/ 
measures taken so 
far 
Lessons learnt 
of public healthcare 
among poor and 
disadvantaged 
 
Political pressure from 
opposition to abolish 
user fee 
 
national health 
insurance established 
in fulfillment of 
election mandate of 
ruling political party 
 
launching the 
insurance scheme 
nationwide. 
 
The experience of 
MHI before the 
initiation of the 
national health 
insurance system 
helped build a 
culture of health 
insurance  
Low infrastructural 
development. 
Lack of coordination 
within NHIS. 
Government is the sole 
funding source for 
NHIS threatening 
financial sustainability. 
Service not yet pro-
poor. 
Capacity inadequacy in 
terms of accreditation, 
monitoring and 
evaluation, quality 
assurance and the like. 
fund management.  
Biometric 
identification being 
tested to avoid 
corruption in 
identification of 
target population. 
To increase 
capacity training 
programs both in-
house and through 
partnerships with 
academic 
institutions, and 
developing 
manuals  
 
implementing health insurance 
schemes. 
Automated claim processing center is 
useful for smooth functioning and 
timely reimbursement to clients. 
 
A monitoring and evaluation unit 
needs to be in place to deal with fraud. 
Periodic clinical audit can be of help.  
Intensive public education programs 
on health insurance needed to 
increase awareness. 
 
Premium payment should be flexible 
in terms of time of payment, mode of 
payment etc. for greater participation. 
Mass community registration can help 
increase inclusion with limited 
resource and effort. 
India Political commitment 
to improve quality of 
healthcare particularly 
for poor 
 
Communist movement 
in West Bengal 
Yes 
Setting  up of a 
regulatory body for 
insurance in 1999 
National Rural 
Health Mission 
(NRHM) setup in 
Lack of awareness 
 
Limited risk pool 
 
Lack of provider 
regulation 
 
Transport support 
of upto Rs. 1000 
per family/year 
helps remove 
financial barrier to 
seek treatment 
(USD 1= Rs.61) 
Low level of public awareness results 
in low risk pool which threatens 
sustainability 
 
Empanelling a large number of public 
as well as private hospitals can create 
a healthy competition between the 
1
9
1
 
  
 
Country  Factors initiating 
insurance mechanism 
for financing healthcare 
Prepared 
environment before 
launching health 
insurance?  
Challenges faced What worked/ 
measures taken so 
far 
Lessons learnt 
initiated a scheme for 
the students 
 
Experience from 
community health 
insurance schemes 
helped build the 
culture for health 
insurance  
2005 and then 
elaborated in 2007 
to provide quality 
healthcare to the 
poor 
 
The national 
planning 
commission set up a 
working group on 
healthcare financing 
Limited utilization by 
the poor and needy 
Lack of provider 
accountability  
 
Smart card based 
identification helps 
avoid fraud and 
misidentification  
two groups of providers and bridge 
the gap in quality of care between the 
two. A purchaser-provider split model 
can be of use. 
 
When targeting poor cashless scheme 
is essential. Cashless transaction 
simplifies claim process and can 
encourage participation. 
 
Majority of the target population were 
illiterate and thus a paperless scheme 
(online claim process) helped greater 
participation.   
 
Making the scheme portable gave 
access to the migrant population of 
the country. 
1
9
2
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CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
 
 
Micro health insurance, the focus of this thesis, has come under discussion in the 
policy arena of Bangladesh in recent times with its mention in the current 
national health financing strategy 2012-32. As elaborated earlier (Chapter 1) the 
current financing strategy of the health sector hinges on establishing a social 
health insurance system on its journey towards achieving universal health 
coverage (1). MHI has been identified as an intermediate step in this journey that 
will allow the country to build its capacity to manage publicly funded large scale 
health insurance schemes (2, 3). As the concept of health insurance is quite new 
for Bangladesh, the financing strategy has identified MHI and/or community 
health insurance to work as a catalyst to introduce health insurance to the 
people of Bangladesh and gradually move towards a national wide system for 
insuring its people from the risk of ill health and the financial catastrophe 
resulting from it. MHI is thus being treated as a means to bridge the gap between 
no insurance for health to insurance at national scale. In this light of strategic 
thinking, the findings of this thesis are expected to contribute to a great extent in 
terms of understanding the prospects and challenges of MHI in a developing 
country like Bangladesh and thereby facilitate the transition from MHI to a social 
health insurance system for the country. The objective of the thesis thus fits well 
into the current health financing strategy of Bangladesh.  
The current chapter will synthesize the findings from the research carried out as 
a part of this thesis and how they relate to the major issues around MHI with 
special focus on low and middle income countries.  
 
CREATING A CULTURE TO INSURE AGAINST THE RISK OF ILL HEALTH 
While insuring health is a common phenomenon in developed countries, the 
culture is almost absent in the developing ones. The advantage of paying in 
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advance for healthcare to secure future health is not well established in the mind 
of the majority of people living in this part of the world (4, 5). Further, with 
limited ability to pay, for the majority of people paying premiums throughout the 
year to ensure healthcare for an unpredictable episode of illness does not appear 
convincing. Literature shows that local communities may spontaneously 
organize themselves against threats to economic survival rather than health care 
costs (6). Thus for countries in the initial stage of MHI implementation, the first 
and foremost challenge would relate to the acceptance of the product and 
increasing the level of understanding. This low level of understanding was also 
demonstrated among the villagers of Chakaria, the study participants (see 
chapter 6). The program people interviewed in our research also expressed this 
as a major challenge in implementing MHI in rural Bangladesh (see chapter 6). A 
few varied methods have been used to create a culture of health insurance in 
other low-income countries. Using popular terms to explain the mechanism of 
health insurance proved to be an effective method. For example in Uganda they 
termed health insurance as ‘association of people who help each other in need’. 
Interestingly the research findings of this thesis also indicate a similar approach 
taken by the program people of Chakaria Health Card Scheme. The low level of 
understanding and confusion around health insurance led the program to use a 
more general term ‘health card’ which was easily accepted by the villagers (see 
chapter 6).  
In addition to understanding the technicality of MHI, studies have documented 
low level of awareness regarding health insurance schemes and their benefits 
among the clients in low-income countries. In India, as documented in chapter 7, 
lack of awareness among the population is a constraint in increasing coverage 
for the national level RSBY scheme which is voluntary in nature. Although the 
government of India pays the premium for the below poverty line population, 
utilization is low due to the clients not being fully aware of the benefits they are 
entitled to.   
In the initial years of MHI schemes, lack of awareness often gives rise to a 
phenomenon where people tend to wait and see if the scheme is worth joining 
and if it can benefit them at all (7). Some of our study participants also expressed 
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preference to remain in their status-quo until the Chakaria scheme has visible 
benefits (see chapter 3 for status-quo theory and chapter 6 for findings) (8). This 
hampers MHIs from reaching a broader base to operate and thereby ensure 
financial viability of the scheme. If an insufficient number of people join to start 
with, a young institution will always struggle to become an attractive 
proposition.  
In convincing these clients, the MHI schemes should have an efficient and active 
marketing team to carry-out the task of informing potential clients about the 
benefits that the members of the scheme are entitled to. The program people of 
the Chakaria scheme reported lack of adequate marketing skills to have delayed 
or hampered their reach to a large number of villagers (Chapter 6).  At the same 
time the importance of increasing the number of scheme members for efficient 
risk pooling under MHI need to be explained to the clients. The broader the 
group of risk-sharing individuals, the lower will be the premiums and the more 
comprehensive the insurance coverage.  
In addition, a good grasp on the theories around decision making under 
uncertainty could play a vital role in this regard.  Theory says people react 
differently to uncertainty based on their attitude towards risk (detailed 
discussion on theories on decision making under uncertainty is presented in 
chapter 3). Framing product propositions and marketing them according to the 
varied group of people has great potential in making the offer attractive to that 
particular group. Thus, further research on how people from different risk 
groups react to different offers of MHI is essential in making it popular and 
building a culture for insuring health in developing countries.    
 
ENSURING EFFECTIVE RISK POOLING: FOLLOWING THE LAW OF LARGE 
NUMBERS 
Effective risk pooling for micro health insurance or any insurance scheme for 
that matter depends on the scheme’s capacity to spread the risk of ill-health 
between the rich and the poor, and between the ill and the healthy. Following the 
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law of large numbers, successful risk pooling that ensures a minimum burden of 
financial consequence of health risk on individuals demands a large client base 
(9).   
 
BANKING ON SOLIDARITY AND QUEST FOR SOCIAL SERVICE  
Two interesting findings from our study need to be highlighted in relation to 
increasing the size of the client pool. One is the understanding about MHI among 
community members of Chakaria that success of an MHI scheme lies in 
solidarity. The second is that many of the better-off respondents opined that, if 
not for their own benefit, MHIs can give them the opportunity to contribute in 
improving the health of their not so well-off neighbors (Chapter 6).  These two 
findings have important implications for MHI schemes in developing countries, 
particularly in settings where solidarity among the community members is 
strong. Earlier studies have also found the success of MHI schemes to be 
dependent on the level of social capital (4, 10, 11). The higher likelihood of NGO 
members joining the Chakaria health card scheme documented in chapter 5 
might also be indicative of the in-built solidarity that the members of such 
development programs share.  
Thus the notion of social service can be used to encourage people to join MHI 
schemes. The dominant religion in Bangladesh is Islam which mandates the 
better-off Muslims to donate a proportion of their income (known as Zakat) 
when their savings exceeds a certain level and it is used as a poverty alleviation 
tool (12). MHI schemes can also think of accessing the zakat funds to subsidize 
premiums for the poor. 
The quantitative findings of the thesis help us identify groups of people who are 
more inclined towards joining the MHI scheme. Results showed that households 
with higher level of education were more likely to join MHI schemes (Chapter 5). 
The influence of education on enrolment in MHI schemes have been documented 
elsewhere (13-17). This could be due to better understanding of the concept of 
health insurance among the educated group. Education has far reaching 
implications in people’s life. Along with it comes access to information on myriad 
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issues, which in turn prompts informed decision-making. The other group of 
people identified was those having membership of development programs 
offered by NGOs, particularly the micro finance programs (Chapter 5). These 
income generating programs give the households access to additional funds that 
they can use to pay for the premium. Another explanation for NGO members to 
join such schemes could be linked with the concept of ‘self-selection bias’ which 
is a condition where the characteristics of the target population or sample that 
causes them to get involved in a group biases the outcome of that group. In other 
words individuals who join development programs might have an inbuilt 
interest to join new schemes that they perceive to be beneficial for their family. 
Additionally involvement with development programs also gives this group 
exposure to knowledge and information, which the other group does not have 
access to or are simply not aware of. 
MHI schemes can bank on these groups of people who are in favor of 
participating in MHI schemes and use them to influence their peer and 
neighbors.  
 
TRUST OVER THE PROVIDER ORGANIZATION 
Due to the fact that MHI is not widespread in developing countries, people tend 
to speculate about its operational mechanism which often results in clients being 
skeptic about its effectiveness. A trusted relationship between the clients and the 
provider organization (both insurer and health service provider) can play a vital 
role in raising the demand for MHI. For the Chakaria health card scheme, the 
integrity of ICDDR,B (the provider organization for the MHI scheme under study) 
resulted in a trusted relationship between the organization and the villagers. As 
a result, people were attracted to the MHI scheme that ICDDR,B offered with the 
belief that the health service would be of superior quality and that as insurer 
ICDDR,B will not mishandle the premiums they pay. The MHI schemes around 
the world, particularly in developing countries, have also been documented to 
experience similar conditions where trust in provider organization boosted 
demand for a particular scheme (18). 
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AN AFFORDABLE PREMIUM FOR MHI: THE RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN 
INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION AND BENEFITS COVERED   
A major challenge for the MHI schemes in the developing countries has been to 
set an appropriate level of premium. MHI schemes around the developing world 
have been found to charge a flat rate premium for its clients. This is primarily 
due to the fact that the client base for MHI schemes are mostly involved in the 
informal sector and charging a sliding scale premium according to people’s level 
of income is complex. However, a flat rate premium tends to make the system 
highly regressive as poor people in this system contribute a higher proportion of 
their income than the wealthier people (19-21). Safe-nets where premium for 
those with lower ability-to-pay are subsidized or exempted have the potential to 
bring in the desired level of equity (19). 
Further, complexity in setting premiums for MHI schemes lie in the fact that 
while the financial viability of any insurance scheme is critical for its long term 
existence, MHIs are primarily designed to ensure inclusion of people with lower 
ability to pay. Therefore, many a times, the organizations designing MHI schemes 
to serve the poor population opt for lowering the premium level in general. This 
is particularly so because studies including the current thesis document lower 
participation among the poor population due to non affordability of the premium 
(13) (chapter 5, 6). This is an intuitive finding, as for the poor, investing money 
in advance to secure healthcare is considered a luxury against the pressing need 
for basic necessities like food, shelter, and clothing. Health becomes a secondary 
issue for these people which gains attention only in case of emergency.  Low 
enrolment in health insurance schemes among the poor was found in Mahajan 
where it is noted that after paying for essential consumption, repayment of 
borrowing, the poor don’t have much left to pay for premiums (22). Building 
safety-nets within the scheme to subsidize services for the poor is a common 
practice in dealing with this challenge.  
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On the other hand, empirical evidence shows that most micro-insurance 
institutions incur losses in their first few years of operation due to the fact that 
they keep the premiums low to attract and retain members (7). However, only a 
good reserve or support from some external partner to make up the shortfall 
between premiums earned and expenses reimbursed can help the MHI scheme 
to survive in such conditions and the scheme can then buildup their client pool to 
reduce risk in future. Otherwise the scheme will be forced to maintain the 
balance between expense and earning either by increasing premiums or by 
truncating benefits both of which will eventually negatively affect demand for 
the scheme. Earlier studies have documented such consequences. Experience 
from the Chakaria Health Card Scheme revealed that low premiums resulted in 
doctors not being available at the health centers round the clock which lead to 
high dropout rates in consecutive years (Chapter 6).   
Further, while MHIs tend to keep premiums low at a rate affordable by all, a low 
price for a product can also signal inferior quality (23). For the case of Chakaria 
scheme the competitors (e.g. village doctors) even tried to use this as a case 
against the scheme with the propaganda that ‘low price means low quality’ 
(chapter 6).  Therefore, MHI schemes in a developing country setting need to 
take these complexities into consideration in designing their product. Methods 
like The ‘CHAT’ (Choosing health plans all together) exercise (24) carried out in 
India to involve the community people in deciding the best combination of 
premium and the product that best suits their need could be tested in 
Bangladesh to make the scheme affordable and acceptable to people from all 
strata of SES (25). Premium levels and products that reflect the affordability and 
need for services of the client have greater potential to attract people from all 
levels of the society (25). 
The role of actuarial science is of great importance in this connection. Many 
countries have learnt the value of actuarial knowledge in scheme design in a 
costly manner where they had set the premium level to reflect client’s ability to 
pay only (26). As a result the premium was too low to ensure financial feasibility.  
 204 
 
Thus for long-term sustainability of the MHI schemes financially viability 
requires attention no less than people’s ability to pay. To attend to the scheme’s 
mandate to include the poor it can build in a safety-net to subsidize premium for 
the poor which has been the case in many other countries. The policy makers 
participating in our study also expressed that the potential of MHI to insure 
people against health risks lies in the scheme’s capacity to protect the poor 
through safety-net programs and affordable premiums. At the same time, the 
schemes need to be designed in a manner that the potential models have the 
capacity to scale up to the national level. It is worth mentioning that the national 
health financing strategy of Bangladesh is also planning to roll out a scheme that 
will completely subsidize the premium for those below the poverty line (1).  
 
NON FINANCIAL BARRIER TO UPTAKE OF MHI 
Affordability of the insurance product is not the sole barrier to uptake of MHI in 
low income countries. The significant impacts of non financial barriers have 
resulted in varying effects of MHI schemes in different parts of the developing 
countries (27-31). As evident from the Chakaria experience, villagers living in 
places far from the health centers were less likely to join the health card scheme 
compared to those who lived nearby (Chapter 5). Low levels of education and 
lower socioeconomic status add to this challenge as has been the case in other 
countries around the developing world (29) (Chapter 5).  
In designing MHI schemes for rural Bangladesh, the provider thus has to 
acknowledge these non financial barriers.  
 
IMPLEMENTING MHI: CAN MICRO FINANCE HELP? 
The link between micro finance and micro health insurance is an interesting one 
and has its implication in effective implementation of MHI programmes in 
developing countries. Micro finance has achieved great success in reaching 
people from lower SES. The famous book “Bankers to the poor” by noble laureate 
Dr. Muhammad Yunus of Bangladesh has argued and demonstrated that access 
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to credit can be ensured for the poor households with impressive rate of 
compliance on loan repayment (32). The Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, one of 
the major micro finance institutes, has shown that poor people can take out loans 
to engage in income earning activities and improve their standard of living.  
On the contrary, it is also true that there are instances where bundling MHI with 
existing MFI schemes has led to loss of clients for MFI due to the higher interest 
rate charged on loans disbursed to pay for the premium for health insurance 
(33). Thus although at a first glance bundling MHI with MFIs may appear 
lucrative, further research to find alternate ways to benefit from the learnings of 
MFI useful for the implementation of MHI needs to be carried out. At the very 
least the MHIs could use the vast reach of MFIs to expand their networks and 
create a client pool that is large enough to efficiently spread the risk of ill-health 
between the rich and the poor, the ill and the healthy and ensure higher value for 
money.  
 
MHI COMPLEMENTING THE NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM 
Despite the challenges of MHI schemes, a well-designed scheme can play a 
complementary role to the national system. The qualitative analysis in this thesis 
revealed the frustration of the community members of Chakaria (a remote rural 
area) with the government services in expressing their preference for an 
alternate health financing mechanism (chapter 6). The dissatisfaction with the 
government health facilities in terms of supply shortage, high patient-doctor 
ratio, long waiting time, unofficial payments and biased treatment for people 
from different socioeconomic status, came up several times in discussion with 
the community members (chapter 6). MHIs can work towards bridging this gap 
between what people need and what the public sector healthcare facilities offer, 
particularly in hard to reach areas. Depending on their suitability, it is also 
possible to use MHIs as insurance providers while healthcare provision is made 
through public and private sector providers, i.e. a purchaser provider split model 
(34). In this connection, the policy makers participating in our study were 
concerned about the possible client loss and resulting inefficient use of public 
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sector resources if an insurance mechanism is introduced that gives clients 
‘freedom of choice’ for healthcare providers (chapter 6). However, international 
experience shows that this model has the potential to induce healthy competition 
in the market and thereby improve quality of services and efficiency in the health 
systems (chapter 7). 
The following section focuses on the essential role of an efficient health 
insurance system as the government of Bangladesh envisions establishing a 
social health insurance mechanism in its journey towards UHC. As mentioned 
earlier the current financing strategy takes MHI as an intermediate step towards 
the establishment of a national-wide health insurance mechanism in Bangladesh 
(1). Therefore, for a successful transition from MHI to a social health insurance 
system, MHI will need to demonstrate that it effectively performs the essential 
roles of a health financing tool.   
 
ESSENTIAL ROLES OF A NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE MECHANISM 
REVENUE COLLECTION  
Revenue collection under health insurance can vary from being financed by an 
earmarked tax like social security tax to general tax revenue. It could also be a 
combined contribution from the client and the employer. Chapter 7 highlights 
experience in the three different countries in this regard. Thailand started with a 
co-payment based method. The deterring effect of co-payment on health service 
utilization later resulted in the Thai government fully subsidizing the premium. 
Thailand currently has achieved universal coverage for health.  In Ghana the 
major share of the fund comes from VAT on goods and services (70%) followed 
by compulsory contribution from formal sector workers in the form of social 
security tax (23%). Premiums from the members on the other hand only fund 
5% of the total revenue.  This system resulted in reduction of OOP expenses to 
some extent but the complete advantages are yet to be realized with the current 
level of enrolment. India, on the other hand, has a revenue collection strategy 
varying from full subsidization from government to combined contribution from 
employer, employee and government.  
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The experience in each of these countries could help Bangladesh design its own 
revenue collection strategy for a national level health insurance scheme. 
Bangladesh has a major share of its population involved in the informal sector 
that makes tax-based revenue collection difficult. Given the limited health sector 
budget, complete subsidization like Thailand might be difficult too if it is to cover 
the whole population. However, the current approach of Bangladesh government 
to fully subsidize the premium for the population below the poverty line (BPL) 
has been adopted from the Indian experience with the expectation that it will 
ensure universal coverage for the BPL population. The effectiveness of this 
approach awaits further investigation. The example of Ghana could also prove to 
be useful in expanding the insurance scheme in Bangladesh to include people 
from all strata.  What the country has to be careful about is that while a mixed 
method could be useful, the coexistence of too many types of schemes will result 
in fragmentation of the resource pool thereby limiting the capacity of the 
schemes to distribute risk across the different groups (21). It has been observed 
that in many low and middle income countries financing reforms followed a path 
where health insurance schemes are solely introduced for the formal workforce. 
In this system better quality health and resources can be focused to already an 
advantaged and organized group, which in another form exacerbates inequities 
in societies and leads to a two-tier system of healthcare provision.  
 
EFFICIENT PURCHASING  
Efficient purchasing is of particular interest for the low and middle income 
countries where resource constraints pull the lever in almost every aspect of 
national planning.  Effective cost containment strategies are necessary to ensure 
efficient purchasing in health systems. At the same time strategies need to be 
sensitive in ensuring universal coverage, access, and quality of services (35). 
Chapter 7 of the thesis discusses the varied approaches taken in the case study 
countries in terms of purchasing health care. Thailand has an efficient 
purchasing mechanism backed by the strong negotiating power of its national 
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security office which is the single purchaser for the majority of the population 
(75%). The closed-ended capitation contracting with diagnosis related group 
(DRG) hospital payment also helped Thailand keep expenditure low. India, on the 
other hand, has not been an efficient purchaser for its RSBY clients. The state 
nodal agency is weak and has not been able to ensure quality healthcare in 
exchange for premiums paid. A strong negotiating power in purchasing 
healthcare could also instigate healthy competition in the market leading to 
improved quality at a reduced price.  
In this connection, the relationship between the purchaser and the provider of 
healthcare services under any insurance mechanism is also of great importance.  
There are varied models the countries can apply depending upon who purchases 
the service on behalf of the clients and who delivers the services included in the 
insurance package. For the case of Bangladesh where public sector facilities 
suffer from low utilization and low satisfaction among the clients, the 
government could think of adopting a purchaser-provider spit (PPS) model 
which will increase the choice of providers and at the same time induce a healthy 
competition between the providers. The PPS model first tested in Finland allows 
the two functions of an insurance mechanism, purchasing and service provision,  
to be distributed between two different parties (34). PPS has the provision to 
include both public and private sector healthcare providers in the scheme and 
provides the clients with access to the providers they prefer, while giving 
purchasers the scope to demand better quality, lower cost services.  The freedom 
of choice of healthcare provider encourages competition amongst the providers 
in terms of delivering quality service. Like other mechanisms PPS also has its 
drawbacks which include providers exploiting the ignorance of patients and 
weakness of purchasers in ordering unnecessarily costly medical services. Again 
a strong purchasing power, stringent regulations and a proper provider payment 
mechanism can control these instances. The mechanism for provider payment 
thus has significant contribution in shaping the outcome of the schemes. The 
learnings from chapter 7 shows India uses a DRG based payment mechanism 
instead of a fee-for-service system which is considered to be too low by some of 
the providers in India and thus instances have been reported where doctors have 
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refused to treat RSBY clients. Thailand, on the contrary, has successfully set the 
DRG based payment at a level that covers costs in most cases. Ghana started with 
a fee-for service mechanism and later moved on to a DRG based payment 
mechanism as fee-for-service was resulting in cost escalation. Capitation again 
has its benefits and disadvantages. In cases it can give rise to provider discontent 
as has been found in Ghana as well as in Nigeria (36). While capitation can result 
in under provision of services, with careful monitoring, strong regulatory and 
quality control audits, it can contribute to cost containment for the schemes.  
 
THE IMPACT OF POLICY 
Political support has played a key role in implementing health insurance 
program to reach universal coverage in many developing countries. This is 
particularly important for Bangladesh where a change in political regime brings 
in changes in all its macro-economic as well as social conditions. The political 
parties in Thailand and in Ghana were the major driving force to implement the 
health insurance schemes in their respective countries. In Thailand the ruling 
political party implemented the insurance scheme soon after a national financial 
crisis. Similarly in Ghana, the mandate to implement national health insurance 
was the winning factor for the political party that came into power in the 
national election. All these point to the importance of key events or windows of 
opportunity like national elections, in bringing in desired changes at the policy 
level. Indeed, creating the policy environment before a country aims for any 
systems reform is crucial as seen in other country studies. In Tanzania, health 
insurance was implemented without necessary legislative changes which 
hindered implementation (37). Likewise Malawi implemented health insurance 
policy in a hurried manner and it resulted in a mismatch between supply and 
demand (38). 
On the legal front, challenges for MHI remain in formulating relevant laws and 
their implementation. Our policy level respondents see the need to formulate 
specific MHI or health insurance act and for smooth operation of the schemes the 
need for claim settlement law which would assist dispute resolution. Having said 
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this, one major concern among the respondents from the ministry of health and 
family welfare of Bangladesh was the lack of coordination between and within 
the various ministries of the government of Bangladesh (Chapter 6).  
 
CONCLUSION 
Health services, by nature, are prone to market failure particularly for the 
difficulties they pose for measuring and monitoring use of resources and quality 
and effectiveness of services. This is what makes health financing all the more 
complex. Programs that are not cautiously managed, regulated, and implemented 
are unlikely to succeed due to the fact that countries vary in terms of conditions 
causing ill health and their financial capacity to protect people from the 
impoverishing effect of ill health (39). The discussion presented in this chapter 
and the rest of the thesis highlights the fact that countries willing to initiate 
health insurance as one of the means of ensuring universal coverage need to be 
flexible in terms of testing and adopting strategies and policies to implement 
health insurance in their own country context. In this connection, the demand 
influencing factors need to be taken into consideration in order for any health 
insurance mechanism to achieve economies of scale. As highlighted in both the 
quantitative and qualitative findings of this thesis, these factors are not only 
related to the characteristics of the clients who demand the services but are 
spread across a wide range of supply-side, institutional and social factors. 
Revisiting and restructuring policies at different stages of health insurance 
mechanism development have played a pivotal role for countries to achieve 
targets. The same mechanism can have a different impact in different settings 
depending on the stage of development of a particular country and its social, 
political and economic context (18, 40-43). Interested countries must therefore, 
set their own priorities for health and the risk protection mechanisms that would 
suit best the achievement of their country specific goals (39). It might prove to be 
effective for a country to have different types of health insurance co-existing to 
serve different groups of the population (44) or have various types follow each 
other in succession (45). It might well be appropriate for Bangladesh to follow an 
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incremental approach at the early stage of the move towards universal coverage 
for health through health insurance by gradually incorporating specific groups of 
people. This would allow the country to build institutional and technical 
capacities to support and sustain the newly developed health financing 
mechanism and at the same time garner adequate political support for future 
scaling up (46). 
However, it is important to realize that creating entitlements by itself does not 
ensure proper utilization of health services by the target population, particularly 
in low-middle income countries. For any health financing reform to succeed it 
should be accompanied by appropriate parallel measures to improve efficiency 
of healthcare delivery.  
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Appendix 1: THE MEMBERSHIP CARD FOR THE CHAKARIA MICRO HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME KNOWN AS “CHAKARIA FAMILY 
HEALTH CARD 
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Appendix 2: CHAKARIA COMMUNITY HEALTH PROJECT SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CENSUS, CHAKARIA, 1999
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APPENDIX 3:  CHAKARIA DEMOGRAPHIC AND HEALTH SURVEY, 2004 
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APPENDIX 5: PRELIMINARY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW WITH MEMBERS AND NON-
MEMBERS OF HEALTHCARD SCHEME IN CHAKARIA   
 
Interview date: 
 
1. Village:  
2. Household number:  
3. Household head name:  
4. Name of respondent: 
5. Age:      6.Sex:               male                  female  
 
7. Occupation: 
 
 
7a. Socioeconomic Status:     poor   non poor   
 
 
Healthcard scheme in Chakaria 
 
             skip 
8. Membership in health card scheme ever:   Yes and continued membership           Q.12,13
      Yes but did not renew                           Q. 12
      No               Q. 9, 10, 11, 13 
 
9. Since when are you a member? ____________________ 
 
10. Why did you join the health card scheme?  
 
11. What benefits did you receive from health card scheme? 
 
12. What was your reason for never enrolling into the health card scheme? 
 
13. Reasons for not renewing 
 
 
14. To you, which was better health service with health card scheme or without health card 
scheme? 
 With health card scheme     why? 
 Without health card scheme    why? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P.T.O 
  
D D M M Y Y 
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Understanding of health insurance and willingness to join micro health insurance schemes  
 
Benefit 
type  
Service Cost  Payment 
mechanism 
Benefit ceiling  
(1 USD=Tk. 84, 2012 
est.) 
Premium  
(1 USD=Tk. 84, 
2012 est.) 
Out-
patient 
services 
Consultation 
at designated 
health centres 
Free of 
charge  
No point of 
service 
payment 
Maximum of 6 
members per 
household per year is 
covered under the 
scheme 
 
Benefit ceiling of Tk. 
54,000/ household/ 
year 
And individual 
household member 
ceiling of Tk. 9,000/ 
household/ year 
Tk. 1000/ 
household/year 
Diagnostic 
tests 
20% 
discount 
on market 
price 
Patient pay 
80% of the 
price out-of-
pocket  
Medicine  20% 
discount 
on market 
price  
Patient pay 
80% of the 
price out-of-
pocket 
In-patient 
services  
Hospital stay, 
operation, 
medicine and 
diagnostic 
No out-of-
pocket 
expenses 
for costs 
not 
exceeding 
Tk 9,000/ 
individual
/ year 
Patients pay 
costs 
exceeding the 
ceiling 
 
Present the above hypothetical health insurance offer. If health insurance is offered in your area:  
 
15. What would be your reason for joining or reason for buying Health insurance?  
 
16.  If you don’t wish to enroll what would be the reason for not enrolling 
 
17. What factors will you consider to continue membership? 
 
18. In your opinion is health insurance necessary for provision of quality healthcare in your 
area?  
Yes  No not sure 
Reason for yes/no: 
 
19.  What do you understand by the term “health insurance”? 
 
 
20. Do you think Health insurance can benefit you?   Yes  No 
  
If yes, Why?        If no, Why? 
 
21.     In your opinion which would be better: current system of health service provision at govt 
facility or healthcare under health insurance scheme? 
Current system of govt health service   why? 
Healthcare under health insurance   why? 
None       why? 
Other       why? 
 
 
_______________ 
Signature of the interviewer      date: 
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APPENDIX 6: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW WITH PROGRAM PERSONNEL 
 
Interview date: 
 
1. Name:  
2. Position held while working for health card scheme:  
3. Sex:  male    female  
4. How long did you work for the health card scheme: 
5. What was your role in the project? 
 
6. What factors helped you in convincing people to enroll in health card scheme? 
 
 
7. What were the operational/programmatic challenges in running the health card scheme? 
(e.g.not enough resource, lack of skill, ) (mention them according to the level of 
importance starting from the most important) 
 
8. Do you think you had enough technical knowledge and skill to operate such a scheme?  
Yes     no   
9. If no, what could have been done to make it easier for you to run the program efficiently? 
 
10. To you, what is the difference between health insurance and other forms of insurance? 
 
11. To you, what is the difference between savings and health insurance? 
 
12. What technique did you use to explain health insurance to people? (e.g. definition, use of 
local term for health insurance) 
 
 
13. What additional skill do you think would be required to run a health insurance scheme in 
your area? 
 
14. To your opinion, does health insurance have the potential to benefit people, particularly 
the poor? 
Yes    why?     No    why? 
 
15. Is health insurance necessary for provision of quality healthcare in your area?  
Yes  No not sure 
Reason for yes/no: 
 
16. To your opinion which is better: govt health service or healthcare under health 
insurance scheme? 
Govt health service at govt facilities   why? 
Healthcare under health insurance   why? 
None       why? 
Other        why? 
 
 
  
 
________________________________             Date :  
Signature of interviewer 
  
D D M M Y Y 
 224 
 
APPENDIX 7: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW WITH POLICY MAKERS  
 
Interview date: 
 
1. Name:  
2. Organization: 
3. Position:  
4. Sex:   male    female  
5. Role in policy making:  
 
 
6. To your opinion does micro health insurance hold the potential for making health 
financing in public sector more efficient?  
7. Yes   why?   No   Why? 
 
 
8. Is health policy in Bangladesh in favor of employing micro health insurance as an 
alternate health financing tool nationally?  
Yes:       
Which factors are favorable? 
   
No:   
Which factors act as barriers? 
 
 
9. If policy is in favor of micro health insurance then what form of health insurance do 
policy makers would prefer for Bangladesh? 
 
 
10. What policy changes need to be brought in to create an enabling environment for micro 
health insurance in Bangladesh? What legislative consequences will this have?   
 
 
11. To your opinion, does micro health insurance have the potential to benefit people, 
particularly the poor?  
 
Yes    why?     No    why? 
12. Is micro health insurance necessary for provision of quality healthcare in Bangladesh?  
 
Yes  No not sure 
Reason for yes/no: 
 
 
13. To your opinion which would make the most efficient use of government budget for 
health? Existing health financing mechanism or health financing under micro health 
insurance? 
Existing health financing mechanism   why? 
Healthcare under health insurance   why? 
 
 
 
 
______________________________    Date:  
Signature of interviewer  
  
D D M M Y Y 
 225 
 
APPENDIX 8: CONSENT FORM FOR HEALTH CARD MEMBERS AND NON-MEMBERS 
Protocol No. PR-12001 Version No.  Date: 00-00-0000 
                                      
Protocol Title:   Problems and prospects of implementing micro health insurance in rural 
Bangladesh: Findings from Chakaria  
Investigator’s name: Shehrin Shaila Mahmood  
Organization: ICDDR,B and The Australian National University  
 
Purpose of the research 
Background : I am a PhD student and as a part of my study I will conduct a research on the health 
card scheme that operated in your area with assistance from ICDDR,B during the time period 
1998-2005. My research will try to find out whether the scheme was considered as an efficient 
health financing tool for the villagers. I would like to interview people who joined and also those 
who did not join the scheme to investigate the factors that influenced the choice to enrol or not to 
enrol. At the same time the research will also aim to assess the level of understanding among the 
villagers about health insurance. The study will also investigate the level of interest among 
villagers to join such schemes and their opinion on the potential of health insurance in ensuring 
access to quality healthcare.  
 
Why invited to participate in the study?  
As the health card scheme was in existence in your village your opinion as a member/non-
member of the scheme would be very useful to fulfil the aim of the study. For this, we are inviting 
you to participate in this study. 
 
Methods and procedures 
If you agree to our proposal of enrolling you in the study: 
I would like you to answer a few questions that will mostly be on your understanding about 
health insurance, the factors that influenced your enrolment/non-enrolment in the scheme, 
which aspects to you would make the scheme more attractive and efficient, your opinion about 
the potential of health insurance to serve as an alternate health financing tool. The interview will 
take about 30 minutes to complete. 
 
Risk and benefits 
We assure you that the study does not involve any physical, financial or other direct/indirect risk 
to you or your household members.  
 
Even though you might not receive any direct benefit by participating in this research and 
providing us with your valuable opinion, the findings from this study will help us to assess how 
far health insurance in the form of micro health insurance will be accepted by people in rural 
Bangladesh. Also, we can asses if micro health insurance can be a solution to the ever rising out-
of-pocket health expenses in a low-income country like Bangladesh. If so, then which aspects of 
micro health insurance would attract people and which need to be amended to cater the needs of 
the clients of a low-income country.  
 
Privacy, anonymity and confidentiality 
I do hereby affirm that privacy, anonymity and confidentiality of data/information identifying 
you/your household members will strictly be maintained. We would keep all information under 
lock and key. None other than the investigators of this research; possible study monitor, and any 
law-enforcing agency in the event of necessity would have access to the information. As my 
program of study is at an overseas university the data related to the study will be taken outside 
the country for analysis; however, any personal identifiable information will be held and 
processed under secured conditions, with access to limited appropriate staff of my organization. 
 
Future use of information 
In case of future use of the information that I collect from you, complete privacy of your 
identification will be maintained. Privacy will also be maintained in case the data is shared with 
other researchers or is presented at conferences.  
Right not to participate and withdraw 
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I should inform you that your participation in the study is voluntary, and you are the sole 
authority to decide for and against your participation. You would also be able to withdraw your 
participation any time during the study. Refusal to take part in or withdrawal from the study will 
involve no penalty or loss.   
 
Principle of compensation  
I am sorry that you will not be provided with any direct financial benefit for participating in this 
study.  
 
Answering your questions/ Contact persons 
I would be happy to answer your questions about the study. (Contact Shehrin Shaila Mahmood, 
phone 880-2-8810021). You can also contact our IRB secretariat (Contact RA, M. A. Salam Khan, 
phone: 9886498 or PABX 8860523-32 ext. 3206) for any further clarification about your right as 
a responded of the study. 
 
If you agree to participate in the study, please indicate that by putting your signature or your left 
thumb impression at the specified space below 
 
Thank you for your cooperation 
 
 
_______________________________________             ____________________ 
Signature or left thumb impression of participant    Date 
 
 
 
_______________________________________             ____________________ 
Signature or left thumb impression of      Date 
Parent/ Guardian/ Attendant 
 
 
_______________________________________            ____________________ 
Signature or left thumb impression of the witness    Date 
 
 
_______________________________________            ___________________ 
 Signature of the PI or his/her representative     Date 
 
 
(NOTE: In case of representative of the PI, she/he shall put her/his full name and designation and 
then sign) 
 
 
(Name and contact phone of IRB Secretariat, RA, M. A. Salam Khan, Phone No: 9886498 or PABX 
8860523-32 Extension. 3206). 
  
 227 
 
APPENDIX 9: CONSENT FORM FOR HEALTH CARD SCHEME PROGRAM PERSONNEL 
 
Protocol No. PR-12001 Version No.  Date: 00-00-0000 
                                      
Protocol Title:   Problems and prospects of implementing micro health insurance in rural 
Bangladesh: Findings from Chakaria  
Investigator’s name: Shehrin Shaila Mahmood  
Organization: ICDDR,B and The Australian National University  
 
Purpose of the research 
Background : I am a PhD student and as a part of my study I will conduct a research on the health 
card scheme that your organization (ICDDR,B) rolled out in Chakaria during the time period 
1998-2005. This study will try to investigate the factors associated with the operation of a micro 
health insurance scheme like yours. Also the study will try to assess the level of knowledge 
among the program people in operating health insurance scheme and identify the prevailing gaps 
in skill and knowledge.  
 
Why invited to participate in the study?  
As you were directly involved in the operation of the Chakaria healthcard scheme your opinion 
will be highly valuable in assessing the feasibility of running such a scheme in rural areas of 
Bangladesh. For this, we are inviting you to participate in this study. 
 
Methods and procedures 
If you agree to our proposal of enrolling you in the study, we will be asking you questions which 
will concentrate on the following issues: 
The operational definition of micro health insurance according to the providers of micro health 
insurance in Chakaria. The level of knowledge and skill on running micro health insurance among 
the program personnel. 
The major challenge in operating micro health insurance schemes in a resource poor setting 
Factors facilitating rolling out of health card scheme in Chakaria 
Factors that can influence efficiency in operating micro health insurance schemes 
The interview will take about 20 minutes to complete. 
 
Risk and benefits 
We assure you that the study does not involve any physical, financial or other direct/indirect risk 
to you or your household members.  
Even though you might not receive any direct benefit by participating in this research and 
providing us with your valuable opinion, the findings from this study will help us to assess from a 
program perspective whether it is feasible to roll out health insurance in the form of micro health 
insurance in a resource poor country like Bangladesh. At the same time from your valuable 
opinion I will be able to identify the gaps in knowledge and skill that demands particular 
attention in making such a program a success. 
 
Privacy, anonymity and confidentiality 
I do hereby affirm that privacy, anonymity and confidentiality of data/information identifying 
you/your household members will strictly be maintained. We would keep all information under 
lock and key. None other than the investigators of this research; possible study monitor, and any 
law-enforcing agency in the event of necessity would have access to the information. As my 
program of study is at an overseas university the data related to the study will be taken outside 
the country for analysis; however, any personal identifiable information will be held and 
processed under secured conditions, with access to limited appropriate staff of my organization. 
 
Future use of information 
In case of future use of the information that I collect from you, complete privacy of your 
identification will be maintained. Privacy will also be maintained in case the data is shared with 
other researchers or is presented at conferences.  
Right not to participate and withdraw 
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I should inform you that your participation in the study is voluntary, and you are the sole 
authority to decide for and against your participation. You would also be able to withdraw your 
participation any time during the study. Refusal to take part in or withdrawal from the study will 
involve no penalty or loss.   
 
Principle of compensation  
I am sorry that you will not be provided with any direct financial benefit for participating in this 
study.  
 
Answering your questions/ Contact persons 
I would be happy to answer your questions about the study. (Contact Shehrin Shaila Mahmood, 
phone 880-2-8810021). You can also contact our IRB secretariat (Contact RA, M. A. Salam Khan, 
phone: 9886498 or PABX 8860523-32 ext. 3206) for any further clarification about your right as 
a responded of the study. 
 
If you agree to participate in the study, please indicate that by putting your signature or your left 
thumb impression at the specified space below 
 
Thank you for your cooperation 
 
 
_______________________________________             ____________________ 
Signature or left thumb impression of participant    Date 
 
 
 
_______________________________________       ____________________ 
Signature or left thumb impression of      Date 
Parent/ Guardian/ Attendant 
 
 
_______________________________________            ____________________ 
Signature or left thumb impression of the witness    Date 
 
 
_______________________________________            ___________________ 
 Signature of the PI or his/her representative     Date 
 
 
(NOTE: In case of representative of the PI, she/he shall put her/his full name and designation and 
then sign) 
 
 
(Name and contact phone of IRB Secretariat, RA, M. A. Salam Khan, Phone No: 9886498 or PABX 
8860523-32 Extension. 3206). 
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APPENDIX 10: CONSENT FORM FOR HEALTH POLICY MAKERS 
 
Protocol No. PR-12001 Version No.  Date: 00-00-0000 
                                      
Protocol Title:   Problems and prospects of implementing micro health insurance in rural 
Bangladesh: Findings from Chakaria  
Investigator’s name: Shehrin Shaila Mahmood  
Organization: ICDDR,B and The Australian National University  
 
Purpose of the research 
Background : I am a PhD student at The Australian National University and my research topic is 
micro health insurance in Bangladesh. The research will look into the feasibility of using micro 
health insurance as an efficient health financing tool in a resource poor country like Bangladesh. 
As you are aware that the health sector of Bangladesh is underfunded where only 4% of national 
budget is being spent on health. The level of out of pocket expenditure is unjustly high compared 
to the ability to pay of the citizens. Therefore you would agree that the country needs alternate 
health financing mechanisms to overcome the resource shortage and safeguard people from the 
sudden financial shock of illness. Health insurance in many countries has proved to be efficient in 
pooling risk and managing health fund to ensure healthcare for all. My research will try to 
understand the factors associated with the uptake of micro health insurance in Bangladesh. In 
particular, a part of my study will investigate whether the policy environment in Bangladesh is in 
favour of rolling out micro health insurance as an alternate health financing mechanism.  
 
Why invited to participate in the study?  
As you hold a valuable position in the policy arena of health in Bangladesh, your opinion will help 
in building a useful discussion around health insurance in Bangladesh. It is for this reason we are 
inviting you to join this study and enrich our findings.  
 
Methods and procedures 
If you agree to join by participating in the interview I will ask a few questions which will focus on 
the following issues: 
The policy environment for health insurance in Bangladesh 
The view of policy makers regarding using micro health insurance or as a health financing tool in 
Bangladesh  
Factors or issues that would influence (negative or positive) the use of micro health insurance in 
a resource poor country like Bangladesh  
The interview will take about 20 minutes to complete. 
 
Risk and benefits 
We assure you that the study does not involve any physical, financial or other direct/indirect risk 
to you or your household members.  
The research findings will help us to assess the policy environment for implementing health 
insurance in Bangladesh.  
 
Privacy, anonymity and confidentiality 
I do hereby affirm that privacy, anonymity and confidentiality of data/information identifying 
you/your household members will strictly be maintained. We would keep all information under 
lock and key. None other than the investigators of this research; possible study monitor, and any 
law-enforcing agency in the event of necessity would have access to the information. As my 
program of study is at an overseas university the data related to the study will be taken outside 
the country for analysis; however, any personal identifiable information will be held and 
processed under secured conditions, with access to limited appropriate staff of my organization. 
 
Future use of information 
In case of future use of the information that I collect from you, complete privacy of your 
identification will be maintained. Privacy will also be maintained in case the data is shared with 
other researchers or is presented at conferences.  
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Right not to participate and withdraw 
I should inform you that your participation in the study is voluntary, and you are the sole 
authority to decide for and against your participation. You would also be able to withdraw your 
participation any time during the study. Refusal to take part in or withdrawal from the study will 
involve no penalty or loss.   
 
Principle of compensation  
I am sorry that you will not be provided with any direct financial benefit for participating in this 
study.  
 
Answering your questions/ Contact persons 
I would be happy to answer your questions about the study. (Contact Shehrin Shaila Mahmood, 
phone 880-2-8810021). You can also contact our IRB secretariat (Contact RA, M. A. Salam Khan, 
phone: 9886498 or PABX 8860523-32 ext. 3206) for any further clarification about your right as 
a responded of the study. 
 
If you agree to participate in the study, please indicate that by putting your signature or your left 
thumb impression at the specified space below 
 
Thank you for your cooperation 
 
 
_______________________________________             ____________________ 
Signature or left thumb impression of participant    Date 
 
 
 
_______________________________________             ____________________ 
Signature or left thumb impression of      Date 
Parent/ Guardian/ Attendant 
 
 
_______________________________________            ____________________ 
Signature or left thumb impression of the witness    Date 
 
 
_______________________________________            ___________________ 
 Signature of the PI or his/her representative     Date 
 
 
(NOTE: In case of representative of the PI, she/he shall put her/his full name and designation and 
then sign) 
 
 
(Name and contact phone of IRB Secretariat, RA, M. A. Salam Khan, Phone No: 9886498 or PABX 
8860523-32 Extension. 3206). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
